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ABSTRACT  
Gendering Flexicurity：The Effects of Flexicurity on Gender Equality 
by  
Szu-Ying Ho  
Advisor: Professor Janet C. Gornick  
Flexicurity is a major labor market strategy that the European Union (EU) Commission 
has adopted; it aims to simultaneously enhance flexibility in response to rapid changes 
and strengthen security in the labor market. Although EU Commission staff have firmly 
asserted that flexicurity will enhance gender equality, a number of feminist scholars have 
expressed doubts that this is the case. However, these academic detractors have thus far 
not proposed any practical quantitative indicators or methods to examine the exact 
relationship between flexicurity and gender equality. Therefore, the major purpose of this 
study is to examine the effects of flexicurity on gender equality using quantitative 
methods. It utilizes micro data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data waves and 
the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) 2005 survey as well as an OECD 
dataset for macro-level flexicurity policy indices. It uses hierarchical modeling to 
estimate the effects of flexicurity policies on (1) on five components of males’ and 
females’ labor market outcomes (i.e., the probability of being employed, of working 
part-time, of being in a female-type occupation, of having a managerial position, or of 
being afforded probabilities for advancement); (2) earnings; and (3) subjective job 
v 
security and employment security. Taken together, this research can shed light on 
flexicurity policies’ effects on different aspects of gender equality: employment 
protection legislation (EPL) does not necessarily exert negative influence on female 
workers’ employment prospects but yields to negative effects on female workers’ 
subjective job security perceptions. At the same time, the effects of active labor market 
policies (ALMPs) seem more inconsistent in regard to female employment prospects, 
while passive labor market policies (PLMPs) do not significantly influence job-loss 
worries for either gender. In other words, the labor institution’s “flexibility” side has more 
negative effects on female workers’ security perceptions, whereas its “security” side still 
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Chapter 1. Background: Flexicurity Policy and Gender 
Equality 
I. The Emergence of Flexicurity as an EU Employment Strategy   
While employers have pursued greater flexibility in the postwar European labor 
market and neoliberal governments have intentionally enhanced the flexibility of labor 
market employment restrictions to attack the high unemployment rate, most European 
countries with long traditions of labor movements have also strongly defended labor rights. 
Consequently, the concept of flexicurity was proposed to reconcile more flexible 
employment1 relationships and declining job security (Tangian, 2007). Although several 
scholars contend that flexicurity is only a special Dutch and Danish phenomenon, it is also 
addressed as the EU-level employment strategy. For example, the EU proposed this 
concept at the Lisbon summit in 2000, and the European Commission adopted flexicurity 
as a top theme after the 2006 meeting in Villach (European Commission 2006a, 2006b).  
Dutch sociologist Hans Adriaansens, a member of the Dutch Scientific Council of 
Government Policy, first proposed the concept of flexicurity. In 1997 the Dutch parliament 
passed the Flexibility and Security Act, which was enacted two years later. This act’s 
specific goal is to allow employers to make greater use of temporary work while 
simultaneously guaranteeing atypical workers2 and typical workers more equal status as 
                                                     
1 Flexible employment indicates that workers can have more freedom to arrange when, where, and how to 
work. However, it also means decreasing job security (by loosening employment protection legislation) and 
enhancing employment security (via more active labor market policies) as compensation. 
2 Atypical workers are workers not on permanent contracts or in full-time jobs. 
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well as similar levels of social protection. Generally, the Dutch and Danish labor market 
models are praised as two realistic and successful examples of flexicurity (European 
Commission, 2006b; Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). 
Several studies suggest that the term flexicurity was first employed in the 1990s by 
Danish Social Democratic prime minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Danish flexicurity 
differs markedly from the Dutch form, emphasizing three crucial elements: low 
employment protection, extensive unemployment benefits, and active labor market policies. 
These are collectively known in Denmark as the “golden triangle.” 
The successful labor market performance of the Netherlands and Denmark in the 
1990s aroused interest in flexicurity in academic circles as well as in the political 
community and among policymakers (Keune and Jepsen, 2007). In 1997, an EU 
Commission green paper made explicit reference to flexicurity, saying it aims “to strike the 
right balance between flexibility and security in the field of modernizing work organization” 
(European Commission, 1997). In 2006, the pathways to flexicurity were the main theme 
of the green paper Modernising Labor Law, and in 2007, the EU Council endorsed the 
publication Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity, which had been issued by the EU 
Commission, and pledged to assist member states “in the establishment and 
implementation of flexicurity strategies which fully take into account their own respective 
specific challenges, probabilities and circumstances” (European Commission, 2007, p.9). 
The following year, the commission launched a public initiative called the Mission for 
Flexicurity, which officially advocates for flexicurity as European labor market policy. 




         Figure 1-1. Timeline of Flexicurity 
 
Flexicurity must be understood within the broader economic and political contexts 
of the European social model (ESM) and the European employment strategy (EES) if we 
are to understand why it was accepted so quickly as part of the EU-level policy agenda. 
Keune and Jepsen (2007) argue that, in addition to the fact that implementations of 
flexicurity in Denmark and the Netherlands were widely hailed as successful, many 
perceived the concept as an alternative to the neoliberal discourse of the labor market that 
dominated debate during the 1980s and 1990s. In other words, the EU accepted flexicurity 
so quickly because it “falls into the realm of the . . . EES” (Keune and Jepsen 2007, p.9). 
Though a positive consensus regarding the merits of flexicurity was arrived at relatively 
quickly, further implementation of the strategy is still the subject of dynamic interactions 
between the EU Commission, Council, Parliament, member states, and social partners (e.g., 
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trade unions and employers’ associations). 
The EES is a prime example of EU soft regulation, including the open methods of 
coordination (OMC)—for example, guidelines and recommendations, sets of indicators for 
monitoring, and policy-learning processes—monitored in large part via member states’ 
peer review (Ashiagbor, 2004). The most crucial drawback of this soft regulation is the 
lack of clear sanctions, and the EES is usually contrasted unfavorably with the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), which sets out clear sanctions of 0.2% of GDP as “non-
interest-bearing deposit[s]” to the EU Commission as a type of fine (Mortensen, 2013). It 
is through soft regulation that member states are asked to translate EU-level policy into 
national labor law. For example, the European Part-Time Work Directive was agreed upon 
in 1997, the Fixed-Term Work Directive in 1999, and the Temporary Agency Work 
Directive in 2008. The main ideas behind these directives are to ensure that atypical 
workers have the same rights and benefits as regular workers and to redress the labor 
market segmentation associated with a multiplicity of different contract types (Fudge, 
2013). Because directives have vertical direct effects but lack horizontal direct effects,3 
Fudge argues that these measures can be viewed as existing between the traditional 
definitions of soft and hard law. 
Several critiques note a tricky situation: that there is no official definition and are 
no concrete standards to inspect the effects of flexicurity. Despite the lack of official 
standards, several scholars still attempt to develop an analytical scheme to explore the 
balance between flexibility and security. Wilthagen and Tros (2004) propose a flexicurity 
                                                     
3 In European law, vertical direct effects protect individuals’ rights against the power of the state, which 
means that individuals can invoke a European provision in relation to the state. Horizontal direct effects are 




matrix to trace this policy: in regard to flexibility, there are external numerical flexibility, 
internal numerical flexibility, functional flexibility, and wage flexibility. The four aspects 
of security, however, include job security, employment security, income (social) security, 
and combination security.4 Job security means the extent of worry about losing one’s 
current job, and employment security means the extent of worry about finding a new job 
that is at least as good as the current one. These researchers contend this matrix can be used 
as “a heuristic tool empirically to trace flexicurity policies as specific trade-offs or at least 
interconnections between flexibility and security.” 
In this project, I choose job security and employment security as my analytical 
targets because the main idea behind flexicurity is to achieve a shift from job security to 
employment security by enhancing active labor market policies (ALMP) (Origo and Pagani, 
2009). ALMP refers to training, lifelong learning, job creation programs and job-search 
assistance. 
The concept of combination security refers to “the certainty of being able to 
combine paid work with other social responsibilities and obligations”; Tros (2004) further 
explains it as a type of work-family balance. But it seems that only Wilthagen and Tros 
stress the importance of combination security and the relationship between gender equality 
and combination security. Interestingly, even Wilthagen and Tros (2004) acknowledge that 
“flexicurity strategies and policies are usually not referred to as such by policy makers and 
legislators” (my emphasis). This finding means that combination security and gender 
equality may not be a priority in the policymakers’ blueprint, but these remain core values 
that many scholars care about. To address this lacuna, I consciously adopt a welfare state 
                                                     
4 The definitions of each kind of flexibility and security will be introduced in Chapter 2.  
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intervention index 5  as the index of combination security, which illustrates specific 
countries’ efforts regarding welfare family policies. 
 
II. Flexicurity and Gender Equality 
When the flexicurity strategy was developed as EU-level policy, the four key foci 
were (1) ALMP, (2) lifelong learning, (3) reformed, modern social security systems, and 
(4) flexible and reliable contractual arrangements. These four principles, however, seem 
only to support the ultimate goal of full employment (Lewis and Plomien, 2009). In 
addition, while the goal of gender equality focuses only on the female employment rate, 
the EU 2007 annual report views the Lisbon target of 60 percent for women’s labor market 
participation by 2010 as having been “achieved.” As a result, researchers have begun to 
pay more attention to young and older people’s employment issues (CEC, 2007b).6  
Official EU statements have firmly stated that flexicurity will enhance gender 
equality. For instance, one of the EU’s eight common principles of flexicurity is that it 
“should support gender equality, by promoting equal access to quality employment for 
women and men and offering measures to reconcile work, family and private life” 
(European Commission, 2007). The same document added that this goal should be 
implemented “by extending provisions on parental leave for fathers [and] providing better 
access to childcare facilities” (30), indicating the Commission’s recognition that family-
related policies are vital for enhancing female employment with the wider goal of 
                                                     
5 The definitions of this welfare state intervention index will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
6 According this article, after the Lisbon target of 60 percent for women’s employment rate is achieved, 
they (EU) will start to focus on other new target groups, such as young and older people. 
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“reducing gender segregation and improving the situation as regards employment and 
social security and transitions” (34). Regarding flexicurity in particular, EU Commission 
staffers contended that the strategy would not only improve the situation of women on 
fixed-term contracts and in part-time jobs but also promote women’s participation in 
“lifelong learning policies and active labor market policies” (p.21). Finally, these 
researchers suggested that flexicurity will “reduce gender gaps in employment, 
unemployment and pay.” 
To judge from this announcement, it would seem that women had been carefully 
integrated into the four main flexicurity strategies. But the European Parliament has 
continually proposed the lack of gender equality concerns in flexicurity, and they have 
doubted that “the Commission communication on flexicurity sets out the principle of 
equality between women and men; its formulation is weak as it does not challenge the 
fundamental inequality between women and men encountered with regard to access to 
participation in the labor market and equal sharing of unpaid work” (European Parliament, 
2007). In addition, Smith and Villa (2010) note the ever-declining role of gender equality 
in the EES, suggesting that while the EES is largely based on soft law, it lacks the longevity 
of hard law when priorities change. These researchers also observe that the Europe 2020 
strategy still accentuates the quantity of jobs rather than their quality. 
Furthermore, a number of feminist scholars contend that these claims of gender 
equality were mere rhetoric that may have pushed women into the labor market without 
due consideration of the quality of the jobs they obtained. 
III. Feminist Critiques of Flexicurity 
Women are usually overrepresented in flexible work but tend not to be entitled to 
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unemployment benefits or other work security benefits. As Figure 1-3 shows, women’s 
part-time employment rates are much higher than men’s, and women with children report 
even higher levels of part-time employment than men do. Men with children under the age 
of six, by contrast, report somewhat lower part-time employment rates than do women with 
children under the age of six. This phenomenon is at the crux of Cipollone et al.’s (2014) 
argument that the liabilities inherent in flexible employment are increasingly borne by 
women and that women who do flexible work are less likely to have access to benefits and 
active employment security policies. Fredman (2004) notes that women are 
overrepresented in nonstandard work, which restricts their access to many important 
worker entitlements, such as unemployment benefits, which full-time workers regularly 
receive. Furthermore, Fredman describes this phenomenon as “the broken promise of 
flexicurity.” Lewis and Plomien (2009) contend that gendered patterns in flexible 
employment tend to exacerbate sexual segregation and gender inequality and that 
flexicurity has not addressed men’s and women’s fundamentally different experiences of 
the labor market. Therefore, many feminists contend that flexicurity strategy has not 
addressed the unequal distribution of unpaid care work, which is mostly performed by 
women. As Lewis (2001) notes, the flexicurity strategy assumes an “individualized adult 
worker model family,” but this assumption ignores the distribution of unpaid care work. 
Additionally, most flexicurity documents seem to assume that security is achieved 
through employment or wages and that part-time work is therefore a benign pathway to 
reconciling family and work responsibilities. Consequently, flexicurity strategies 
emphasize improving the female employment rate rather than job security or work quality. 
Critics of flexicurity have challenged this assumption, arguing that gender equality cannot 
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be guaranteed solely by securing employment for women. Lewis (2001) further argues that 
most work-family policies were adopted to support the goal of bringing more women into 
the workforce, but insufficient attention has been paid to the quality of work and the 
working conditions women endure. For example, the EU Commission’s job-quality 
indicators are “access and participation” (CEC, 2003). 
Similarly to Lewis and Plomien (2009), Fredman (2004) notes that women are 
overrepresented in nonstandard work. From the figures, we can observe the patterns for 
male and female employment in the 1990s and 2000s. Although female employment rates 
have increased considerably over the postwar period (OECD, 2002), in most countries, as 




Figure 1-2. Employment Rates by Gender in the 2000s7 (Source: LIS)8 
                                                     
7 All the tables and figures presented here are assumed in the 2000s. Some captions consciously mention in 
the 1990s and 2000s, and it is because there are the same topics in this research for two different times. 
8 These years’ data are also used in subsequent chapters, which means that I chose these years’ data to link 












Figure 1-5. Female Full- and Part-Time Employment Rates in the 2000s (Source: 
LIS)9 
 
Figure 1-3 shows part-time employment rates for males and females in the 1990s and 
2000s. Female part-time employment was highest in the Netherlands, where it reached 
almost 60 percent in the 1990s and 2000s. Furthermore, while the female part-time 
employment rate decreased slightly in several countries, there was a marked increase in 
Germany, Luxembourg, and Italy.  
Compared to women, men’s share of part-time work in total male employment is 
quite low. In both the 1990s and the 2000s, men’s part-time employment rates were below 
10 percent in all countries. The most important phenomenon is that the female-to-male 
ratio in part-time employment increased greatly from the 1990s into the 2000s in some 
countries; in the Netherlands, for instance, it increased from 6.6 to 11.2.  
                                                     




Figures 1-4 and 1-5 show the full- and part-time female employment rates in the 
1990s and 2000s. In most countries, full-time employment rates increased. Part-time 
employment rates increased in certain countries, however, while in others they did not 
change notably. In the Netherlands, the part-time employment rate increased from 30 
percent to 43 percent, while full-time employment increased from 20 percent to 31 percent. 
By contrast, in Spain, full-time employment increased from 26 percent to 54 percent, and 
part-time employment increased only from 3 percent to 7 percent. These patterns varied 
among countries; therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to further analyze these changes, 
particularly how flexicurity policies have affected them. 
Many important worker entitlements, including unemployment benefits, are 
provided regularly to full-time workers and not offered to nonstandard workers. As 
mentioned before, a number of feminist scholars have addressed the ramifications of 
flexicurity (Lewis, 2001; Fredman, 2004) and the failure to acknowledge the unequal 
distribution of unpaid care work that primarily women do for children, the disabled, and 
the olderly. Although some EU-level documents mention childcare systems, they often 
seem to portray such systems merely as instruments for achieving female employment 
goals. For example, the Joint Employment Report argued that expansion of affordable, 
accessible, high-quality childcare provisions was needed specifically “to allow both 
parents to work” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a). To the extent that 
the goal of gender equality is seen narrowly as increasing women’s employment 
possibilities, women may take on more precarious work so that they can also assume (or 
persist in) major unpaid caregiving responsibilities. For example, the Dutch “one-and-a-
half” earner model allows women to accept both work and family responsibilities but yields 
13 
 
a large share of female part-time workers. Although some scholars contend that this policy 
was built from the bottom up and is well accepted (Visser, 2002), Lewis and Plomien (2009) 
question whether governments should acquiesce to or even applaud this “voluntary” 
inequality. These researchers’ answer appears to be a resounding no: within flexicurity 
strategy, gender equality should not be regarded as a mere stepping-stone on the path to 
full employment but rather as an end in itself. As a result, I argue that gender equality 
cannot be only an instrument for full employment but needs to be an individual goal in the 
flexicurity strategy. 
Flexicurity has also been criticized for promoting strategies that reduce women’s 
benefits from ALMP, at least relative to men’s benefits. Lewis and Plomien (2009) suggest 
that men benefit somewhat more from employment activation measures than women do, 
and Bergemann and Van den Berg (2008) note that, although certain ALMP have more 
positive effects for women than for men, such effects are discernible only in areas with low 
female labor participation rates. 
  To date, such critiques have not proposed practical quantitative indicators that 
would help us examine the relationship between flexicurity and gender equality (Fredman 
2004; Hansen, 2007; Jepsen, 2004; Lewis and Plomien, 2009). Thus, while the research 
discussed above reminds us that the relationship between flexicurity and gender equality 
cannot be taken for granted, it addresses this issue only theoretically. Although some 
scholars have employed descriptive statistics to illustrate women’s overrepresentation in 
temporary or fixed-term work, none have analyzed this phenomenon more deeply or 
examined other labor market outcomes, including but not limited to female labor force 
participation rates and gender wage gaps. Thus, the major purpose of the proposed research 
14 
 
is to examine the effects of flexicurity on gender equality using quantitative methods. 
Finally, the research cited above pays little attention to workers’ subjective sense of 
employment security. Cheng and Chan (2008) found that job insecurity correlates with low 
job satisfaction, low organizational commitment, inferior work performance, and even poor 
health. Green (2009) found that workers in transitional and developing economies worry 
the most about insecurity and that minority groups—including female, less-educated, and 
older workers—suffer more from job insecurity than others. As Origo and Pagani (2009) 
argue, the main idea behind flexicurity is to achieve a shift from job security to employment 
security, but whether this has been achieved in practice remains an open question. For 
example, in Denmark’s style of flexicurity, low employment protection may result in lower 
job security (i.e., a greater risk of losing one’s job), even as strong ALMP guarantees higher 
employment security in the form of greater probability that a person will find another job. 
Conventional wisdom holds that longer tenure leads to improved job and employment 
security. According to Auer and Cazes (2003), however, the relationship between tenure 
and perceived security still requires further exploration. For example, these researchers 
observe that Denmark’s workers had lower average employment tenures than those in other 
EU countries but that a greater share of Danish workers perceived their employment as 
secure. In other words, the relatively lower employment protection legislation (EPL) may 
have caused them to lose jobs more easily, but the more developed ALMP also allowed 
them more easily to find new jobs, which suggests greater employment security. By 
contrast, workers in Japan enjoyed a high average tenure but reported greater insecurity, 
probably due to their country’s lower levels of social protection. In contrast to both Auer 
and Cazes’s (2003) work, which analyzes only average tenure and average subjective 
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security, and Green’s (2009) research, which focuses only on how individual factors 
influence workers’ subjective security, this dissertation will analyze macro and micro data 
together to explore how these two levels may influence individual workers’ job security, 
employment security, and job satisfaction, with special reference to gender differences, 
gender equality, and flexicurity policy. 
 Consequently, it is important to be sensitive to the effects of these two different 
types of EPL (regular job EPL and temporary job EPL)10 and to the asymmetry, trade-off, 
or balance between them, particularly the effects for different genders. The second chapter 
will provide a more detailed discussion regarding the origins, effects, and debates of the 
concept flexicurity. The third chapter will introduce the dissertation’s methodology, 
including the methods, data, and indicators. The effects of flexicurity on labor market 
outcomes, gender earning gaps, and subjective job security perception will be explored 
separately in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Finally, the seventh chapter will present a discussion and 
the study’s conclusions. 
  
                                                     
10 EPL is a composite index, and it measures the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or 
groups of workers. A more detailed definition of EPL will be introduced in Chapter 3, footnote 31. 
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Chapter 2. Origins, Operations, and Effects: A Critical Review 
of Flexicurity 
 
I. Preface: The Partial Deregulation of Labor Markets in the 1990s 
Flexicurity generally means enhancing flexibility in response to rapid changes 
while simultaneously strengthening security for minority groups in the labor market. To 
trace the development of flexicurity more completely requires starting from the partial 
deregulation of labor markets in the 1990s. 
Whereas in the 1970s the discussion of unemployment focused on shocks, the 
persistence of high unemployment for another two decades shifted the discussion from 
shocks to labor market institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). There is a rough 
consensus that in Europe since the 1970s, labor market rigidities (due to the EPL and a 
strong unionization tradition) and less competitive product markets have contributed to 
high unemployment rates and a low capacity to create jobs (Lodovici, 2000). EPL is a 
composite indicator that can measure the “procedural inconveniences” for firing in regular 
contracts, including the period of notice and severance pay for individual dismissals and 
the difficulty of individual and massive dismissals. It is argued that tight regulations on 
firing may deter hiring, thereby reducing labor demand, and hamper a firm’s ability to 
address market uncertainty and economic structural fluctuation. In particular, after the 
OECD’s Jobs Study (1994) was published, most economists and experts recommended 
enhancing labor market flexibility and easing employment protection provisions, as this 
report’s conclusions suggest (Lodovici, 2000; Noelke, 2015; Saint-Paul, 1996).  
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The OECD (2004) report suggests that a process of convergence across OECD 
countries has occurred regarding EPL, but this progress has been driven largely by an 
easing of regulation in countries where EPL was relatively strict at the end of the 1980s. 
While time-series data on the EPL indicators show an overall decline in the stringency of 
dismissal regulations, most of the changes that occurred in the 1990s focused on temporary 
rather than regular employment. In other words, these reforms combined eased temporary 
job regulations while leaving existing job security provisions for regular or open-ended 
jobs’ regulations unaltered (OECD 2004, p.63). However, it is interesting that the OECD 
report also indicates that the relative position of countries across the spectrum of EPL has 
not changed notably since the 1980s. For example, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Canada remain the least-regulated countries, whereas southern European countries are 
still characterized by the most stringent provisions. Two countries are exceptions worth 
noting: France, which originally ranked in the middle of the spectrum, has become among 
the most regulated nations; Italy presents an example of the opposite end in changing 
regulations.  
At the same time, the major differences of overall EPL across those countries 
should be attributed to the different EPL regulations for temporary employment. As the 
OECD (2004) report suggests, France, Greece, Spain, Mexico, and Turkey present the most 
stringent overall EPL among OECD countries while not having particularly rigid 
provisions for regular contracts. In other words, the variation of overall EPL is highly 
influenced by the variation in temporary job regulations, and the most prevalent means of 
reform are easing the use of fixed-term contracts or facilitating the use of workers hired 
from temp agencies. Generally, in the 1990s, the changes in provisions for temporary 
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employment accounted for changes in overall EPL in two-thirds of countries. There 
remained several exceptions, however, among them low-regulated countries adding 
restrictions on temporary employment, such as France in the late 1980s and Hungary, 
Poland, and New Zealand.  
Furthermore, it is argued that the loosening of temporary contract regulations serves 
as a way to circumvent stringent rules on regular contracts, particularly in countries that 
face political deadlocks for loosening EPL for regular jobs. In other words, the deregulation 
of employment protection legislation is a partial reform that eases the use of temporary 
contracts but maintains existing provisions for regular jobs (OECD, 2004; European 
Commission, 2006). As Saint-Paul (1996) explains, incumbent employees are more 
numerous and better organized than the unemployed, meaning that the former usually exert 
greater political influence and power on labor market policy reforms. Furthermore, two-
tiered reforms are particularly achieved when unemployment rises, because these reforms 
do not increase employees’ exposure risk to unemployment. By contrast, across-the-board 
reductions in firing costs will be strongly opposed in times of rising unemployment or sharp 
recession because such reforms threaten incumbent employees’ job security. In other words, 
the need to maintain social consensus or obtain political support is a crucial determinant 
for labor market reforms. Bentolila et al. (2008) even propose a useful indicator of political 
viability of labor reforms, the ratio of the number of workers under permanent contracts, 
to the sum of total employees (permanent and temporary) and the unemployed. If the ratio 
is greater than 0.5, it means that the workers under permanent contracts (or the “insiders”) 
are the median voters, and these workers under permanent contracts also the target the labor 
unions try to protect. By contrast, if the ratio is below 0.5, it means that temporary job 
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workers and the unemployed become the union’s target group. Bentolila et al. (2008) 
further argue that the first Spanish two-tiered employment promotion contract (EPC) 
reforms in 1984 can be understood as the only politically feasible way to create more job 
possibilities while the unions opposed altering the status quo; the indicator was well above 
0.5 in 1984. After this reform, temporary contracts could be used almost without constraint 
but only for seasonal or temporary needs. However, the indicator was lowest (0.48) in 1993 
due to the widespread use of fixed-term contracts and the further increase in unemployment; 
therefore, in 1994, EPCs were virtually eliminated and persisted only for workers older 
than 45 and for long-term unemployment. It is argued that the government endeavors to 
restore the “causality principle”11 in Spanish labor law (Toharia and Malo, 2000). In 
addition to political power, in 1997 the government attempted to make a new balance (or 
trade-off) between greater flexibility for permanent workers 12  and less flexibility for 
temporary ones.    
Taken together, while neoliberal governments intentionally enhance the flexibility 
of employment restrictions in the labor market to attack the high unemployment rate, most 
European Union countries with long traditions of labor movements strongly defend labor 
rights. In this context, the concept of flexicurity was proposed to reconcile more flexible 
employment relationships and declining job security (Tangian, 2007). 
                                                     
11 While temporary contracts could be used almost without constraint in 1984, to restore the causality 
principle means to restore stricter regulations on temporary contracts, so that only seasonal work or other 
temporary work can adopt temporary contracts.  
12 There is a new type of permanent contract with severance payments in cases of unfair dismissal lowered 
to 33 days’ wages per year of service with a maximum of twenty-four months’ wages, but it is restricted to 
workers under 30 or over 45, which can encourage more young and middle-aged workers into permanent 
contract jobs. The trade-off is to impose stricter conditions on the use of temporary contracts and the 
elimination of EPCs (Toharia and Malo, 2000; Bentolila et al., 2008).  
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II. The Origins and the Debate: The Concept of Flexicurity 
Origins and Definitions of Flexicurity 
A number of scholars have contended that flexicurity was the European alternative 
to the “Anglo Saxon flexibility of the labor market mantra” (Auer,2010, p.371), which can 
serve as an alternative to US-styled flexibility and the neoliberal view of labor market 
deregulation (Keune and Jepsen, 2007; Keune, 2008; Auer, 2010). As Keune (2008) 
contends, the fallacy was that this perspective had become too apparent (which means the 
OECD was aware that deregulation is not valid for fighting unemployment), and the 
“OECD retracted many aspects of its radical stance” (95). (Compared with the OECD,13 
which loudly advocated for deregulation in their 1994 Jobs Study). Even the European 
Commission cited Wilthagen’s (1998) statement about flexicurity: “in response to the 
dominant deregulation of 1980s, the notion of flexicurity claims that investment in social 
policies is not a wasteful burden but instead constitutes an economic production factor” 
(p.13). This statement aptly resonates with Esping-Andersen’s (2002) idea of the social 
investment state. 
As for the exact origins of the concept of flexicurity, most scholars agree that this 
concept was first proposed and employed in speeches and interviews by the Dutch 
sociologist and government policy adviser Hans Adriaansens in 1995—particularly in the 
context of the preparation of the Flexibility and Security Act, the goal of which was to 
allow employers greater use of temporary work while guaranteeing more equal rights and 
social security for atypical workers (European Commission, 2006b; Wilthagen and Tros , 
                                                     




2004; Keune and Jepsen, 2007). As Barbier (2007) further argues, these endeavors to 
reform the labor market pertained to a long-term process of reducing inequalities between 
atypical and standard employees in the Dutch context, which only reemphasizes that the 
innovation of flexicurity needs to be understood in a broader context as a response to the 
consequences of the partial deregulation of the labor markets in the 1990s. 
Afterward, Wilthagen (1998) took up and modified this concept in his 1998 
discussion paper. Interestingly, until 2006, the European Commission (2006b) held that 
“the relevant literature is still developing and there is no single definition of the concept 
that is currently universally accepted.” That said, there is still an apparent consensus 
regarding the two origins of flexicurity: in the Netherlands and in Denmark. Consequently, 
the European Commission introduced two sets of definitions in their report Employment in 
Europe 2006.  
The Dutch scholar Wilthagen and his colleagues proposed the first set (Wilthagen 
1998, 2002; Wilthagen and Rogowski, 2002; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; European 
Commission, 2006b). Wilthagen was considered probably the main actor to contribute to 
this word’s installation in Dutch policy forums, such as in academia (Barbier, 2007). For 
example, he proposed flexicurity as a trade-off nexus (see Table 2-1), and this definition 
was also cited in Employment in Europe 2006. 
 
Table 2-1. Flexibility versus Security Trade-Offs (Source: Wilthagen and Tros 2004) 
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According to Wilthagen and Tros (2004), a more comprehensive definition of flexicurity 
is 
a degree of job, employment, income, and “combination” security that facilitates 
the labor market careers and biographies of workers with a relatively weak position 
and allows for enduring and high quality labor market participation and social 
inclusion, while at the same time providing a degree of numerical (both external 
and internal), functional and wage flexibility that allows for labor markets’ (and 
individual companies’) timely and adequate adjustment to changing conditions in 
order to maintain and enhance competitiveness and productivity. (170)  
 
Furthermore, more detailed definitions of these four dimensions of flexibility and security 
are provided below (Wilthagen et al. 2003; Wilthagen and Tros 2004):  
• External numerical flexibility: the difficulty or ease of hiring and firing 
employees and the extent to which fixed-term employment contracts can be used 
• Internal numerical flexibility: the difficulty or ease of changing the quantity of 
labor a firm uses without having recourse to either hiring or separations (through 
changes in working hours, use of part-time or overtime work, etc.) 
• Functional flexibility: the difficulty or ease of changing the working organization 
or the ability of workers and enterprises to adapt to new challenges (multitasking, 
job rotations, etc.) 
• Wage flexibility: the degree of responsiveness of wage costs to economic 
conditions 
• Job security: expectations regarding the tenures of specific jobs 
• Employment security: expectations regarding remaining in work (not necessarily 
with the same employer) 
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• Income security: the degree of income protection in the event that paid work 
ceases 
• Combination security: the ability to combine paid work with other private or 
social activities 
Furthermore, it is argued that one of the main ideas behind flexicurity is to achieve 
a shift from security within a job to security of a job—or a shift from job security (stability 
of the current job) to employment security (lifelong employment opportunities and abilities) 
(EMCO, 2006; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Origo and Pagani, 2009). Consequently, one of 
the sections of this dissertation will explore the effects of flexicurity policies on job security 
and employment security. In addition, it is interesting that when Wilthagen (2002) first 
proposed this nexus, the title of this table was “Flexibility versus Security Trade-Offs in 
the Netherlands,” whereas in a later paper, the title was retitled “Flexibility versus Security 
Trade-Offs” (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004), which suggests the process of drawing from 
empirical reforms in the Netherlands to portray a new regulatory approach that could be 
promoted to EU member states and elsewhere. 
As for the second set of definitions for flexicurity provided in Employment in 
Europe 2006, there is Denmark’s “golden triangle” model, which includes relatively loose 
employment protections, extensive unemployment benefits, and high spending on ALMP. 
Denmark is also argued to be an originator of flexicurity; for example, research suggests 
that the term was first employed in the 1990s by the country’s Social Democratic prime 
minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, who commended his incumbency (1993–2001) as a 
crucial period for the realization of flexicurity (Barbier, 2007).  
    In addition, while several scholars consciously note the need to distinguish between 
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the dissemination processes in academia and the political arena (Barbier, 2007), we can see 
that there is a clear pattern between these two spheres. First, flexicurity attracted 
widespread attention in academia. While the concept was first proposed in the Netherlands 
in the mid-1990s by a sociologist (also a policy adviser in the government) and in Denmark 
(although they mentioned only the combination of the flexible labor market and individual 
social security, not the exact word flexicurity), this concept was quickly developed by 
Wilthagen14 and his colleagues (Wilthagen, 1998; 2002; Wilthagen and Rogowski, 2002; 
Wilthagen and Tros, 2004) as well as by academics in other European countries, such as 
Denmark (Madsen, 2003, 2004), Belgium (Peeters et al. 2008), and Germany (Tangian 
2004, 2006, 2007, 2008). Furthermore, this concept even spread widely beyond Europe—
for instance, to the United States (Kuttner, 2008), Australia (Belchamber, 2010), and Asia 
(Lue and Park, 2013).  
Second, politicians deliberately use this term to portray their labor market reform 
policies. For example, besides Danish Social Democratic prime minister Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen (1993–2001), his Liberal successor, Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2001–2009), 
claimed he invented flexicurity, although a number of scholars commented that the 
emergence of flexicurity is a policy strategy in a specific historical context, not a specific 
person’s innovation (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Bredgaard and Daemmrich, 2012). 
 Third, the successful labor-market performance of the Netherlands and Denmark 
in the 1990s and the intense discussion in academia both aroused interest in flexicurity 
among policy makers at the EU level. In addition, while some scholars (such as Wilthagen) 
                                                     
14 He was later nominated as one of the seven members of the “Expert group on fexicurity” by the 
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs in the European Commission, and he was also the 
chair of this expert group (Barbier, 2007; Klindt, 2011). 
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were “naturally” involved in the policy making process as both scholars and experts, it is 
not surprising that this concept seems quickly to have become the consensus labor market 
remedy at the EU level. In 1997, an EU Commission green paper made explicit reference 
to flexicurity and described its aim as “strik[ing] the right balance between flexibility and 
security in the field of modernizing work organization” (European Commission, 1997). In 
2006, the pathways to flexicurity were the main theme of the green paper Modernising 
Labor Law, and in 2007, the EU Council endorsed the publication Towards Common 
Principles of Flexicurity, which the EU Commission had issued. Flexicurity was also 
incorporated into European Employment Strategy 2007 (and the Lisbon Agenda): guideline 
twenty-one calls for member states “to promote flexibility combined with employment 
security” and to implement employment policies aimed at “achieving full employment, 
improving quality and productivity at work, and strengthening social and territorial 
cohesion.” In 2008, the Commission launched a public initiative called Mission for 
Flexicurity, which officially advocates for flexicurity as European labor market policy. 
Although flexicurity is usually criticized for its openness and vagueness (Keune 
and Jepsen, 2007; USLU, 2016), the EU level provides some clear flexicurity guidelines 
for member states, such as these eight common principles: 
(1) Flexicurity is a means to reinforce the implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy, create more and better jobs, modernise labor markets, and promote good 
work through new forms of flexibility and security to increase adaptability, 
employment and social cohesion. 
(2) Flexicurity involves the deliberate combination of flexible and reliable 
contractual arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, effective 




(3) Flexicurity approaches are not about one single labor market or working 
life model, nor about a single policy strategy: they should be tailored to the specific 
circumstances of each Member State. Flexicurity implies a balance between rights 
and responsibilities of all concerned. Based on the common principles, each 
Member State should develop its own flexicurity arrangements. Progress should be 
effectively monitored. 
(4) Flexicurity should promote more open, responsive and inclusive labor 
markets overcoming segmentation. It concerns both those in work and those out of 
work. The inactive, the unemployed, those in undeclared work, in unstable 
employment, or at the margins of the labor market need to be provided with better 
probabilities, economic incentives and supportive measures for easier access to 
work or stepping-stones to assist progress into stable and legally secure 
employment. Support should be available to all those in employment to remain 
employable, progress and manage transitions both in work and between jobs. 
(5) Internal (within the enterprise) as well as external flexicurity are equally 
important and should be promoted. Sufficient contractual flexibility must be 
accompanied by secure transitions from job to job. Upward mobility needs to be 
facilitated, as well as between unemployment or inactivity and work. High-quality 
and productive workplaces, good organisation of work, and continuous upgrading 
of skills are also essential. Social protection should provide incentives and support 
for job transitions and for access to new employment. 
(6) Flexicurity should support gender equality, by promoting equal access 
to quality employment for women and men and offering measures to reconcile work, 
family and private life. 
(7) Flexicurity requires a climate of trust and broadly-based dialogue among 
all stakeholders, where all are prepared to take the responsibility for change with a 
view to socially balanced policies. While public authorities retain an overall 
responsibility, the involvement of social partners in the design and implementation 
of flexicurity policies through social dialogue and collective bargaining is of crucial 
importance. 
(8) Flexicurity requires a cost effective allocation of resources and should 
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remain fully compatible with sound and financially sustainable public budgets. It 
should also aim at a fair distribution of costs and benefits, especially between 
businesses, public authorities and individuals, with particular attention to the 
specific situation of SMEs. (Auer, 2010, p.373–74) 
 
In addition, the European Expert Group on Flexicurity also provided four 
components for member states to operationalize the concept to “make flexicurity work”; 
the four components are as follows (Bekker and Wilthagen 2008, p.70): 
—Flexible and secure contractual arrangements and work organizations, both 
from the perspective of the employer and the employee, through modern labor 
laws and modern work organizations. 
—Effective ALMP, which effectively help people to cope with rapid change, 
unemployment spells, reintegration, and importantly, transitions to new jobs (the 
element of transition security). 
—Reliable and responsive lifelong learning (LLL) systems to ensure the 
continuous adaptability and employability of all workers and to enable firms to 
keep up productivity levels. 
—Modern social security systems, which provide adequate income support and 
facilitate labor market mobility; they will include provisions to help people 
combine work with private and family responsibilities, such as childcare. 
 
From the above official EU statements, we can see flexicurity is an ambitious policy 
strategy. The major objective of flexicurity is to combat high unemployment rates by 
loosening labor market regulations while enhancing individual workers’ employability 
through ALMP that adapt to the flexible labor market situation. In addition to this major 
goal, the EU official asserts that “flexicurity, as an integrated policy strategy, addresses 
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many of these issues at the same time.”15 Furthermore, flexicurity, it is also argued, can 
“combat asymmetries within the labor market obviously including the gender, age, and 
ethnic dimensions . . . also aim at social cohesion and fighting poverty and exclusion by 
spreading the benefits of safe employment and income security to all citizens” (European 
Expert Group on Flexicurity, 2007). To date, we can see that flexicurity not only has been 
an ambitious policy strategy but was also argued to address (or need to address) many such 
issues at the same time.   
  In addition, it is interesting that to make flexicurity seem a “fair” policy proposal 
for workers and employers, the report argues that “flexicurity is in the interest of both 
employees and employers.” For flexibility, they argue that “workers need ‘active’ flexibility 
(i.e., flexibility geared toward their needs) to be able to combine work and private 
responsibilities; companies need flexibility to anticipate and respond to changing markets 
demands and circumstances” (European Expert Group on Flexicurity, 2007, p.13). 
Ironically, worker flexibility is usually ignored in discussions of flexicurity, while 
employer flexibility, or the ease or difficulty of hiring and firing workers (also known as 
EPL), becomes the major objective in debates on flexicurity. Although the EU report 
actually developed indicators to measure the work-life balance for employees, this 
dimension has still attracted little attention in academia. The developments of the indicators 
will be reviewed more thoroughly in the next section.  
 
Political Economy and the Critiques of Flexicurity 
Flexicurity also needs to be understood in a broader economic and political context 
                                                     
15 European Commission’s 2006 Annual Progress Report, January 25, 2006, COM (2006) 30; pp. 19–20. 
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regarding the ESM and EES. Why is flexicurity being accepted so quickly in the EU-level 
policy agenda? As Keune and Jepsen (2007) argue, in addition to the successful models in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, flexicurity could be an alternative to the bankrupt neoliberal 
discourse of the labor market, which dominated debate in the 1980s and 1990s. In other 
words, the European Union accepted this concept so quickly because it “falls into the realm 
of the EU’s European Employment Strategy” (Keune and Jepsen 2007, p.9). It seems a 
rapid consensus, but it is still in a dynamic process of the interaction among the EU 
Commission, Council, and Parliament; EU member states and social partners; Business 
Europe (the employers’ organization); and the European Confederation and European 
Trade Union Confederations (ETUC, the workers’ organization). 
Furthermore, the EES is a main example of EU soft regulation, and soft regulation 
is also known as the open methods of coordination (OMC) and includes EU guidelines and 
recommendations, a set of indicators for monitoring, and policy-learning process. In 
addition, the monitoring is mostly done by member states’ peer review and EU institutions’ 
surveillance (Ashiagbor, 2010). The most crucial drawback of soft regulation is the lack of 
clear sanctions, and the soft regulation of the EES is usually contrasted with the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU); the latter sets clear sanctions of 0.2% of GDP as “non-
interest-bearing deposit[s]” to the EU Commission as a type of fine (Mortensen, 2013). 
However, soft regulation includes asking member states to translate the EU-level policy 
agenda into national labor law. For example, the European Part-Time Work Directive was 
agreed upon in 1997, the Fixed-Term Work Directive in 1999, and the Temporary Agency 
Work Directive in 2008. The main ideas behind these directives are to ensure that atypical 
workers have the same rights and benefits as regular workers and to attack the labor market 
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segmentation associated with different forms of contracts (Fudge, 2013). Because 
directives have vertical but not horizontal direct effects, Fudge (2013) argues that directives 
could be viewed as being between soft and hard law measures. Furthermore, it was argued 
that the 1957 Treaty of Rome left social and labor market regulations in the hands of 
member states (Keune, 2008; USLU, 2016). Consequently, some researchers further argue, 
compared to the EU’s concrete economic identities (such as the Euro and European Central 
Bank), the lack of legitimacy and identity in the social policy field and member states’ 
reluctance to surrender their competencies to supranational authorities are the main reasons 
for the “soft” character of the EES, the OMC, and policy concepts such as flexicurity 
(Ashiagbor, 2005; USLU, 2016). 
Actually, a number of studies focus on the interactions and even conflicts and 
disagreements among different EU social actors (including the European Union 
Commission, Council, and Parliament as well as EU member states and social partners). 
For example, although the commission of the European Community’s role is usually 
viewed as a disseminator of knowledge and a broker of divergent interests (Keune and 
Jepsen 2007), it actually has its own preferred interpretation of flexicurity. According to 
Keune (2007), the EU Commission’s view on flexicurity is quite clear: 
Flexibility should be provided by low EPL and easy use of flexible contracts while 
security should derive from employment security . . . Its call for modern social security 
remains vague and underspecified . . . Hence the emphasis in the Commission’s 
conceptualization is first of all on increasing flexibility, while security remains much less 
developed. 
As for the Council of the European Union, although it generally approved of the 
eight principles proposed by the Commission, it still had minor revisions in its final version. 
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For example, the reference to insiders and outsiders in the labor market in principles one 
and four were removed. According to Mainland’s (2010) interviews with some important 
decision-makers from EU-level actors, this change resulted from disapproval of this 
dichotomy by some member states and the ETUC. Furthermore, the Council does not like 
the connotations of “taken from the one and given to the other” (p.251). In addition, the 
major difference between the Council and the Commission involves each’s perspective on 
employment protection and flexibility: “The inactive, the unemployed, those in undeclared 
work, in unstable employment, or at the margins of the labor market need to be provided 
with better probabilities, economic incentives and supportive measures for easier access to 
work or stepping-stones to assist progress into stable and legally secure employment.” 
According to Keune (2008), this paragraph represents a clear departure from the 
Commission’s view on the need to loosen employment regulations and flexible contract 
jobs. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Council contends that “Europe needs more 
and joint GOOD WORK . . . Regular employment relationships are indispensable. . . . The 
Member States are called upon to strengthen standard working relationships in accordance 
with their national practice and to limit their circumvention by atypical employment 
relationships” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a). We can see the Council 
emphasizes more the strengthening of regular contract jobs, while the Commission is more 
inclined toward the deregulation of the employment protection legislation. 
The European Parliament also has positions that contradict those of the 
Commission. For example, the Parliament has commented that “the interpretation of the 
Commission’s flexicurity options is too one-sided.” It is fair to say that the Parliament’s 
view is more in line with the Council’s: while the Council emphasizes the importance of 
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“GOOD WORK” in capitals, the Parliament also calls for “the quality of employment.” 
Furthermore, the Parliament has a more straightforward comment on the Commission’s 
position related to the gender dimension: “the Commission’s communication completely 
disregards the obligations and responsibilities” set out in its communications A Roadmap 
for Equality between Women and Men (2006) and Tackling the Pay Gap between Women 
and Men (2007). Compared to the Commission, the Parliament more strongly emphasizes 
lifelong education and training to strengthen transition security, employment security, and 
job security. While commenting that the Commission’s view on flexicurity was “too one-
sided,” the Parliament advocated “a more balanced” view on flexicurity. In other words, 
while most mainstream flexicurity discourse argues that “one of the main ideas behind 
flexicurity is to achieve a shift from job security (stability of the current job) to employment 
security (lifelong employment probabilities and abilities)” (EMCO 2006; Wilthagen 1998; 
Wilthagen and Tros 2004), the Parliament still calls for improving job security (USLU 
2016).  
Similarly, just as there are disagreements among EU-level actors, European Union 
member states also hold different perspectives on flexicurity. According to Mainland’s 
(2010) analysis for the Council’s Employment Committee (EMCO), two coalitions in 
EMCO that have been labeled as “minimalist” and “regulation.” Until 2006, the 
“minimalist coalition” was led by the United Kingdom and associated with Denmark, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, and Spain.16 Poland joined this coalition after 
2004. The major objective of this coalition is to minimize labor market regulations and 
                                                     
16 According to Mainland (2010), Spain joined the regulation coalition after the Socialist electoral victory 
in April 2004, and this example suggests that the national election and political party inclination greatly 
influenced their perspective on the EU level flexicurity debate.  
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emphasize the creation of jobs over the quality of jobs. However, the “regulation coalition” 
is more inclined to extensive labor market regulations and firmly insists on the balance of 
flexibility and security in regard to the flexicurity debate. This coalition includes Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, Greece, and new members such as Hungary, Slovenia, and Cyprus 
as well as—most importantly─the Directorate-General for Employment. According to 
Mainland’s (2010) vivid analyses of the process of the development of flexicurity, it was a 
painful process for the member states to reach consensus. Generally, one of the major 
concerns of member states that remained skeptical about flexicurity was that the entire 
flexicurity discourse overemphasizes the importance of external flexibility, or job security, 
while barely mentioning the extent to which flexicurity will change the European 
unemployment benefits system. Consequently, some Central and Southern European 
governments and trade unions worried that flexicurity was just liberalization in disguise, 
or “the sugar coating on a bitter liberalization pill” (p.242). 
Mainland (2010) also mentions the influences of specific countries on the 
development of flexicurity. For example, the German presidency in the first half of 2017 
was highly skeptical of flexicurity and even sent a letter to the EU Commission (associated 
with the Portuguese and Slovene presidencies), asking them to remove content regarding 
numerical flexibility and job security (such as dismissals and terms of notice) in its work 
in the communication. Although the Commission did not follow this advice, this action still 
illustrates the tensions in the flexicurity debate during the process of reaching a consensus. 
In addition, the Austrian presidency initiated flexicurity in the EU-level discussion; in 
particular, as the United Kingdom quietly resigned from the leading position, Austria 
became the most liberal one in the “minimalist coalition” (though more moderate than the 
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United Kingdom, suggesting that the coalition’s position became more moderate) (Klindt 
2011). The change in the French government, however, and its last-minute support of the 
European social partner organizations were critical in the process of reaching the final 
consensus.  
Mainland (2010) concludes that reaching consensus was possible because the two 
parties made mutual concessions. The supporters of flexicurity succeeded in providing a 
set of concrete, common principles through the EU decision-making process, while the 
skeptics succeeded in downplaying the initial emphases on the transition from job security 
to employment security as well as on the divisions between insiders and outsiders.com 
      Consequently, due to the contested process of reaching consensus on flexicurity, it 
is not surprising that one of the most common comments on flexicurity pertains to its 
“vagueness,” “ambiguity,” and “openness” (Viebrock and Clasen 2009; Auer 2010; USLU 
2016). However, there are two different views on its vagueness. Some scholars contended 
that this vagueness is the one of the crucial shortcomings of flexicurity, because some 
diametrically opposed views or policy strategies can be plausibly argued  to fit the 
flexicurity logics. Consequently, Burroni and Keune (2011) doubt that flexicurity will 
become an invalid policy guide17 due to its inclusiveness to almost all types of labor 
market practices, even contradictory ones. Furthermore, Burroni and Keune (2011) note 
that ambiguity makes all EU-level policy actors endorse the importance of flexicurity at an 
abstract level despite their having very different interpretations of and views on how to 
translate flexicurity into practical policy strategies. For example, while Business Europe 
and the ETUC both seem to approve of the importance of flexicurity, they actually have 
                                                     
17 It means it almost includes all types of labor market policies, even contradictory ones. 
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very different policy preferences on how to “embody” belief in flexicurity. Regarding 
employment protection legislation, Business Europe contends that labor market regulation 
needs more flexible procedures to fulfill companies’ need to fiercely compete in the market, 
while the ETUC asserts that the excessive flexibility of labor market regulation is the main 
cause of precarious jobs. Furthermore, Business Europe argues that loosening EPL will 
create more jobs and employment probabilities, while ETUC is concerned more that 
employment protections can serve as a buffer to give redundant workers time to look for 
new jobs. In regard to unemployment benefits, Business Europe advocates a more 
“employment-friendly” social security system, which means the benefits should not be 
generous enough to discourage rapid reentry into the labor market. Meanwhile, the ETUC 
contends that a comprehensive social security system and generous unemployment benefits 
could be important economic supports that help the unemployed to find suitable new jobs 
(Business Europe 2007; ETUC 2007a, 2007b). We can see that these two social partners 
still have very divergent interpretations of flexicurity; despite their both seeming to agree 
on the broad concept of flexicurity, Business Europe presents most of the employers’ 
opinions, whereas ETUC adheres to labor’s rights and interests. Burroni and Keune (2011) 
further argue that the flexicurity discourses from the two camps “have not overcome this 
labor-capital divide or brought the two sides closer to each other” (79).  
However, the advantage of this ambiguity is to allow everybody to place their 
preferred versions under flexicurity’s broad umbrella (Auer, 2010), and USLU (2016) 
argues that the Commission of the European Communities (2007b) has “deliberately 
instrumentalized the concept’s ambiguity in order to absorb all the main actors into the 
debate in line with its own policy preferences” (p.237).   
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The ambiguity of the definition of flexicurity is also a double-edged sword (like the 
flexicurity concept itself): it allows every important EU-level actor’s policy preferences to 
be included under this big umbrella, but this vagueness also suggests that it is not enough 
to serve as a concrete labor-market reform guideline. Consequently, Keune (2008) has a 
more pessimistic comment on this situation: “today flexicurity is a contested concept that 
is used by a variety of actors to promote their traditional views on labor market reforms” 
(p.92).  
              
Monitoring Flexicurity: Development of the Measurements of Flexicurity 
Despite these conceptual debates about flexicurity, there are still expert groups 
working diligently to develop many useful, comprehensive, and occasionally complicated 
indicators and measurements to assess flexicurity. For example, in one report titled Towards 
a Methodology to Monitor and Analyze Flexicurity (FLC) and Work-Life Balance (WLB) 
Policies in the Member States of the EU, Muffels and his colleagues (2010) propose two 
frameworks of measurements: “a Stock-Flow-Outcome approach (SFO),” which views 
flexicurity as a “state of affairs,” and an “Effort-State-Challenges approach (ESC)” that 
views flexicurity as a “policy strategy.” They further explain that an SFO can usually be 
adopted to capture the agency or decisions of individual agents, while an ESC can usually 
be adopted to capture the institutional dimension or structural part. They list many tables 
of indicators, one of which I cite as an example (Table 2-2). In addition, many reports focus 
on flexicurity policies’ development in specific countries, and they usually adopt the radar 




Table 2-2. EES Indicators and Indicators Proposed by the EMCO-Indicators 
Group (2008, 2009) 
 
 Input Indicator Process Indicator Output Indicator 
Flexible contractual arrangements 
EES Access to flextime Diversity and reasons 




Transitions by type  
Overtime hours 
EMCO OECD’s index of 
strictness of EPL 
Including wage 





% Workers in each 
type of contract 
(permanent, voluntary 
fixed term, part-time) 
Transitions by type 
of contract 
Frequency of 
persons with at least 
the same employment 
security as previous 
year 
Lifelong learning 
EES Public spending on 
human resources 
Investment by 








status, pay level) 
Educational 
attainment of adults 
E-skills 
EMCO Access rules to LLL, 







Active labor market policies (ALMP) 
EES Expenditure on LMP 
measures per person 
wanting to work 
Expenditure on LMP 
measures as % of 
GDP 
Activation/support 










indicator on training 
measures 
Modern social security systems 
EES LMP expenditure on 
supports per person 
wanting to work 
LMP expenditure on 
supports as % of GDP 
Activation/support Poverty risk among 
the unemployed 
EMCO Access rules to 
benefits 
Coverage of certain 
benefits for persons in 
atypical contracts  
In-work poverty risk 
by type of contract 
Dynamic measure 
for transitions from 
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work to inactivity 
Reconciliation of work and private life 
EES Childcare 
Care of dependent 




Inactivity trap after 
childcare cost (lone 
parent with children) 
Employment impact 
of parenthood 
(employment rates for 
women and men 
without and with 
young children) 
 
Lack of care for 
children and other 
dependents (share of 
persons who do not 
work or who work 
less because of lack 
of suitable care 
facilities) 
Drop in theoretical 
replacement rates due 




parenthood and work 
Workers combining 
partial retirement and 
work 
 
Source: Muffels et al. (2010) 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Radar Charts on Flexicurity Input Indicators: Figures for the 




Figure 2-2. Radar Charts on Flexicurity Process Indicators: Figures for the 
Netherlands (Source: EMCO 2009) 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Radar Charts on Flexicurity Output Indicators: Figures for the 
Netherlands (Source: EMCO 2009) 
 
Moreover, Muffels et al. (2010) note that one of most crucial developments with 
flexicurity measures is the increasing use of dynamic indicators, such as the rate of 
transition from one state of employment to another status. In the past, by contrast, the 
40 
 
majority of these indicators were static. Table 2-3 presents different types of transitions:=. 
A type-one transition indicates a transition from permanent employment to permanent 
employment, and it has a + sign, which means upward mobility or transition. A type-two 
transition indicates the transition from permanent employment to self-employment, and it 
has a − sign, which means downward mobility or transition. Following these types of 
transitions, the tables can be illustrated by the percentage of transition types in Figure 2-4,  
 
Table 2-3. Transitions Matrix Employment Transition Security (ETS) (Source: 
Muffels et al. 2010) 
 
Figure 2-4. Employment Transition Security (ETS) by Country EU26, 2005–2006 





which presents the percentage of upward and downward transitions in each country more 
clearly. However, these types of descriptive statistics still cannot help us understand how 
flexicurity policy indicators influence these labor market outcomes (such as transition 
types). Consequently, further regressions or multilevel regressions need to be done to 
untangle these puzzles.   
 
 
III. Effects of Flexicurity    
Effects of Flexibility  
Although EPL’s effects on labor market performance is still a controversial subject 
in both theory and empirical studies, a consensus has developed regarding the effects of 
EPL in recent decades. First, EPL does not exert a significant effect on total unemployment, 
and the main explanation of this result is that strict EPL has two opposite effects: to reduce 
the separation rate from employment into unemployment and to decrease the exit rate from 
unemployment into employment. Consequently, these effects may offset each other (OECD 
2004, 2006; Nickell and Layard, 1999). However, EPL may have different effects on 
different types of unemployment. Nickell (1997) determined that a higher EPL may 
decrease total employment and short-term unemployment but will increase long-term 
unemployment. The OECD (2004) has a similar observation: strict EPL increases long-
term unemployment while reducing the flows into and out of unemployment. In other 
words, employment protection tends to reduce employment fluctuations over the cycle but 
also increases the length of unemployment spells. Consequently, Lazear (1990) argues 
strict employment regulations, such as severance pay requirements, will reduce total 
employment. According to Lazear (1990), moving from no severance pay to three months 
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of severance pay for employees with ten years of service would reduce the employment-
to-population ratio by 1 percent. Most scholars think that stricter EPL will result in “safer 
jobs but longer spells,” and several economic scholars contend that strict EPL may be time 
wasted (Nickell and Layard, 1999) and even damage labor-market performance (Heckman 
and Pagés, 2000). Table 2-4 summarizes the effects of flexibility on labor market outcomes. 
First, we see there are some different measurements that are adopted to capture the level of 
employment protection legislation. While most studies adopted the composite EPL index 
(from 0 to 6) created by the OECD, there are still other measurements, such as the EPL 
index from 0 to 2 (Nickell et al., 2005) or 0 to 1 (Belot and Van Ours, 2000); one study 
uses only the ranking number of twenty countries (from 0 to 20) (Nickell, 1997), while the 
range between every country may not be equal. Therefore, this indicator seems not very 
convincing.  
For the effects of EPL, the empirical studies show mixed results. While some 
studies do confirm the theoretical assumption that stricter EPL would increase 
unemployment or decrease employment (Lazear, 1990; Scarpetta, 1996; Elmeskov et al., 
1998; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Belot and Van Ours, 2000; Heckman and Pagés, 2000; 
OECD, 2002), there are also some findings that suggest there is no significant effect of 
EPL (Nickell 1997; Baker et al. 2005; Nickell et al. 2005). Stiglbauer (2006) reviews some 
studies about the influence of labor market institutions on unemployment, and he also 
found the mixed effects of EPL. In addition, while he considers the influences of other 
labor market institutions to be more “clear” (such as more generous unemployment benefit 
will increase unemployment, and active labor market policies reduce unemployment), he 
even contends that the number of studies that finds no influences on unemployment 
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“clearly outweighs the number of studies that finds that employment protection measures 
raise unemployment” (p.68). Because this work reviews only five studies, the conclusion 
may not be very decisive. However, these messages may help us understand that 
deregulation orthodoxy is not always true. 
To challenge this deregulation orthodoxy, Howell (2005) edited Fighting 
Unemployment: The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy. In this book, he and other 
contributors challenge the “OECD-IMF orthodoxy” by thoroughly reviewing 
representative works in this area (which I also review in Table 2-2) and noting some of the 
critical methodological and statistical issues in those works. Furthermore, while several of 
the studies find only mixed effects of EPL, those authors excessively claim the benefits of 
deregulation. For example, despite the rather weak findings in Elmeskov et al. (1998), 
Baker et al. (2005)18 comment that this work is “less cautious and strongly argues for the 
importance of labor market institutions in the explanation for high unemployment in the 
OECD” (p.93). Additionally, according to Elmeskov et al. (1998), the deregulation 
recommendations are “bitter and hard for many countries to swallow . . . as a result, there 
is a natural tendency in many countries to delay needed reforms . . . or search for alternative, 
sweeter remedies. It requires strong political will and leadership to convince electorates 
that it is necessary to swallow” (p.242). This statement suggests that deregulation is the 
one and only correct reform agenda for most countries; they also believe that deregulation 
is a bitter remedy for most countries and that every country should (and must) swallow it.  
      Moreover, Howell’s book includes many other empirical works that challenge 
deregulation orthodoxy. Although studies increasingly note that EPL may not be the only 
                                                     
18 Baker’s et al. (2005) work is chapter three in this book; the editor, David R. Howell, is also one of the 
chapter’s authors.  
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reason for high unemployment and deregulation not the only panacea, even the OECD 
tempered or changed some of its original recommendations. While easing employment 
regulations is the most important recommendation in its Job Study (1994), the OECD (2006) 
now indicates that there are different combinations of labor market institutions, such as the 
pairing of active or passive labor market policies with the easing of EPL. Consequently, 
these combinations may be viewed as a type of flexicurity. Furthermore, the 2006 OECD 
report mentions that although Anglo and Scandinavian labor market models have good 
labor market performances (i.e., low unemployment and high employment rates), the latter 
however presents more equal distribution. In other words, if we pursue not only good labor 
market performances but also more equal distribution among different classes and genders, 
then we need to pay more attention to the effects (both intended and unintended) of 
different labor market reform agendas. 
 
Effects of Flexibility on Different Groups 
Thus, the next question will be: Who pays for safer jobs? There is considerable 
evidence that a stringent EPL tends to worsen the employment prospects of minority groups, 
such as young people, women, and the long-term unemployed. In other words, these 
minority groups’ employment patterns are more affected than others by the extent of 
employment protection regulation. A number of studies have suggested that EPL strictness 
may negatively influence the young and prime-aged (25–54) women while having positive 
effects on other groups’ employment rates (OECD, 2004). For example, Nickell (1997) 
found that greater EPL exerts a positive effect on prime-aged male workers but has negative 
effects on the entire working-age population and overall labor supply. At the same time, 
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the OECD (2004) and Author (2006) found a negative impact of EPL on youth employment 
rates. Autor et al. (2006) found that stricter employment regulations decrease the total 
employment rate, but the effects strengthen in the case of female and less-educated workers. 
Algan and Cahuc (2006) also found that EPL favors prime-aged males, who are usually 
insiders in the labor market, but harms the employment prospects of the “outsiders,” who 
are usually women and young people. In addition, Jaumotte (2004) found that strict 
employment regulations exert a positive effect on female part-time participation, possibly 
because a high EPL induces firms to resort to part-time contracts to achieve greater 
flexibility. Furthermore, Estévez-Abe and Hethey-Maier (2015) found that strict 
employment protection has negative effects on women’s economic positions compared to 
their partners’, which suggests that greater EPL may decrease married women’s percentage 
of contributions to family earnings and increase their economic dependence. They further 
argue that these are the “gender implications” 19  of strict employment. Despite these 
shortcomings of strict employment regulations, there is still little literature that focuses on 
flexicurity’s effects on gender occupational inequality. Consequently, this research will fill 
that gap, and in the following part, it will review how welfare state policies influence 
gender occupational inequality.    
Some feminist scholars still doubt this supposed negative relationship between EPL 
and minority groups’ labor market outcomes. (2011) contends that the OECD’s (2006) 
report, which suggests that labor market regulations will yield adverse effects on women’s 
employment, refers to only three main studies. The first two are the OECD’s own studies—
                                                     
19 This paper argues stricter EPL decreases married women’s contributions percentage in the household 
and enhance their economic independence. So the “gender implication” is the author wants to argue the 
lower EPL is more beneficial for gender equality in the household. 
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namely, its 2004 and 2006 Employment Outlook studies and a single study by Bertola et al. 
(2002). The OECD (2004, 2006) and Bertola et al. (2002) also argue that a higher level of 
unionization decreases the employment-to-population ratios of young and older workers 
relative to prime-aged workers and prime-aged women relative to prime-aged men and that 
it even raises the unemployment rate of prime-aged women. Rubery (2011) further 
criticizes Bertola et al.’s (2007) work for primarily focusing on the effects of union density 
and for the fact that the OECD (2006) also cites this study as its main evidence. As Rubery 
contends,  
this study hypothesizes that unions will raise wages for groups who, if displaced, 
will still find useful things to do outside the labor force and will not remain 
unemployed. The authors deploy this argument to explain the lack of higher 
unemployment for younger women relative to younger men but prime age women 
do show higher relative unemployment even though many mothers fall into this age 
category. At best the results are too ambiguous for these to form the basis for 
support for policies of labor market deregulation [my emphasis]. (p.1108–1109) 
Moreover, the only other main study quoted, by Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002), 
mainly focuses on the effects on young people.  
While deregulation orthodoxy states that EPL’s rigidities will reduce employment 
probabilities for labor market returners and deter job creation in volatile sectors, Rubery 
(2011) contends that EPL applied to female-dominated sectors will be beneficial for stable 
employment and even promote women’s career continuity. Furthermore, Rubery notes, the 
asymmetry between EPL for regular contracts and EPL for temporary jobs may exacerbate 
the dualization of the labor market. To prevent this situation, the Dutch flexicurity 
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legislation and EU directive that guarantee temporary or part-time workers the same rights 
as regular contract workers and provide temporary workers with appropriate prospects for 
moving to permanent contracts are important solutions to this possible dualization 
(Wilthagen and Tros 2004). 
Similarly, Cipollone et al. (2014) argue that greater EPL and ALMP will have 
negative effects on females’ employment possibilities, but combining only a high degree 
of flexibility with high-level social protection will lead to significant gains in female 
employment possibilities; it is also the crux of flexicurity policies. This was the first study 
to consciously examine the effects of flexicurity policies on women’s labor market 
participation, but the authors did not further explore how flexicurity policies influence 
gender occupational inequality. Consequently, one of the major purposes of this research 
is to reveal how flexicurity policies influence gender occupational inequality. 
Furthermore, Dieckhoff and Steiber (2015) challenge this deregulation orthodoxy 
by noting that men benefited more clearly from stricter employment protection than women 
did, while neoclassical theory asserts that protective labor market institutions are 
detrimental for labor market outsiders (such as women). These researchers also observed 
that the deregulation of temporary contracts did not affect women more adversely than men.     
Howell (2004) also doubts the OECD Job Study’s (1994) labor market deregulation 
orthodoxy, and he further argues that the simple flexibility story is not enough to explain 
labor market performance in specific countries. We need to understand gender and labor 
market regulations by using a more context-specific approach. 
 
Effects of Security: Passive Labor Market Policies 
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Compared to EPL, it seems that there is a more concrete consensus on the effects 
of unemployment benefits (UB). A number of studies conclude that more generous 
unemployment benefits correlated with higher unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; Elmeskov 
et al., 1998; OECD, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Belot and Van Ours, 2000; Bertola 
et al., 2002).  
While it might not be due to the moral hazards of UBs, because unemployment 
benefits inhibit the ability to respond to adverse economic shocks, higher UB replacement 
rates may be a result of—or remedy for—high unemployment. Considering this issue, 
some authors have adopted a lagged unemployment rate as the dependent variable.  
That said, there remain different detailed effects of different aspects of UBs. For 
example, some studies note that UB replacement rates correlate with total unemployment 
(Nickell, 1997; OECD, 1999; Bertola et. al, 2002), others suggest that UB duration 
significantly increases unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000), and others yet do not 
find that UB duration has a significant effect (OECD, 1999). 
Nickell’s (1997) work finds that UBs exert different effects on different groups: the 
UB replacement rate increases total unemployment but has no significant effect on long- 
and short-term unemployment. UB duration shows a significant effect on long-term 
unemployment only. In addition, both the UB replacement rate and UB duration do not 
have significant effects on the labor supply (including all working-population and prime-
aged males), and only UB duration significantly decreases all working-age-population 
employment rates. These findings remind us that some labor market institutions may have 
unintended effects that exacerbate inequalities between insiders and outsiders—so that, for 
instance, prime-aged males are usually less affected by these reforms.  
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However, several scholars attempt to explore the interactions between different 
labor market institutions. According to Elmeskov et al. (1998), there is a significant 
interaction between ALMP and UBs in structural unemployment. As the authors contend, 
this is because the joint effect of generous benefits and high spending on active programs 
raises the reservation wage of the unemployed and may exert a stronger effect on 
unemployment. Given this reasoning, the largest interaction would be expected in countries 
with the highest ALMP. However, the results have not fulfilled this expectation—the 
largest interaction was observed in low-level ALMP countries, followed by high-level 
ALMP and intermediate-level ALMP countries. Consequently, the mechanisms of the 
interaction between UB and ALMP must still be further explored. 
Moreover, some scholars try to test the interactions between UBs and economic 
shocks. For example, economic shocks are found to have a stronger effect on 
unemployment when replacement is high and UB duration is long (Blanchard and Wolfers 
2000), although some studies suggest that there is no significant interaction between the 
UB replacement rate and duration with shocks (Bertola et al., 2002). 
There are several exceptions, however, such as Nickell et al. (2005), who found that 
the UB replacement rate and duration have no significant effect on structural 
unemployment and that there are no significant interactions between labor market 
institutions and economic shocks. 
Finally, some studies present the counter-effect: UB replacement and duration are 
found to significantly reduce unemployment in certain subperiods while increasing or 




Gendered Effects of Passive Labor Market Policies 
 As Sainsbury (1999) suggests, different gender policy regimes result in different 
utilizations of social benefits among men and women and further gender inequality. 
Sainsbury (1999) analyzes men’s and women’s utilization of social benefits in the early 
1980s in Scandinavian countries, and she finds that the strict requirements for old-age 
occupational pensions made a relatively smaller percentage of women than men able to 
receive those pensions. For example, the Norwegian requirement is forty years of 
employment with minimum earnings, and the Swedish requirement is thirty years of 
employment. As a result, only 40 percent of Norwegian and Danish female pensioners get 
old-age occupational pensions, compared to 60–70 percent in Finland and Sweden. 
Sainsbury argues that this is because Norway and Denmark are more in line with the male 
breadwinner and separate gender role regimes, while Finland and Sweden are more 
inclined toward the individual earner-carer model. Sainsbury also notes a tricky situation: 
Norwegian welfare policies have entitled women to social rights as mothers and carers, but 
these policies also make it less necessary for women to enter the labor market. In contrast, 
according to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) argument, low-income transfers in liberal countries 
may lead to an “employment-forcing” effect. This tricky comparison reminds us that every 
policy design must concern not only intended outcomes but also unintended or reverse 
outcomes.  
    Generally, the security side of flexicurity usually includes passive labor market 
policies (PLMP) (such as unemployment benefits) and ALMP (including training, lifelong 
learning, job creation programs, and job-search assistance). Similarly, several scholars note 
the inscribed gender relations in these two types of policies. In regard to unemployment 
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benefits, we can see that many related policies imply the male breadwinner regime or a 
separate gender role regime. For example, as Bosco (1996) suggests, it is usually half as 
likely for unemployed women as for unemployed men to be able to obtain unemployment 
benefits. Jepsen and Meulders (1997) analyze European unemployment benefit systems, 
and they determine women are overrepresented in nonstandard work. As a result, women 
have limited access to unemployment benefits. This is because many countries’ 
unemployment benefits require claimants to have specific work histories, and the duration 
of unemployment benefits also depends on a person’s prior history in the labor market. 
Jepsen and Meulders divide the EU member states into three categories according to their 
degree of dependence on previous work histories and paid contribution. They that find most 
countries (eight of fifteen) are located in the “moderate group,” which means they require 
approximately 50 percent employment in the reference period (e.g., one year of 
employment during the past two years). Women are usually more likely than men to have 
short or discontinuous work histories, which results in limited entitlements for them. In 
addition, unemployment insurance includes specific requirements about work intensity, 
and women’s part-time work histories make them unable to be covered by unemployment 
insurance. For example, in Luxembourg and Denmark, employees need to work in excess 
of fifteen hours per week to receive unemployment insurance. Again, women’s part-time 
work histories result in restricted access to unemployment insurance. In addition to their 
limited access to unemployment benefits, women usually receive lower unemployment 
benefits than men do. As Jepsen and Meulders (1997) suggest, this is firstly due to the 
persisting gender wage gap; unemployment benefits are usually calculated as a specific 
percentage of the previous wage. In addition, unemployment benefits for part-time work 
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are usually for a limited duration or maximum amount.   
      Consequently, Jepsen and Meulders (1997) contend that social security should 
insure individuals against the risk of unemployment but not adopt the family as a unit. This 
argument resonates with the discussion about gender policy regimes: only in the individual 
earner-carer model, where each person can be ensured social security as an independent 
person, are these rights direct rights. In contrast, as Jepsen and Meulders (1997) suggest, 
derived rights indicate a person’s access to entitlements as a spouse or dependent. For 
example, Jepsen et al. (1997) suggest that in certain cases, certain unemployed persons 
may claim higher benefits for their dependent spouses, and they contend that this may be 
a crucial disincentive for women to enter into the formal labor market. As a result, they 
contend that only the individualization of social security will lead to gender equality.      
       The logic of the “family wage” was a prevalent inscribed gender relation in some 
countries’ unemployment benefits systems’ design. As Jepsen and Meulders (1997) argue, 
these derived rights cause women to be viewed as dependents and thus lose access to direct 
unemployment entitlements. In addition, the family wage further legitimates gender 
inequality. For example, Pierson (1990) analyzes the gender debate about Canadian 
unemployment insurance in 1930–1940, finding that the “family wage” was a powerful 
factor in shaping that debate. The legislators contended that they had pursued “gender 
equality” but that this equality “cannot evolve into injustice for men,” because they 
“usually have more dependents than women.” Consequently, both the 1935 act and 1938 
unemployment insurance bill included a dependent share allowance for the “wife.” From 
the above, we can see there are substantial inscribed gender relations in PLMP, including 
unemployment benefits and occupational pensions. 
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Effects of Security: Active Labor Market Policies 
Compared to EPL and UBs, there is a greater consensus on the effects of ALMP in 
reducing unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Stiglbauer, 2006), even though 
there are still studies that do not find a significant effect of ALMP (OECD 1999; Bertola et 
al., 2002; Baker et al., 2005). Moreover, there is even one study suggesting that ALMP 
significantly increase unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).  
In addition to those studies that focus on ALMP’ effects total unemployment, there 
are still numerous studies exploring the efficiencies of individual ALMP programs. For 
example, Kluve (2010) employs a meta-analysis to analyze 137 programs from ninety-five 
different evaluation studies, and he finds that program type is the crucial factor for program 
effectiveness. According to Kluve, direct employment programs in the public sector are 
rarely positive because the created jobs are usually additionally generated. In other words, 
these types of programs cannot effectively enhance individual workers’ employability, 
because these jobs are not close to the ordinary labor market. In Kluve’s meta-analysis, 
direct employment programs are even found to significantly decrease the program’s effect.  
With regard to vocational training, which is usually viewed as the most traditional 
and classic ALMP measure, as Bollens (2011a) suggests, most policymakers firmly believe 
in the effectiveness of vocational training, even though few solid studies support this 
conclusion. In particular, after the Great Recession in 2008, the harsh economic and 
budgetary situation has required more effort to evaluate the results of ALMP. In fact, 
Bollens (2011a) contends that the insight is much more “nuanced,” which means that the 
results of current studies are still mixed. In addition, most studies suggest that training 
courses can certainly have a positive long-term impact, whereas the short-term impact is 
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less favorable. One of the shortcomings of the training program is the so-called “locking-
in effect”: because they follow training courses, unemployed persons may stay unemployed 
for longer periods of time on average than they would had they not followed the training 
(Bollens, 2011b). However, this short-term negative effect may be compensated by the 
positive long-term effect if the unemployed can find better or more-sustainable jobs after 
these training programs. Kluve’s (2010) meta-analysis also confirms this claim: while only 
a few nuanced positive results could be found in the short term, the positive effects of 
training courses are much clearer in the long term. 
 Wage subsidies can also be understood as private sector incentive programs, which 
are meant to encourage employers to hire new workers or to maintain jobs, particularly 
during economic recessions or in hard times. As De Vos (2011) observes, in the 2008 Great 
Recession, the major objectives of European governments’ subsidy mechanisms were 
virtually to protect existing jobs and avoid redundancies but not to create more new job 
possibilities for vulnerable groups. Consequently, these types of programs may sometimes 
even widen the chasm between insiders and outsiders. To solve this problem, De Vos (2011) 
particularly highlights that in times of crisis, ALMP should focus on creating new job 
possibilities for outsiders or enhancing their employability rather than only keeping 
insiders in their current jobs. Furthermore, wage subsidies may have a positive short-term 
effect on enhancing employment, but these programs are often expensive, and their long-
term effects are still not clear. Therefore, Bollens (2011a) suggests these types of programs 
are less recommended for wide use and should focus only on disadvantaged groups that 
have little chance of finding employment, such as disabled people.  
Finally, a number of studies noted that employment search service and sanctions 
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programs are particularly effective for employment, particularly for those with a qualifying 
education, and are also more cost-effective. Furthermore, intensive job-search counseling 
and guidance have been proven to considerably increase participants’ chances of outflow 
from unemployment. For example, according to Denmark’s several natural experiments, 
Andersen and Svarer (2012) concluded that intensive counseling is effective at increasing 
participants’ employment prospects; they also found a shift from more expensive programs, 
such as classroom training, to less expensive programs, such as job training (internship 
with allowance or unemployment benefits).  
 
Gendered Effects of Active Labor Market Policies 
According to Rubery (2002), men have been traditionally viewed as prime 
participants for ALMP. For example, these programs usually require specific eligibility, 
such as status as a benefit claimant or employment in heavy industry or manufacturing. 
However, after the implementation of the EU employment strategy in 1997, several 
countries, including France, Germany, Greece, Austria, and Spain, have set minimum 
quotas or targeted numbers for women. Take Greece as an example: it set a 60 percent 
quota for women in ALMP in 1999, which is equal to the female percentage of the 
unemployment population.        
In addition, Friedlander et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1999) and Stanley et al. (1998) 
all found that ALMP have positive effects on earnings and reemployment rates, and these 
effects were particularly noticeable for adult women. Despite some ALMP’ specifically 
focusing on women, these programs’ effects on gender equality are still mixed. 
Furthermore, there is little consensus about whether ALMP can address unemployment or 
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enhance employment numbers. Furthermore, there is still controversy about what types of 
employment-enhancing programs can actually help enhance employment. A number of 
studies examine individual programs’ effectiveness, but there is still little comparative 
research that addresses gender aspects. 
Bergemann and Van den Berg (2008) conducted a review survey about ALMP’ 
effects for women, and they found almost uniformly positive results for female workforce 
participation. In addition, they found that these programs’ effects for women are greater 
than for men, particularly in countries with relatively low female participation rates. In 
contrast to Kluve’s work, Bergemann and Van den Berg contend that the strongest effects 
are found in skill-training programs, but their paper reviews only sixteen studies, most of 
the results of which were actually mixed; therefore, the most important contribution of 
Bergemann and Van den Berg’s paper may be their noting that ALMP have more positive 
effects for women than for men but only in areas with low female labor participation rates. 
As a result, we can say that ALMP’ effectiveness for gender equality is still uncertain, and 
there is still a lack of comparative studies and macro-level research to examine the different 
effects in different countries and welfare regimes.      
Despite the fact that the training programs may yield a potential risk of the locking-
in effect, other research has found some reverse effects (or even beneficial effects) for 
training programs. Lechner and Wiehler (2011) found that participation in training 
programs is more effective for women than for men—particularly for young women, 
because participation in training courses usually reduces or postpones pregnancies and 
increases attachment to the labor force. This finding is similar to another observation: some 
teenage girls choose nonmarital motherhood not only because of an “accident” or lack of 
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contraceptive technology but also because they perceive a lack of economic opportunity 
for advancement. For example, several scholars have observed that girls who are more 
committed to greater academic and career success are more likely to prevent teenage 
pregnancy (Kearney and Levine, 2012). Colen et al.’s (2006) finding also supports this 
argument: in the US during times of economic expansion, African American women may 
delay childbearing to take advantage of improved educational or job opportunities. In 
addition, the decrease in the unemployment rate is associated with a decrease in African 
American, but not Caucasian, female teenage childbirth. In other words, the expectation of 
future career prospects and participation in training programs have similar effects on 
female workers’ (and particularly women of childbearing age’s) reducing or postponing 
their pregnancies, thus increasing their attachment to the labor force. 
     
Effects of Flexicurity Policies: A More Comprehensive Assessment 
To date, one of the shortcomings of current flexicurity evaluation and assessment 
reports has been that assessments usually focus only on descriptive or correlative results 
(despite some expert groups’ having already created many useful, comprehensive, and even 
complicated indicators and measurements). In addition, many reports focus on flexicurity 
policies’ development in specific countries, and they usually adopt radar charts to monitor 
flexicurity development in specific countries. Although this type of data can help us trace 
a specific country’s development deeply, it lacks a further, comprehensive explanation 
about how flexicurity influences many important labor market outcomes.  
However, there remain several important lessons that we can learn from these 
evaluation reports. For example, in Evaluation of Flexicurity 2007–2010: Final Report 
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(Smith et al., 2012), the authors adopt four indicators to trace the impacts of the 
implemented flexicurity policies on labor market outcomes. These include increasing 
employment security, facilitating employment transitions, reducing labor market 
segmentation, and reducing gender disparities. Regarding employment security, this report 
analyzed only some employment rates (including total, female, and youth employment 
rates) and unemployment rates (including total, youth, and long-term unemployment rates). 
The second is more interesting because one of the major goals of flexicurity is to facilitate 
labor market transitions, including from education to the labor market, from unemployment 
to employment, from job to job, and from one employment status to another (such as from 
part-time work to full-time work). Here the focus is only on the shift from precarious 
employment to more stable employment. This indicator is critical to the flexicurity debate 
because while some scholars contend that flexible work can be a stepping-stone for stable 
jobs, other scholars suggest that atypical jobs are usually dead-end jobs. According to this 
report, in the post-2007 period, the highest levels of transition to more stable employment 
were observed in the Eastern European cluster, while the lowest were found in the Anglo-
Saxon cluster. However, the extent of precarious employment is also among the lowest in 
the Anglo-Saxon cluster. Continental, Southern European, and Nordic countries occupy the 
middle ground in terms of transitions. 
There are only a few studies that have adopted multilevel methods to trace the 
effects of flexicurity policies (rather than focus only on correlation or on macro labor 
market outcomes, such as the unemployment rate), and Muffels’s (2013) work is among 
the most important in this group. Muffels examines the impact of flexicurity policies on 
labor market transitions, and he further defines two types of transitions: integrative 
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transitions (referring to transitions from fixed-term jobs to permanent jobs and reentry into 
employment) and exclusionary transitions (referring to exits from employment). EPL for 
regular contracts is found to have a significant negative effect on voluntary job mobility 
and on transitions from temporary jobs into permanent ones. However, EPL for temporary 
contracts significantly increases the transitions from temporary jobs into unemployment. 
At the same time, EPL for regular contracts significantly increases transitions from 
unemployment to temporary jobs, while EPL for temporary contracts significantly 
decreases transitions from unemployment into permanent jobs. Taken together, these 
results seem to confirm the deregulation argument: that stricter EPL deters stable 
employment and increases nonstandard employment. However, Muffels’s (2013) study 
also found that the generosity of unemployment benefits increases transition probabilities 
from temporary jobs into permanent jobs; this finding corresponds to the job-matching 
argument, which suggests that more generous unemployment benefits serve as better 
economic backups for job seekers and lead to better or matching jobs (Gangl, 2006).   
In addition, several studies consciously examine the interactions between different 
labor market institutions, such as between EPL and ALMP and between ALMP and PLMP. 
As mentioned before, Cipollone et al. (2014) found that combining a high degree of 
flexibility and a high level of security yields positive effects on female employment 
prospects, and it is also the crux of flexicurity policies. At the same time, this research 
clearly indicates the threshold effect: only when the flexibility indicator (EPL) is above 
1.77 and the security indicator (percentage of expenditures on ALMP and PLMP by GDP) 
exceeds 1.6620 will there be a positive effect on the female employment rate. However, 
                                                     
20 Because it is a composite indicator, it does not have substantive meaning. For further discussion, please 
see chapter three, footnote 31. 
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except for this study, most literature treats EPL and LMP as separate policy measures, and 
the interactions between these two factors remain still less explored. 
 
IV. The Welfare State Paradox21: The Welfare State Facilitates Women’s 
Not Only Labor Force Participation but Also Gender Occupational 
Inequality   
 
While Esping-Andersen (1990) propose a threefold typology of welfare state 
regimes, many feminist scholars contend that this framework makes no reference to gender 
inequalities and ignores the family as an important dimension in welfare state analysis 
(Orloff, 1993). Decommodification, the heart of his typology of welfare states, “occurs 
when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood 
without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.21–22); work is defined as paid 
work and welfare as policies that permit, encourage, or discourage the decommodification 
of labor. Lewis (1997) argues that this construct misses the importance of unpaid work, and 
it resonates with Orloff’s (1993) emphasis on family. In other words, Esping-Andersen’s 
notion of decommodification implies an assumption about women usually assuming 
unpaid work in family, while only male workers can participate in the labor market and 
enjoy the benefits that decommodifcation entails. In this context, feminist welfare scholars 
contend that access to paid work give women more autonomy in marriage (Orloff, 1993). 
In other words, “commodification” is potentially emancipatory (Orloff 1993, p.318). As a 
result, participation in the labor market is crucial for women’s emancipation and economic 
                                                     
21 There are many different kinds of Welfare State Paradoxes, but this term only refers to that kind of 




To date, there much literature has focused on the contributors to female labor force 
participation, and one heated debate concerns the effects of the welfare state on women’s 
employment patterns. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that welfare regime types can 
predict female employment patterns because the specific public policy features of different 
regimes can shape women’s specific workforce participation trajectories. More precisely, 
female employment levels should be highest in social democracies (due to the large 
demand from the public sector and the extensive supply resulting from the generosity of 
family policy), moderate in liberal countries (which are largely driven by market forces), 
and lowest in conservative corporatist countries (due to the traditional gender labor division 
in the household and maternal policies that encourage mothers to stay at home and take 
care of their children).  
However, several feminist scholars contend that Esping-Andersen’s welfare state 
typology loses the ability to predict women’s part-time employment in different clusters, 
and a number of studies note the variation in each cluster. For example, Norway has 
reported lower levels of not only female employment but also public support compared to 
other Nordic countries (Leira, 1992; Borchorst, 1994).    
Furthermore, Gornick’s studies suggest that specific welfare state characteristics 
exert a greater influence on women’s employment patterns than the overall welfare state 
regimes do (Gornick, 1999; Gornick et al., 1998). For example, Gornick et al. (1998) note 
that specific welfare characteristics, such as generous public childcare and parental leave, 
lead to a decrease in the “child penalty,” suggesting that these work-family reconciliation 
policies can efficiently relax women’s care responsibilities and enhance mothers’ 
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employment regardless of whether a country is socially democratic. Rønsen and Sundström 
(2002) found that women who were entitled to paid leave had higher employment rates 
than noneligible women. Cipollone et al. (2014) also found that institutional supports, 
including family subsidies and parental leave, positively influence women’s employment 
prospects. 
At the same time, the welfare state can serve as an employer to enhance women’s 
workforce participation by providing substantial employment opportunities in the public 
sector. More specifically, the extension of the welfare state usually indicates the expansion 
of the public sector in health, education, and social services, areas usually dominated by 
female workers. This expansion is observed because the welfare state represents a 
considerable part of the modern labor market in creating more public employment 
opportunities through ALMP. Consequently, a number of studies have noted that the level 
of welfare state extension positively influences women’s labor participation (Kolberg, 
1991; Kolberg and Esping-Andersen, 1991). Therefore, to consider the effect of the welfare 
state as an employer, the percentage of the total workforce employed in the public social 
service sector will be part of the indicator to capture the availability of public services that 
the state provides as well as the welfare state’s extent as an employer (Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006).  
Despite these benefits for women’s employment, there is still a heated debate 
regarding the generosity of the welfare state, which may result in negative outcomes in 
terms of women’s labor participation. Specifically, different types of welfare state policies 
may have different effects on women’s employment. For example, more publicly funded 
childcare systems or higher-quality, more affordable childcare may release mothers’ caring 
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burdens and afford women more choices and greater freedom to take market-paid work. 
Consequently, a number of studies have suggested that more attractive childcare options 
will increase maternal employment and that the higher cost of childcare has a negative 
impact on maternal employment (Blau and Robins, 1988; Kimmel, 1995; Leibowitz et al., 
1992; Ribar, 1992). 
By contrast, parental leave has more complicated effects on female employment, 
and there are more controversial debates regarding this policy measure. For example, long 
parental leave may result in unintended outcomes. More specifically, it may encourage 
women to stay at home for a long time, and such lengthy career interruptions may harm 
women’s human capital, even limiting their opportunities for training or promotion. 
Furthermore, because women take longer parental leaves than men do, such long absences 
may discourage employers from hiring women. Consequently, too generous a work-family 
policy may actually worsen gender equality. As for empirical studies, the effects of parental 
leave on women’s employment are still mixed. Paid maternity and extended parental leaves 
are known to increase women’s labor market attachment (Ruhm, 1998; Ruhm and Teague, 
1995; Jaumotte, 2004); in particular, family leave coverage increases women’s likelihood 
of returning to employment after childbirth (Waldfogel et al., 1999). Furthermore, Gornick 
et al. (1997) and Gornick and Meyers (2003) have found that the gender gap in employment 
rates is lower in countries that provide paid leave.   
By contrast, other studies have found that long-term maternity and parental leave 
negatively effect gender equality in the labor market. Ruhm (1998) found that parental 
leave is associated with reductions in women’s relative wages for extended durations. 
Gupta et al. (2008) also found that long-paid maternity leave has an adverse effect on 
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women’s wages; therefore, they argue that extensive family-friendly systems may become 
a “system-based glass ceiling” for women’s career advancement. That said, most studies 
have suggested that leave durations of up to six months are neutral in their effects on 
relative wages (Bertrand et al. 2010; Ruhm 1998; Waldfogel 1999).  
Furthermore, the other serious unintended outcome of lengthy family leaves is  
occupational sex segregation. As Stier and Mandel (2009) contend, although paid parental 
leave is likely to push more married women into the labor market, lengthy leaves might 
lock them into “feminized sectors,” where wages are lower because the sectors are female 
dominated. Additionally, an increase in the women’s labor supply in reaction to leave 
policies may result in increased “crowding” in female-dominated jobs and a consequent 
drop in wages (Summers 1989). 
In addition, Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) further examine welfare state 
policies’ effects on the gender wage gap and occupational sex segregation. Regarding the 
gender wage gap, Mandel and Semyonov (2005) found that gender-related earnings 
disparities are less pronounced in countries with more developed family policies, but they 
also argue that these lower earnings differentials should be attributed to these countries’ 
more egalitarian wage structures rather than to their family policies. In other words, the 
level of welfare state intervention does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the gender 
wage gap. As for occupational sex segregation, Mandel and Semyonov (2006) argue that 
the welfare state has a crucial, twofold effect on female labor participation: the welfare 
state facilitates women’s access to the labor market but not to powerful or desirable 
positions. Furthermore, nations with more developed welfare policies and larger public 
service sectors tend to have high concentrations of women in feminized occupations. This 
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important reflection on welfare state policies reminds us that welfare state policies may 
have many different unintended outcomes, and we need to be more cautious regarding these 
diverse effects. 
 
V. Wage Structure: An Alternative Explanation for the Gender Wage 
Gap 
 
As Blau and Kahn (1992) suggest, two factors can contribute to transnational 
variations in the gender wage gap. One consists of gender-specific characteristics, such as 
gender discrimination, indicating that women receive differential treatment even though 
men and women are equally qualified. Gornick (1999) further interprets it as women’s 
labor market “positions,” suggesting women’s labor market positions relative to men’s.22 
The other factor is grounded in overall wage structures, particularly the magnitude of wage 
dispersion. To clarify, wage structure can be defined as the returns to qualifications (skills) 
and job sectors (occupations and industries), and it has different effects (Blau and Kahn 
1992, 1996; Blau and Winkler 2017). 
Generally, variations in the gender wage gap across countries largely confirm 
Esping-Andersen’s threefold welfare state regimes: gaps are most pronounced in the liberal 
market economies of English-speaking countries. However, corporatist (continental 
European countries) and Social democratic economies (Nordic countries) have generally 
reported lower gender wage gaps than the liberal countries have. It is argued that more 
centralized wage-bargaining systems are associated with lower interfirm and interindustry 
wage disparities, are often characterized by conscious policies to secure low-wage workers 
                                                     
22 It means women’s earnings relative to men’s in the wage structure. 
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(regardless of gender), and “may indirectly reduce the gender pay gap” (Blau and Kahn 
1992, 1996).  
This association can be observed clearly in Figure 5-1 (in the results section), which 
presents the relationship between overall EPL and general wage dispersion (measured by 
a ninety-to-ten ratio). The liberal market economies of English-speaking countries, such as 
the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which are concentrated in 
the left side of the figure, indicate lower overall EPL and greater wage inequality. However, 
for the lower wage inequality group, although slightly cut across welfare state regimes, we 
still can see loose clusters: Social democratic countries are in the middle of the area, while 
the corporatist economies occupy the right area of the figure, which is characterized by 
strong union traditions and stricter labor market regulations. As Blau and Kahn (1992, 2003) 
contend, highly centralized wage-setting mechanisms, high union density, and strong 
collective bargaining power can efficiently contribute to lower wage dispersion. And as 
they reemphasize, American women have relatively higher human capital and wages than 
women in other developed economies, but there remains a substantial gender wage gap, 
which may be due to the unequal overall wage structure. 
This division of the contributors to gender earning inequality is meaningful because 
these two arguments may have different policy implications (Gornick, 1999). For example, 
while American women enjoy higher wages than women in other countries and the United 
States has had a stronger commitment to and legislation for antidiscrimination than most 
other countries, the United States still reported the largest gender gap among advanced 
countries, a result of the extremely unequal wage structure in the United States (Blau and 
Kahn, 1996).  
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In addition, Gornick and Jacobs (1998) argue that social policy affecting women’s 
overall employment and policy that influences the overall wage structure may be more 
promising avenues for promoting women’s situation in the labor market, particularly in 
countries bearing a great magnitude of wage dispersion. Their argument resonates with 
Gornick’s (1999), in which gender inequality is attributed to the overall wage structure and 
to policies aimed at enhancing overall wage structure, such as strengthening union 
bargaining, and creating more centralized wage-setting mechanisms. However, if gender 
inequality can be attributed to women occupying lower positions than men in the labor 
market, then we should focus on policy that specifically aims to raise women’s pay and 
other workplace gender equality measures. However, as Whitehouse (1992) reveals, 
centralized industrial relations and sustained expenditures on ALMP are more likely to 
deliver relatively high earnings for women, while gender equality legislation did not have 
clear effects on gender earning equality. Consequently, Whitehouse argues that the 
emancipatory potential of gender equality legislation is best practiced within a collective 
rather than liberal framework. This conclusion implies that wage structures have a greater 
influence on gender earning equality than gender-specific factors do, even if we 
acknowledge that the different reasons for the gender wage gap require us to adopt different 
policies to handle it.  
Moreover, as Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) argue, the welfare state 
facilitates women’s access to the labor market but not to powerful or desirable positions. 
In addition, these researchers contend that gender-related income disparities are less 
pronounced in countries with more developed family policies, but it should be attributed 
to these countries’ more egalitarian wage structures rather than to their family policies. 
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However, the effects of flexicurity on the gender wage gap remain less discussed. 
Thus, the first purpose of this dissertation is to examine how flexicurity policies affect the 
gender wage gap in different countries. The second purpose is to examine whether, when 
lower gender income differentials emerge in countries with strong flexicurity policies the 
results reflect developed flexicurity policies or egalitarian wage structures. 
    
VI. Flexicurity and Job Security Perception 
It is argued that one of the main ideas behind flexicurity is to achieve a shift from 
“security within a job” towards “security of a job”, or a shift from job security (stability of 
the current job) to employment security (lifelong employment probabilities and abilities) 
(EMCO, 2006; Wilthagen, 1998; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004). Workers’ perceptions of 
security are crucial for the successful implementation of flexicurity policies (Chung and 
Oorschot, 2011). Job and employment security not only have vital consequences for mental 
and physical health and well-being but also have a considerable influence on employees’ 
work motivation, organizational commitment, and even productivity (Ashford et al., 1989; 
Clark et al., 2010; De Witte and Näswall, 2003; Ferrie, 2001). 
However, it remains unclear whether this concept is achieved in practice. 
Conventional wisdom holds that longer tenure leads to higher job and employment security; 
however, some research finds adverse effects of this relationship. According to Auer and 
Cazes (2003), in the Danish style of flexicurity, low employment protection may result in 
lower job security (i.e., a higher risk of losing one’s job); however, strong, active labor 
market policies guarantee higher employment security in the form of a higher probability 
that an individual will find another job. Additionally, these authors find that Denmark’s 
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workers have shorter average employment tenure than do workers of other EU countries, 
although a higher share of Danish workers perceive their employment as secure. In contrast, 
workers in Japan enjoy a long average tenure but report greater insecurity, which may be 
due to their country’s lower levels of social protection. The relationship between tenure 
and perceived security requires further exploration.  
    Gender is vital to understanding perceptions of work security due to the fact that 
women are overrepresented in non-standard work, experience restricted access to many 
important worker entitlements, and disproportionately suffer from the precarious work 
conditions (Fredman, 2004). Jepsen (2004) contends that women are more often affected 
by “bad” flexibility than men are. “Bad” flexibility refers to flexible jobs that are low 
quality, dead end, and low wage. Although many official EU statements have firmly 
asserted that flexicurity would enhance gender equality, Fredman calls this phenomenon 
“the broken promise of flexicurity”. Lewis and Plomien (2009) contend that gendered 
patterns in flexible employment tend to exacerbate sex segregation and gender inequality 
and that flexicurity has not addressed men’s and women’s fundamentally different 
experiences of the labor market.  
Due to the importance of this topic, there is ongoing debate about how to achieve job 
security and employment security as well as the type of policy measures necessary to 
achieve this goal. Based on this heated discussion in both policy and academia, studies 
have examined the determinants of perceptions of job security. However, some gaps remain 
in this area. First, most studies focus only on job security or employment security and 
overlook the shift from the former to the latter, which is the crux of flexicurity policies. 
Second, many studies examine only individual-level or national-level factors, and few 
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multi-level analyses have been conducted to explore the combined influence or interaction 
of these two levels. Green’s (2009) ambitious work was the first study to include 32 
countries in a comparison; however, it focused only on individual-level rather than 
national-level predictors. Third, although some recent studies adopt multi-level methods, 
most cross-national research in this area includes only small numbers of countries with a 
strong focus on European countries (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Chung and Oorschot, 
2011; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2008; Erlinghagen, 2008). Fourth, the link between 
perceptions of security and welfare state intervention or public caring resources remains 
largely unexplored. As Wilthagen and Tros (2004) argue, one of the main ideas of 
flexicurity is to achieve “combination security”, which refers to “the certainty of being able 
to combine paid work with other social responsibilities and obligations”. Tros (2004) 
further explains flexicurity as a type of work-family balance. However, this understanding 
has been less frequently discussed and examined in research on flexicurity; Wilthagen and 
Tros (2004) discuss “flexicurity strategies and policies, which are usually not referred to 
as such by policy makers and legislators…”. Whereas most studies of flexicurity policies 
concentrate on the impacts of EPL and LMP, Hansen (2007) argues that public care 
facilities are crucial factors in the successful Danish flexicurity model. She notes that the 
“flexicurity model lacks a perspective – public care facilities”. Furthermore, she strongly 
suggests adding public care facilities into the Danish “golden triangle” and renaming 
flexicurity “flexicArity” (p.88-91). This study, which is based on data from the 





Defining Job security, Employment Security, and Job-Loss Worry 
Scholars of psychology have explored job security for several decades and have 
divided job security into two categories: cognitive security and affective job security. In 
the psychological research framework, “cognitive job security” indicates individuals’ 
estimate of the probability of losing their current job, whereas “affective job security” 
refers to worry or anxiety about losing one’s job, including concerns about the expected 
outcomes of losing one’s current job. As Anderson and Pontusson (2007) argue, in addition 
to cognitive security, there are two expected consequences of losing one’s job: “the 
prospects of finding another job and access to sources of income that do not depend on 
finding another job” (p.214). Following Ebralidze’s (2012) research design, three outcome 
variables can be examined: job security (also known as “cognitive job security” in 
psychological terms), employment security, and job-loss worry (also known as “affective 
job security” in psychological terms). 
    The first outcome variable is job security. Job security indicates the certainty of 
retaining a specific job with a specific employer and the stability and certainty of holding 
a current job. A typical survey question to examine job security is, “How satisfied are you 
with your present job or business in terms of job security?” As Clark and Postel-Vinay 
(2008) suggest, the respondent’s answer to this question involves at least two pieces of 
information: “the probability of job loss and the cost of job loss” (p.210). To estimate job 
security more precisely, following previous researchers’ designs (Anderson and Pontusson, 
2007; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2008; Ebralidze, 2012), the indicator for job security is the 
level of agreement with the statement, “My job is secure”23, with five possible responses 
                                                     
23 ISSP 2005, Work Orientation, Q10. 
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ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. 
Employment security refers to lifelong employment probabilities and abilities. It 
also indicates the certainty of remaining in work, although not necessarily with the same 
employer. To gauge employment security, respondents are asked to rate their agreement 
with the statement, “How difficult or easy do you think it would be for you to find a job at 
least as good as your current one?”24 The answer is provided on a four-point scale of 
agreement from “very easy”, “fairly easy”, “fairly difficult” to “very difficult”.. For the 
third outcome variable, job-loss worry, the indicator is the level of agreement with the 
statement, “To what extent do you worry about the possibility of losing your job?”25, with 
four possible responses ranging from “I do not worry at all” to “I worry a great deal”. 
 
Perceptions of Security: Country-Level Influences 
A number of studies have explored the relationship between national labor market 
institutions and workers’ job security perceptions. EPL is the most heated debate focus of 
the labor market because it is usually adopted as a “flexibility” indicator in the flexicurity 
literature (Bertozzi and Bonoli, 2009; Tangian, 2007). EPL is usually considered a double-
edged sword: although it guarantees higher job stability, it also increases the associated 
cost of dismissal and thus reduces employers’ willingness to hire (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 
2008). Consequently, one study argues that stricter regulations may result in longer 
unemployment duration (Nickell, 1997) despite the development of part-time and 
temporary work (Buddelmeyer et. al, 2004; Dolado et.al, 2002; Polavieja, 2003). Thus, 
more rigid EPL may lead to lower perceptions of job security.  
                                                     
24 ISSP 2005, Work Orientation, Q22. 
25 ISSP 2005, Work Orientation, Q25. 
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    Empirical studies generally confirm the idea that stricter EPL has negative effects on 
job security. Using bivariate analyses, Böckerman (2004) and Devicienti et al. (2008) find 
a significant positive correlation between EPL and job security, though the OECD (1997) 
reveals no significant correlation between perceptions of security and EPL. In multi-level 
research, Böckerman (2004) finds negative effects of EPL on job security, whereas 
Erlinghagen (2008) finds no significant effects of EPL on job security. Anderson and 
Pontusson (2007) find that EPL has significant negative effects on job security but no 
significant influences on employment security. However, most of these studies do not 
distinguish EPL for regular contract jobs from EPL for temporary contract jobs and thus 
cannot measure and discern the effects of these two different types of EPL. This distinction 
is crucial in the specific historical context. Time-series data on the EPL indicators show an 
overall declining trend for the stringency of dismissal regulations, but most of these 
changes that occurred in the 1990s focused on temporary employment rather than regular 
employment. Furthermore, it is argued that the loosening of temporary contract regulations 
serves as a way to circumvent stringent rules on regular contracts, especially in countries 
facing political deadlock for loosening EPL for regular jobs. In other words, the 
deregulation of employment protection legislation is a partial reform that eases the use of 
temporary contracts but maintains the existing provisions for regular jobs (OECD, 2004; 
European Commission, 2006). Consequently, it is important to be sensitive to these two 
different effects of EPL, especially the effects for different genders. Although women are 
usually over-represented in non-regular employment, women are more likely to be 
influenced by the loosening of regulations for temporary contracts. Thus, this paper is the 
first to measure different influences on workers’ job security for different gender groups.   
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Previous studies suggest that ALMP exerts positive effects on employment security 
but does not influence job security. This research suggests a critical point in job security 
research: different macro-level factors may have specific influences on different types of 
job security. ALMP is usually adopted as “security” indicators in the flexicurity literature 
(Bertozzi and Bonoli, 2009; Tangian, 2007). They roughly indicate the level of government 
endeavour in the area of labor market security, including occupational training programmes, 
public employment programmes, employment search services, and wage subsidies. Higher 
ALMP levels are argued to represent greater effort by the government to enhance workers’ 
employability and thus may also increase workers’ perceptions of employment security. 
Anderson and Pontusson (2007) find that ALMP exerts positive effects only on 
employment security but do not influence job security. Chung and Oorschot (2011) argue 
that ALMP, which secures employability skills, is more important than EPL in providing 
individuals with employment security.  
    In addition, a number of studies have revealed the positive effects PLMP on job 
security perceptions. PLMP is a critical indicator of “security” in the flexicurity literature. 
They usually refer to unemployment benefits (UB), which can be understood as the level 
of government effort to provide economic supplements for the unemployed. Using 
bivariate methods, a number of studies have suggested that the generosity of 
unemployment benefits has a positive correlation with job and employment security 
(Böckerman 2004; Devicienti et.al 2008). In a multi-level analysis, Anderson and 
Pontusson (2007) found that more generous unemployment benefits lead to lower levels of 
job-loss worry, although Ebralidze (2012) did not find a significant influence.  
    Despite these two critical labor market institutions, some research suggests that 
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market forces are more important factors to predict individuals’ job security. With lower 
unemployment rates or higher employment rates, workers may expect a more optimistic 
labor market situation. Thus, market forces are also crucial factors in workers’ perceptions 
of security. For example, Chung and Oorschot (2011) found that when market factors 
(measured by average employment rate and GDP growth rate) are taken into account, both 
institutional factors lose their significance. Similarly, Erlinghagen (2008) found that only 
the long-term unemployment rate had significant effects on job security, whereas EPL, 
social security spending, and average GDP growth did not have significant influences. 
Clark and Postel-Vinay (2008) showed that the 6-year average of local unemployment 
reduced perceived job security in temporary jobs but had positive effects on permanent 
workers. Anderson and Pontusson (2007) found that unemployment rate changes from the 
previous year have significant negative effects on job security and employment security, 
whereas the 6-year average unemployment rate had significant effects on job security but 
not employment security. 
     One of the main ideas behind flexicurity is to achieve a shift from job security to 
employment security (EMCO 2006; Wilthagen 1998; Wilthagen and Tros 2004). Auer and 
Cazes (2003) found that Denmark’s workers with lower average work tenure but reported 
higher security perceptions than workers in other EU countries, and it is because the more 
developed Danish government to active and passive labor market policies in Denmark. In 
contrast, workers in Japan have a high average tenure but also showed higher extent of job 
and employment insecurity. However, the effects of average tenure are still mixed, so and 
further exploration is needed. 
     Welfare state intervention is usually a crucial factor in female labor market outcomes. 
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Gornick and her colleagues (1997) note that family policy is a more powerful predictor of 
women’s employment patterns than Esping-Anderson’s welfare clusters are. Mandel and 
Semyonov (2005; 2006) demonstrated that more developed welfare-state policy enhances 
women’s employment probabilities (though not necessarily in powerful positions) and 
reduces gender wage gaps. However, the effects of welfare state intervention on job and 
employment security, especially the differences between the two genders, remains less 
examined. It is necessary to explore further how welfare state intervention influences men’s 
and women’s subjective job security. Whereas “welfare state generosity” in flexicurity 
studies usually indicates only the scope of ALMP and PLMP, this study is the first work 
that deliberately adopts the “welfare state intervention index” as an index of combination 
security.  
     As Madsen (2006) argues, dynamic social dialogue and strong trade unions are vital 
factors in the successful implementation of flexicurity. However, the relation between 
union power and workers’ job security remains unexplored. Higher levels of trade-union 
power may suggest better working conditions and stronger negotiation power, which may 
be helpful to ensure higher perceptions of security among individual workers. In attempts 
to measure the power of unions to affect working conditions, the collective agreement 
coverage rate has been found to be a better measure than the union membership coverage 
rate (Visser, 2006). With regard to the effects of unions, Lyness et al. (2012) assume that 
higher collective agreement coverage ensures a higher level of job security, although they 
did not find a significant correlation between these two factors. Few studies to date have 
addressed the collective agreement coverage rate as a macro-level determinant of job 




Security Perceptions: Micro-Level Studies 
     Although Green (2009) found that women reported lower security perceptions than 
men did, many studies have not found gender-specific effects with regard to job security 
(Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen 2008; OECD 1997; Green et al.,2001). 
Erlinghagen argues that this may be because women’s inferior job security perceptions are 
“not mediated directly by the ‘gender’ characteristics” (p.190) but by lower tenure, higher 
work-family conflict, or more precarious employment conditions. Due to the mixed results 
of previous studies, this dissertation explores how gender influences individuals’ 
perceptions, with a particular focus on the interaction between gender and other important 
factors, such as welfare state intervention. 
   The findings with regard to age remain ambiguous. Although the OECD (1997) finds 
a positive correlation between age and job security, Green (2009) and Näswall and De Witte 
(2003) suggest converse outcomes. Erlinghagen (2008) found that young workers (aged 
20-39) reported lower security perceptions than did middle-aged workers (aged 40-54), 
whereas older workers’ (age 55-67) perceptions were not significantly from middle-aged 
workers. Anderson and Pontusson (2007) found that age has a positive effect on job 
security but a negative effect on employment security. This finding may suggest that older 
workers usually have longer tenure and are more confident about holding their current job, 
but older workers may face inferior situations with regard to finding a new job in the labor 
market.  
   With regard to family composition, Anderson and Pontusson (2007) assumed that 
having an employed spouse is associated with lower worry about job loss, although they 
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did not find significant effects. Ebralidze (2012) did not find that an employed spouse was 
related to lower job-loss worry, although their samples included only young workers aged 
18-33 years. Muñoz de Bustillo and De Pedraza (2010) found that an employed spouse had 
a significant influence on lower job security in the Netherlands and Germany but not in 
Spain, Belgium and Finland. They also found that the presence of children did not show 
significant effects on security perceptions, and Green et al. (2000) found that mothers with 
young children experienced lower job security than fathers with young children did.  
    For job characteristics, a number of studies have revealed that atypical employment 
has negative effects on perceptions of security. For example, fixed-term workers and 
temporary-contract workers report lower job security than do their permanent-contract 
counterparts (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2008; Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005). Erlinghagen 
(2008) found part-timers didn’t present lower job security than full-timers, and it may 
because they have different expectations for their work. However, he found fixed-term 
employees report lower job security than workers on permanent contracts. Muñoz de 
Bustillo and De Pedraza (2010) suggested that temporary-contract workers show lower job 
security than permanent-contract workers do in five countries (Netherlands, Germany, 
Spain, Belgium and Finland), whereas part-time workers show significant differences from 
full-time workers only in Belgium and Germany. However, Erlinghagen (2008) found that 
part-time workers did not show significant differences from their counterparts. The effects 
of different types of atypical contracts require further exploration.   
   A number of studies have demonstrated that workers in the public sector report higher 
job security perceptions than do their counterparts in the private sector (Anderson and 
Pontusson 2007; Muñoz de Bustillo and De Pedraza, 2010). Furthermore, Clark and Postel-
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Vinay (2008) found that private sector workers’ perceptions of job security were 
determined by EPL and PLMP, whereas public sector workers’ perceptions of security were 
not influenced by these two labor market arrangements. With regard to the influence of 
trade unions, Anderson and Pontusson (2007) noted that union membership had positive 
effects on job security and employment security.  
     In the following chapter, the methodology, including the data, the research questions 
and analytic strategy will be discussed. Also, the empirical findings on the effects of EPL, 
PLMP, and ALMP are summarized in following Tables: 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6. In these three 
tables, most of previous studies only explore the influences of EPL, ALMP and PLMP. On 
employment rate or unemployment rate. However, the effects of these three country-level 
factors on individual-level labor market outcomes are still less examined. Consequently, 
this dissertation consciously adopts multilevel methods to examine the relationship 
between these three factors and individual-level labor market outcomes. 
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Appendix: The Effects of EPL, PLMP, and ALMP: Summaries of Empirical Findings 






Dependent Variable Results Other control 
variables 
Lazear (1990) EPL (including 
SEV = Number 
of months of 
salary given to 
workers as 
 severance pay 
upon dismissal 
after ten years 
of service,0-15 







ten years of 
service,0-10) 
 
Employment rate The stricer EPL (increased severance pay) will 
reduce employment rate. 
 
Scarpetta (1996) EPL (0-6, 
average of 
regular contract 
and fixed term 
contract) 
Structural unemployment EPL is found to raise structural unemployment 
and non-employment, especially exerts stronger 
effects on youth and long-term unemployment. 
ALMP. UB replacement 
rates, union density, 
coordination index, 







Nickell (1997) EPL (ranking 
number, 1-20) 
Total unemployment, long-term 
unemployment, short-term 
unemployment, employment to 
population ratio (overall and male-aged 
males). 
EPL doesn’t have significant effect on total 
unemployment, short-term unemployment and 
long-term unemployment. EPL is found to  
reduce employment to population rate, but 
doesn’t reduce prime-aged males’. 
ALMP; UB replacement 
rate; UB duration, union 
density, union coverage, 
coordination index. Tax 





EPL (0-6) structural unemployment EPL significantly increase structural 
unemployment, especially in countries with an 
intermediate level coordination system. 
EPL, ALMP, UB 
replacement rate; UB 
duration, union density,  
coordination index, 
corporatism index, tax 
wedge, minimum wages. 
OECD (1999) EPL (0-6) Unemployment and employment rates  In most cases, EPL decreases unemployment and 
employment rates but not significant. But EPL 
only shows negative and significant effect on 
prime-age men unemployment. EPL also shows 
positive but not significant effect on prime-age 
males employment and youth unemployment. 
ALMP, UB replacement 
rate; UB duration, union 
density, coordination 
index, centralisation 





Unemployment EPL is found to increase unemployment. 
Furthermore, EPL also exacerbates the negative 
effect of shocks on unemployment. 
 
TFP growth, labour 
demand shocks, real 
interest rate shocks. 
ALMP.UB duration 
index. 
UB replacement rate. 
Union density. Union 
coverage. coordination 
index. Tax rates. 
 
Belot and Van 
Ours (2000) 
EPL(0-1) structural unemployment EPL is found to have significant effect on 
structural unemployment before introducing time 
and country fixed effect. 
Also, The authors also found positive interaction 
between taxes and replacement rates, union 
density and centralization, and negative 
interaction between EPL and centralization. 
Change in inflation, UB 
replacement rates, union 
density, union coverage, 

















Employment and unemployment (by 
gender and age) and incidence of long-
term unemployment.  
EPL shows negative and significant effect on 
overall employment rates. Furthermore, the 
impact on prime-age male employment is half of 
the total employment, while the impact on youth’s 
is almost two times larger. Though there is no 
significant effect on the female workers. 
As for unemployment, while OLS and random 
effects shows positive and significant effect, fixed 
effects shows negative and insignificant effect. 
GDP level, GDP growth, 
minimum wages, union 
centralization. 
Bertola, Blau, and 
Kahn (2002) 
EPL (0-6) Unemployment EPL is found to have significant interaction with 
shocks on unemployment, which suggests the 
institutions and shocks have interaction effect. 
Furthermore, EPL exerts more stronger effect on 
youth and the older groups. 
TFP growth, labour 
demand shocks, real 
interest rate shocks. 
ALMP. UB replacement 
rate. Union density. 
Union coverage. 
coordination index. Tax 
rates. 




EPL(0-6) Unemployment EPL is found to have no effect on unemployment 
rates, except for the sub-period 1980-99 when 
EPL is found to reduce unemployment. 
Change in inflation, UB 
replacement rates, UB 
duration index, union 
density, union coverage, 




EPL (0-2) structural unemployment EPL is found to have no significant effect on 
structural unemployment, and there are also no 
significant interaction between labour market 
institutions and economic shocks.  
Money supply shock, 
change in TFP growth, 
labour demand shock, 
real import price shock, 
real interest rates., UB 
replacement rates, UB 
duration index, union 
density, coordination 














Dependent Variable Results Other control variables 
Scarpetta (1996) UB index (including 
average of replacement 
rates for individuals with 
different durations 
unemployment spell, 
different level earnings 
and family types. 
Structural unemployment UB is found to significantly increase structural 
unemployment.  
EPL, ALMP, union density, 
coordination index, 
corporatism index, tax 
wedge. 
Nickell (1997) UB replacement rate; UB 
duration 
Total unemployment, long-term 
unemployment, short-term 
unemployment, employment to 
population ratio (overall and 
male-aged males). 
UB replacement rate is found to increase total 
unemployment but no significant effect on long-
term and short-term unemployment. UB 
duration shows significant effect on long-term 
unemployment only.  
Both UB replacement rate and UB duration 
didn’t show significant effect on labor supply 
(including all working population and prime-age 
males), only UB duration significantly 
decreases all working age population 
employment rates. 
EPL, ALMP, union density, 
union coverage, 
coordination index. Tax 





UB index (including 
average of replacement 
rates and duration) 
structural unemployment UB is found to significantly increase structural 
unemployment. Also, there is a significant 
interaction effect between UB and ALMP.   
EPL, ALMP, union density, 
coordination index, 
corporatism index, tax 
wedge, minimum wages. 
OECD (1999) UB replacement rate 
(%) ; UB duration 
(months) 
Unemployment  UB replacement rate is found to significantly 
increase unemployment rates, while UB 
duration doesn’t.  
ALMP, UB replacement 
rate; UB duration, union 
density,  coordination 









UB replacement rate(%) ; 
UB duration (months) 
Unemployment Both UB replacement rate and duration is found 
to significantly increase unemployment rates. 
Also, economic shocks are found to have 
stronger effect on unemployment when the 
replacement is high and the duration is long.  
EPL, TFP growth, labour 
demand shocks, real interest 
rate shocks. ALMP. Union 
density. Union coverage. 
coordination index. Tax 
rates. 
Belot and Van 
Ours (2000) 
UB replacement rate (%) structural unemployment UB is found to have significant effect on 
structural unemployment before introducing 
time and country fixed effect. 
EPL, Change in inflation, 
union density, union 
coverage, coordination 




UB replacement rate(%) Unemployment UB replacement rate is found to have significant 
effect on unemployment. 
Though there is no significant interaction 
between UB replacement rate and duration with 
shocks.  
EPL, TFP growth, labour 
demand shocks, real interest 
rate shocks. ALMP. Union 
density. Union coverage. 
coordination index. Tax 
rates. 
OECD (2002) UB replacement rate (%) Employment rate In some cases UB is found to significantly 
decrease employment rates. 
 
EPL, union density, product 





rate(%) ; UB duration 
(months) 
Unemployment UB replacement and duration are found to 
significantly reduce unemployment in some 
sub-periods, while increases or decreases 
unemployment but not significant in other 
periods. 
EPL, change in inflation, , 
union density, union 
coverage, coordination 




UB replacement rate(%) ; 
UB duration index 
structural unemployment UB replacement and duration are found to have 
no significant effect on structural unemployment, 
and there are also no significant interactions 
between labour market institutions and economic 
shocks.  
EPL, money supply shock, 
change in TFP growth, 
labour demand shock, real 
import price shock, real 
interest rates., union density, 
coordination index, tax 















Dependent Variable Results Other control 
variables 




relative to GDP per 
capita) 
Structural unemployment In some cases ALMP is found to decrease 
structural unemployment and non-employment. 
(while UB is almost significant in all models, so 
the author argues the UB generosity have more 
stronger effect than ALMP). 
EPL. UB replacement 
rates, union density, 
coordination index, 
corporatism index, tax 
wedge. 
Nickell (1997) ALMP Total unemployment, long-term 
unemployment, short-term 
unemployment, employment to 
population ratio (overall and male-
aged males). 
ALMP is found to significantly decrease total 
unemployment and long-term unemployment, but 
not short-term unemployment. ALMP doesn’t 
exert significant effect on employment to 
population rate, no matter for the total working 
age population or prime-aged male. 
EPL; UB replacement 
rate; UB duration, union 
density, union coverage, 
coordination index. Tax 





ALMP structural unemployment ALMP is only significantly decreases structural 
unemployment in some cases. Besides, there is 
significant interaction between ALMP and UB on 
structural unemployment.  
EPL, UB replacement 
rate; UB duration, union 
density,  coordination 
index, corporatism 
index, tax wedge, 
minimum wages. 
OECD (1999) ALMP (% spending 
as GDP) 
Unemployment and employment rates  ALMP is found to have no significant effect on 
unemployment and employment rates. 
EPL, UB replacement 
rate; UB duration, union 
density,  coordination 
index, centralisation 
index, tax wedge. 
Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000) 
ALMP (% spending 
as GDP) 
Unemployment ALMP is found to increase unemployment. 
However, there is no significant interaction 
between ALMP and economic shocks.  
 
EPL; TFP growth, 
labour demand shocks, 
real interest rate shocks. 
UB duration index. 
UB replacement rate. 







index. Tax rates. 
 
Bertola, Blau, and 
Kahn (2002) 
ALMP (% spending 
as GDP) 
Unemployment ALMP is found to have no significant on 
unemployment, no interaction with shocks on 
unemployment, either.  
  
EPL, TFP growth, 
labour demand shocks, 
real interest rate shocks. 
UB replacement rate. 
Union density. Union 
coverage. coordination 




ALMP (% spending 
as GDP) 
Unemployment ALMP is found to have no significant on 
unemployment. 
EPL, Change in 
inflation, UB 
replacement rates, UB 
duration index, union 
density, union coverage, 


















Chapter 3. Methodology: Research Questions and Methods 
I. Data and Sources 
Micro-level data 
Data employed in this dissertation are drawn from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) Database26 and the 2005 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). 
LIS is an archive of comparable micro-datasets for a large number of countries and 
provides important individual demographic features (age, education level, marital 
status, and gender) and labor-market status variables (employed/not employed, in part-
time/full-time work, occupation, and annual earnings).  
The proposed research sample comprises people of prime working age, 15-6527, 
from 20 countries, including 17 Western countries and three East Asian countries. The 
Western countries can be further divided into four groups: Nordic (Sweden, Finland, 
Norway, and Denmark); Continental European (Germany, France, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands); South European (Spain and Italy); Anglophone (Australia, Canada, the 
                                                     
26 Due to the data comparability, I will use data from wave 6 and wave 7; they are collected from 
2005-2008.  
27 Previous studies found young workers (aged 15-24) and old workers (aged 55-65) have higher job 
and employment insecurity perceptions than prime aged workers, so I include young workers in 
Chapter 6. For the consistency, Chapter4, 5, and 6 all adopted three age groups: young workers (aged 





United Kingdom, Ireland, and the United States); Eastern European (Hungary and the 
Czech Republic), and East Asian (Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea).28 Despite Holliday 
(2000) having proposed the concept of “productivist welfare capitalism” as a fourth 
type of welfare-state regime identifiable in East Asian countries, few comparative 
studies in this area have included East Asian data. As a result, this dissertation will make 
an important contribution to our understanding of this fourth type of welfare state. 
The ISSP is an open-ended collaborative program of annual surveys on 
important research topics in the social sciences, which has covered a different survey 
topic each year since 1985. In 2005, the survey topic was “work orientation”, which 
included questions about the respondents’ subjective perceptions regarding three kinds 
of security. The 2005 ISSP provides indices of subjective perceptions of job security, 
employment security, and job-loss worry.  
 
Macro-level data 
The macro-level data are from a variety of sources, such as the OECD 
Employment database 29 , which includes EPL, ALMP, and PLMP. The first index 
                                                     
28 Italy is only in Chapters 4 and 5, based on the LIS Database, and Belgium is only in Chapter 6, 
which draws from the ISSP. Moreover, due to the lack of annual earnings data for Korea in 2006, 
Chapter 5 does not include Korea, so there are only 18 countries in Chapter 5, but 19 countries in 
Chapter 4 and 6 The total number of countries have been adopted in this research (including Chapters 






measures the flexibility of labor market regulation, and I have followed a number of 
scholars (e.g., Tangian, 2007; Bertozzi and Bonoli, 2009) in using the OECD’s EPL, 
which measures the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups 
of workers30 (OECD, 2013). As for the Modified Welfare State Intervention Index, the 
maternity leave measure (full paid weeks) is from OECD Social Protection and Well-
being dataset31, public spending on early childhood education and care as % of GDP 
are from OECD Family Database32, and public employments33 are also from OECD 
Public Sector, Taxation and Market Regulation dataset34. This dissertation’s data on 
collective agreement coverage rates come from the ILO report Social Dialogue 
Indicators: International Statistical Inquiry 2008-2009 (Hayter and Stoevska, 2011). 
II. Measures 
Individual characteristics  
   In Chapters 4 to 6, the following individual worker characteristics are included: 
                                                     
30 Overall EPL includes three parts: job protection of workers in regular contracts, collective dismissals, 
and provisions regarding fixed-term contracts and temporary work. As for job protection of workers in 
regular contracts, three main areas are considered, such as 1) what reason for dismissal is viewed as 
“justified” or “fair”; 2) procedural inconveniences that the employer may face, such as sending notice to 
local labor office; 3) notice and severance pay provisions, such as the notice period before dismissal, and 
the level of severance pay. As for the provisions of fixed-term work, it also measures the maximum 
number of successive contracts and maximum cumulated duration. (OECD, 2013) 
31 http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54760 
32 http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm 






gender, coded as female (1=yes, 0=no), age 35 , education measured as completed 
bachelor’s degree (1=yes, 0=no), family composition coded as partnered 36 (1=yes, 
0=no), presence of pre-school aged child37 (1=yes, 0=no), and number of children38. It 
is because the presence of children under the age of six in the household is an important 
factor that may influence the employment patterns of parents (particularly mothers). 
In addition, a number of studies have noted that some job characteristics are 
highly influenced by worker’s job security perception, so the following job 
characteristics will also be included in Chapter 6: part-time work status (1=yes, 0=no), 
public sector employee (1=yes, 0=no), union membership (1=yes, 0=no), and 
managerial position (1=yes, 0=no).  
Country-level characteristics  
To measure the strictness of legally mandated employment protection, first, the 
OECD’s composite overall EPL will be adopted, which measures the procedures and 
costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers (OECD, 2005). The 
                                                     
35 Age will be coded as 15-24, 55-65, and 25-54 as the reference group in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.   
36 In LIS data, when “marital status” is coded as 1, it includes married and in consensual union. In 
ISSP, “partnered” means an answer of “yes” for the statement: “Do you have or live with a partner?” 
Thus, cohabitation or being partnered are the main concern here, but not formal marriage. 
Consequently, I use “partnered” to substitute “married” in all three result chapters.  
37 The presence of children under the age of six in the household is an important factor that may 
influence the employment patterns of parents (particularly mothers)，and only LIS has data on 
“number of children”, so only Chapter4 and 5 include this variable. 
38 Including all aged of children (under 18) and live together.  





index 39  covers three distinct dimensions: (1) regulations regarding individual 
dismissals of workers with regular contracts, (2) additional restrictions for collective 
dismissals, and (3) regulations for temporary employment. The OECD Secretariat also 
annually compiles an overall flexibility index that includes these four aspects. Moreover, 
due to the different types of EPL exerting different effects on labor market outcomes 
(particularly after the partial deregulation in the 1990s as mentioned before), the effects 
of EPL for regular contracts and EPL for temporary contracts are also examined. As for 
the indices for measuring security, ALMP and PLMP are measured by the percentages 
of GDP that are expended on and that roughly indicate levels of government endeavor 
in the area of labor-market security. ALMP includes training, lifelong learning, job 
creation programs and job-search assistance, while PLMP usually refers to 
unemployment insurance benefits (UB). 
     Following Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006), I will measure work-family 
policies using their Welfare State Intervention Index (WSII). This composite index 
includes three indicators to represent the scope of family policies in each country: (1) 
the number of fully paid weeks of maternity leave, i.e., the number of paid weeks 
multiplied by the replacement rate during the leave; (2) the percentage of pre-school 
                                                     
39 There are total 18 basis measures for the composite index EPL, including 8 measures for the first 
part, 4 measures for second part, and 6 measures for the third part, and the 18 measures are not given 





aged-aged children in publicly funded childcare facilities (indicating the generosity of 
a specific nation’s public childcare systems); and (3) the percentage of the total 
workforce that is employed in the public social service sector (as a measure of the 
availability of public services provided by the state, as well as the extent of the welfare 
state as an employer).40 However, due to data availability, I slightly adjust two of the 
indicators. As for the percentage of pre-school aged-aged children in publicly funded 
childcare facilities, due to the lack of suitable comparative cross-national data, I 
substitute the percentage of GDP spent on early childhood education and care, because 
it also can represent the generosity of a specific nation’s public childcare system. 
Similarly, as for the percentage of the total workforce that is employed in the public 
social service sector, due to data availability, I substitute the percentage of workforce 
in the public sector relative to total employment of the working age population. Public 
employment in health, education, and welfare as a percentage of the working age 
population is a good indicator to measure the level of a specific country’s endeavor on 
welfare state policies, but Huber and Stephens (2000) found it is not complete in the 
Welfare State Exit Entry Project (WEEP) data. But they also found that civilian 
government employment is highly correlated with the percentage of public employment 
                                                     
40 According to Mandel and Semyonov (2006), the Welfare State Intervention 





in health, education, and welfare from total working age population. Consequently, I 
adopt civilian government employment to substitute the percentage of public 
employment in health, education, and welfare in total working population. Due to these 
two slightly adjustments, I call it the Modified Welfare State Intervention Index 
(MWSI).  
     As Madsen (2006) argues, the political environment and the dynamic between 
social partners (including trade unions) are factors that are crucial to the success of 
flexicurity implementation. Higher levels of trade union power may suggest more 
concentrated wage negotiation mechanisms, which would tend to result in more 
compact wage structures and more equal earnings between male and female workers. 
When seeking to measure the power of unions to affect working conditions, the 
collective agreement coverage rate has been found to be a better measure than the union 
membership coverage rate (Visser, 2006). The collective agreement coverage rates 
indicate the number of employees covered by the collective agreement, divided by the 
total number of wage and salary-earners. 
 
Dependent Variables  





market status variables. Those are separately coded as employed (1=yes, 0=no), in part-
time41 (1=yes, 0=no), in temporary work (1=yes, 0=no), in managerial position (1=yes, 
0=no), and in female-type occupation (1=yes, 0=no). As for the definition of a female-
type occupation, the construction used here draws on Mandel and Semyonov’s (2006) 
work on how welfare state interventions influence women’s employment probabilities. 
According to Mandel and Semyonov’s (2006) definition, a female-type occupation is 
one in which the proportion of women exceeds 150% of the female proportion of a 
country’s work force. For example, if the total female labor force is 40% in Germany, 
and over 60% of accountants in Germany are female, we can say that accountancy in 
Germany is a female-type occupation. 
    As for the second section (Chapter 5), there are two different dependent variables 
in this part: the first one is the natural log of wage (annual earnings), and the second 
one is the percentile of wage (annual earnings), which can present the relative wage 
structures in different countries. In other words, the dependent variable (annual earnings) 
will be defined in nominal terms and once in standardized terms to differentiate the 
flexicurity and welfare state policy effects from the wage structure effects. The 
standardized measure indicates a percentile ranking scale on which individuals are 
                                                     
41 Due to self-reported part-time working status having a high variability between countries, working 






ranked in each country according to their relative earnings within a specific country’s 
earnings ladder (Gornick, 1999). This division of the contributors for gender earning 
inequality is meaningful because these two arguments may lead to different policy 
implications. 
  With regard to the third section (Chapter 6), there are three workers’ 
subjective perceptions that will be measured. To estimate job security, the indicator is 
the level of agreement with the statement, “My job is secure”, with five possible 
responses: (5) “strongly agree”, (4) “agree”, (3) “neither agree nor disagree”, (2) 
“disagree”, and (1) “strongly disagree”. For the purposes of analysis, “strongly agree” 
and “agree” are coded as 1 in a new dummy variable, job security, whereas the other 
responses are coded as 0.42 
To assess employment security, the respondents are asked to provide the extent of 
their agreement with the statement, “How difficult or easy do you think it would be for 
you to find a job at least as good as your current one?” The answer is provided on a 
five-point scale of agreement: (1) “very difficult”, (2) “fairly difficult”, (3) “neither 
easy nor difficult”, (4) “very easy” and (5) “fairly easy”. For the purposes of this 
research, the answers “very easy” and “fairly easy” are coded as 1 for a new dummy 
                                                     
42 At first, I interested in ordinal response, but I found that violated the parallel lines/proportional odds 





variable, employment security, whereas the other possible answers are coded as 0.  
With regard to the third outcome variable, job-loss worry, its indicator is the 
level of agreement with the statement, “To what extent do you worry about the 
possibility of losing your job?” with four possible responses: (1) “I worry a great deal”, 
(2) “I worry to some extent”, (3) “I worry a little” and (4) “I do not worry at all”. “I do 
not worry at all” is coded as 0 for the new dummy variable, and any level of job-loss 
worry is coded as 1.  
 
III. Analysis Strategy  
A multilevel model will be adopted to evaluate the effects of national-level 
characteristics on individual-level outcomes while controlling for variation of 
individual-levels. It is important to note that, for ease of discussion, throught this 
dissertation, I use the terminology of institutional/policy “effects”. However, I am 
aware that the research design does not allow drawing strong conclusions about 
causality. 
For the first section (Chapter 4), there are a total of five labor market outcome variables 
that will be estimated: employed (1=yes, 0=no), in part-time job (1=yes, 0=no), in 





type occupation (1=yes, 0=no). The model includes micro-level worker and job 
characteristics that prior research inidicates are associated with labor market outcomes. 
Macro-level factors are also included because the prime objective is to explore how 
country-level factors, particularly flexicurity policies and welfare state interventions, 
influence individual labor market outcomes. Also, it should be noted that, because of 
the limited number of countries included in this project, the macro-level variables will 
be introduced one at a time after controlling for GDP per capita.43 
However, due to some limitations of the models (such as the not concave 
iterations), I follow Möhring’s (2012) suggestion, which is to adopt the fixed effects 
approach as an alternative to multilevel models for cross-national analyses. According 
to Möhring (2012), multilevel modelling originated from educational research, in which 
pupils are typically nested in classes and sometimes in schools as a third level. As for 
multilevel analyses in social policies or social sciences, there is usually no random 
                                                     
43 As Möhring (2012) suggests, multilevel modeling originated from educational research, and here, 
pupils typically nested in classes (and sometimes nested at schools at the third level) are analyzed, but 
in social policy or sociology research, multilevel models are usually applied to analyze individuals 
nested in countries. The application of multilevel models for this type of research is confronted with 
some problems. First, the country selection is usually not a random sample in these surveys. Second, 
these datasets often include only 25 countries or less. Consequently, multilevel models on the basis of 
international surveys have a low number of degrees of freedom on the country-level. According to 
Möhring (2012), “If models are correctly specified paying regard to the small country-level N, only a 
low number of macro-level indicators can be controlled for”. 
Furthermore, following Lyness, Gornick, Stone and Grotto’s (2012) research, due to the limited 
number of countries included in this paper, they suggest, ”the macro-level data will be introduced one 
at a time” after controlling one major macro-level indicator. Taken together, due to the limited number 





sample at the upper level, and there is usually a small N at the upper level. Consequently, 
Möhring suggests adopting fixed effects regression models to substitute for multilevel 
models, and, in practice, this is done by including dummy variables for N-1 countries 
in the model. Also, Möhring argues that the main drawback of fixed effect models is 
that country-level variables cannot be estimated, because after the inclusion of N-1 
country dummies there is no variance left to be explained by additional country-level 
variables. However, this shortcoming can be fixed by including interactions between 
micro-level and macro-level variables (Möhring, 2012),. Furthermore, Möhring also 
provides an example, indicates that the pseudo R-squared in a fixed effect model is 
equal to the Interclass Correlation (ICC) of the multilevel null-model. Due to the not 
concave iterations, I will estimate fixed effect models for all five outcomes, and also 
multilevel analysis for temporary jobs, and will compare the results of these two 
methods.  
 As for the second part (Chapter 5), macro-level factors are also included 
because the prime objective is to explore how country-level factors, particularly 
flexicurity policies and welfare state intervention, influence the gender earning gaps. If, 
as official EU statements have claimed, flexicurity policies can guarantee female 





observe lower gender earning disparities in countries with more prominent labor market 
policies endeavors. Furthermore, to measure the effects of wage structure on gender 
earnings differentials, in addition to the natural log of wage (annual earnings), the 
percentile of wage (annual earnings) will be adopted as the second dependent variable, 
which can present the relative wage structures in different countries. 
    At the micro-level, based on the foregoing literature review, I hypothesize that 
females and younger respondents will report a lower level of earnings (annual earnings). 
I also hypothesize that having a partner and completion of higher education (college or 
more) will be positively related to the earnings (annual income), but the presence of 
children and number of children will be negatively related to the earnings. 
     At the country-level, I examine the effects of many important macro-level factors, 
including the level of labor market “flexibility” (measured by overall EPL, regular job 
EPL, and temporary job EPL), and the level of government labor market policy effort, 
which can be conceptualized as the level of labor market “security” (measured by 
ALMP), and the level of combination security (measured by MWSI). I hypothesize that 
all of these macro-level contextual features will be positively associated with the natural 
log of earnings. However, following Mandel and Semyonov’s (2005, 2006) research 





individual worker’s earnings percentiles. By examining the two different dependent 
variables (one in nominal terms and one in standardized terms), we can differentiate the 
flexicurity and welfare state policy effects from the wage structure effects more clearly. 
From a theoretical point of view, this division of the contributors for gender earnings 
inequality is meaningful because these two arguments may lead to different policy 
implications (Gornick, 1999). 
     With regard to the third section (Chapter 6), a multilevel model is adopted to 
evaluate the effects of national-level characteristics on individual-level outcomes while 
controlling for variation at the individual-levels. Three outcome variables are estimated: 
job security, employment security, and job-loss worry. The model includes micro-level 
worker and job characteristics, which have been found to be associated with security 
perceptions. Macro-level factors are also included because the prime objective is to 
explore how country-level factors, particularly flexicurity policies and welfare state 
intervention, influence the three types of job security.  
    If, as supporters have claimed, flexicurity policies can guarantee workers higher 
security perceptions and higher levels of gender equality, then we should expect to 
observe higher levels of subjective security perception in countries with more 





disparity between the genders with regard to perceptions of security. Table 6-1 shows 
the analysis model, which includes micro-level and macro-level factors.  
      At the micro-level, based on prior the literature, I hypothesize that women will 
report lower levels of security perceptions. I hypothesize that young workers and older 
workers will perceive less security than middle-aged workers and that having a partner 
and completing higher education will be positively related to perceptions of security. 
However, the presence of children will be negatively related to security perceptions. 
Furthermore, having an employed partner will decrease the extent of job-loss worry. 
For job characteristics, I hypothesize that part-time work will be negatively related to 
perceptions of security, whereas being employed in the public sector and being a union 
member will show positive effects on security perceptions.  
     At the country-level, I examine the effects of many important macro-level factors, 
including standard of living (GDP per capita), the level of labor market “flexibility” 
(measured by EPL), and the level of government labor market policy efforts, 
conceptualized as the level of labor market “security” (measured by ALMP and PLMP), 
the labor market situation (measured by the unemployment), the average tenure, the 
level of combination security (measured by MWSI), and union power (measured by 





features will be positively associated with security perceptions, with the exception of 
EPL and the average unemployment rate. Again, because women usually suffer more 
than men do from work-family conflict, I hypothesize that the level of welfare state 
intervention influences women’s security perceptions more than those of men.   
       Also, as for the covariance structure, I use the Stata default, which is an 
independent covariance structure. An independent covariance structure allows for 
distinct variance for each random effect within a random-effects equation and assumes 
that all covariances are 0.44 As for the standard errors, I use vce(robust) in Stata, which 
refers to the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator. 
       Also, at the end of each chapter, I want to present margins effects of three 
country-level factors (overall EPL, ALMP, and MWSI) on each dependent variable 






                                                     





Chapter 4: The Effects of Flexicurity on Women’s 
Employment Probabilities in 19 Countries 
I. Correlations between Macro-level Factors and Labor Market 
Outcomes 
     Figure 4-1 presents the relationship between overall EPL and the total female 
employment rates45. The liberal market economies of English-speaking countries (such 
as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom) are concentrated in 
the left side of the figure, which indicates lower overall EPL and higher female 
employment rates,  
  
Figure 4-1. Overall EPL and Female Employment Rates  
                                                     





while the corporatist economies and Social democratic countries occupy the right area  
, and Social democratic countries (such as the Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden) 
perform better on female employmentthan the corporatist countries (such as Germany, 
France, Italy, and Spain). Generally speaking, this pattern seems to confirm the 
deregulation orthodoxy argument: stricter labor market regulation is harmful for 
minority groups (such as women) in the labor market because employers may be 
reluctant to hire women with potentially higher labor costs. However, there is only a 
weak (-0.27) and insignificant correlation between these two factors, so following the 
deregulation orthodoxy logic, the correlation between regular EPL and female part-time 
employment rate is further tested. If the deregulation argument were true, then we 
would anticipate that a higher regular EPL will yield a higher minority group atypical 
employment rate, such as the female part-time employment rate.  
 





However, there is only a weak (0.12) and insignificant correlation between these two 
factors. Consequently, Figure 4-2 does not seem to support the deregulation argument 
on this point. Subsequently, the correlation between ALMP and the female employment 
rate was tested. As reviewed in the previous section, there were almost uniformly 
positive results for female employment rates, and these program effects for women are 
larger than for men, particularly in countries with low female employment rates 
(Bergemann and Van den Berg, 2008; Lechner and Wiehler, 2011). The result in Figure 
4-3 generally confirmed these studies: the correlation is moderately high (0.47), and it 
is significant. In addition to these two critical policy factors in flexicurity, this research 
also intends to identify how welfare state interventions influence women labor market 
outcomes, particularly how welfare state interventions influence occupational sex 
segregation.   
  





According to Mandel and Semyonov (2005; 2006), there is a crucial twofold effect of 
the welfare state on female labor force participation: the welfare state facilitates 
women’s access to the labor market, but not into powerful and desirable positions. In 
other words, more intense welfare state interventions may yield a higher percentage of 
workers in female-type occupations. However, these two factors are only slightly 
correlated (0.07), and the correlation is insignificant. Consequently, Figure 4-4 seems 
to not support the “welfare state paradox”46 argument.  
 
Figure 4-4. MWSI and % of Worker in Female-Type Work 
 
II. Results of Multilevel Analysis: Determinants of Five Labor 
Market Outcomes  
Table 4-1 shows the results of fixed effects models testing micro and macro 
                                                     
46 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “welfare state paradox” to refer to a specific gendered 





determinants of individual employment rates. In the first null model, the pseudo R-
squared47 is on 0.024, which suggests only 2.4% of the variability can be explained by 
the country differences. In Model 1, I test the effects of six individual-level factors on 
the employment probabilities. Being female significantly decreases the employment 
probabilities compared to male workers, and young workers (aged 15-24) and older 
workers (aged 55-65) both have lower employment probabilities than prime aged 
workers. Holding bachelor degree or higher degree and being partnered both 
significantly increase the employment probabilities. In contrast, the presence of a pre-
school aged child decreases the likelihood of being employed. Furthermore, the number 
of children also significantly decreases the likelihood of being employed. Also, the 
pseudo R-squared in Model 1 becomes 0.138, which suggests these individual factors 
explain 10% of the variability of the outcomes. In the following model, the interaction 
between gender and partnered, gender and the presence of pre-school aged children, 
and gender and the number of children are tested. All three interactions are significantly 
negative, which suggests being partnered, the presence of pre-school aged children, and 
the number of children have more negative influences on female workers’ employment 
probabilities than male workers’. 
                                                     
47 R-squared in an ordinary OLS means the proportion of the total variability of the outcome that is 
accounted for by the model. However, in a logistic regression, there is no R-squared, and the pseudo R-






Following, five country-level characteristics are tested, including important contextual 
factors, flexicurity policies indicators, and the MWSI, while controlling for the six 
micro-level indicators. Due to the limited number of countries (19 countries), macro-
level factors are introduced one at a time. In the following models, the interaction 
between gender and some vital flexicurity policy indicators are tested.  
In Model 3,4, and 5, three types of EPL and the interaction between gender and 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Individual-Level Factors
1.200*** 1.376*** 0.944*** 0.852*** 0.842*** 0.703*** 0.991*** 1.133***
(0.029) (0.039) (0.045) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.051)
 Worker Characteristics
-1.404*** -1.404*** -1.682*** -1.627*** -1.587*** -1.985*** -1.449***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.095) (0.075) (0.061) (0.065) (0.060)
-0.942*** -0.942*** -0.916*** -0.917*** -0.916*** -0.916*** -0.916***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
-1.302*** -1.302*** -1.245*** -1.245*** -1.248*** -1.250*** -1.250***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
0.645*** 0.655*** 0.655*** 0.655*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.656***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
0.128*** 0.441*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.334*** 0.295*** 0.268***
(0.012) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
-0.380*** 0.192*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.216*** 0.224*** 0.225***
(0.011) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
-0.123*** -0.017 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012
(0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
-0.396*** -0.252*** -0.253*** -0.251*** -0.203*** -0.167***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
-0.758*** -0.782*** -0.782*** -0.796*** -0.810*** -0.811***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
-0.143*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.157*** -0.154*** -0.153***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Country-Level Interaction
0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** -0.000003*











Pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.138 0.143 0.144 0.144 0.145 0.146 0.146
  Female × MWSI
Note:  N = 19 countries.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
    Age 55-65
  Female  × GDP per capita
  Female  × Regular EPL
  Female  × Temporary EPL
  Female × ALMP
  Partnered
  Preschool Children
Table 4-1. Fixed Effect Models Predicting  Employed Probabilities with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
 Intercept
  Female
    Age 15-24
  Bachelor Degree or  higher
degree
  Numbers of Children
  Female  × Overall EPL
  Female × Preschool
Children
  Female × Numbers of
Children





EPL are tested separately. Only temporary EPL presents significantly negative 
interaction with gender, which suggests stricter temporary EPL is more negatively 
associated with female workers’ employment probabilities. This finding seems to 
confirm the “deregulation orthodoxy”: the strictness of labor market regulation is not 
beneficial for increasing employment probabilities, especially for women. Furthermore, 
this finding also resonates with the “partial deregulation” phenomenon, which suggests 
easing temporary job regulation while keeping existing regular job security provisions 
unaltered. In other words, this finding suggests the partial deregulation is more 
negatively associated with women’s employment prospects, as I assumed.  
On the other hand, ALMP is found to be positively associated with gender, 
which means that a higher level of ALMP expenditures are more positively associated 
with female workers’ employment probabilities than male workers’ probabilities. This 
finding confirms previous studies, such as that of Bergemann and Van den Berg (2008), 
who found that ALMP programs’ effects for women are larger than for men, especially 
in countries with relatively low female employment rates, and Lechner and Wiehler 
(2011), who found that participation in training programs is more effective for women 
than for men, especially for young women because the participation in training courses 





As for the MWSI, it also shows a positive and significant interaction effect between 
gender and welfare state interventions, which suggests that a higher MWSI is more 
positively associated with female workers’ employment probabilities than with male 
workers’. This result corresponds to Mandel and Semyonov’s (2006) finding: the 
welfare state facilitates women’s employment by raising public service employment 
and providing more family-friendly support measures. 
Table 4-2 shows the results of fixed effects models testing the micro and macro 
determinants of probabilities for employment in a part-time job. In the first null model, 
the pseudo R-squared is 0.05, which suggests only 5% of the variability can be 
explained by the country differences. Also, the pseudo R-squared in Model 1 becomes 
0.141, which suggests these individual factors explain 9% of the variability of the 
outcomes.  
 With regard to individual-level factors, being female, being a young or older 
worker, and the presence of pre-school aged children are positively and significantly 
related to the likelihood of holding a part-time job. In contrast, being a prime-aged 
worker, holding a bachelor or higher degree, being partnered, and the number of 






Model indicates a positive and significant interaction effect between being 
female and overall EPL, which suggests that higher EPL is positively associated with 
part-time job probabilities for women than men, and it confirms the literature’s 
prediction: higher EPL is more harmful for minorities or other outsiders in the labor 
market, such as women. As for Model 2 and Model 3, we find that stricter regular EPL 
also is positively associated with women’s probabilities of holding a part-time job more 
than for men, while the strictness of temporary job EPL is negatively associated with 
women’s probabilities of holding part-time jobs more than for men. These results seem 
to confirm the previous studies’ conclusions: the strictness of EPL is harmful for 
“outsiders” of the labor market, while “insiders” (usually meaning prime-age men) are 
better protected by the strict employment regulations. However, why is temporary EPL 
more negatively associated with women’s probabilities of holding part-time jobs than 
for men? This finding still needs to be further explored. 
Model 4 demonstrates a negative and significant interaction between being 
female and ALMP, which means that higher ALMP is negatively associated with  
women’s probabilities of holding a part-time job compared to men. As for Model 5, it 
shows a negative and significant interaction effect between gender and welfare state 





probabilities of holding a part-time job compared to men. 
 
 
It seems surprising to find this outcome because previous studies (Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006) find that higher welfare state intervention will lead to unintended 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Individual-Level Factors
 -8.97***  -9.97***  -9.66*** 2.83*  -9.17***  -10.67***
(0.038) (0.028) (0.235) (1.28) (0.205) (0.215)
 Worker Characteristics
0.738*** 1.135*** 1.135*** 2.56*** 3.41***
(0.056) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.053)
1.318** 1.318** 1.318** 1.318** 1.318**
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
0.054** 0.054** 0.054** 0.054** 0.054**
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
-0.217*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.248*** -0.259***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.300*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.074*** -0.072***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
0.562*** 0.365*** 0.365*** 0.381*** 0.381***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
-0.052*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.067***












Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.141 0.1407 0.1428 0.1516 0.1534




    Age 55-65
  Bachelor Degree or
higher degree
  Partnered
  Preschool Children
  Numbers of Children
  Female  × Overall EPL
    Age 15-24
  Female × MWSI
N = 19 countries.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
  Female  × Regular EPL
  Female  × Temporary
EPL





outcomes, such as more women holding non-regular contract jobs. Consequently, this 
result also needs to be further explored.  
Table 4-348 adopted a fixed effect model to test individual factors and the 
interaction between country and individual-level factors on the probabilities of holding 
a temporary job. The null model is significant, while the pseudo R-squared is only 0.02, 
adding individual-level factors increases the pseudo R-squared to 0.05 (although the 
pseudo R-squared is still 0.05 after adding country-level interactions). With regard to 
the individual-level factors, being female, being a young or older worker, the presence 
of pre-school aged children and the number of children are positive and significantly 
related to the likelihood of holding a temporary job. In contrast,completing a bachelor 
degree or higher degree, and being partnered, are negatively associated with the 
likelihood of holding a temporary job. As for the gender interactions, only the number 
of children is more positively associated with female workers’ probabilities of holding 
a temporary job than male workers’. With regard to country-level factors, both regular 
EPL and temporary EPL are more positively associated with female workers’ 
probabilities of holding a temporary job than male workers’.  
 
                                                     







Table 4-4 adopted multilevel models to test individual factors and the 
interaction between country and individual-level factors on the probabilities of 
holding a temporary job. The null model is significant, which suggests the variation 
among the countries is significant. Basically, the individual-level results in Table 4-4 
are very similar to the results in Table 4-3. However, the results of the country-level 
factors are different: as Table 4-4 shows, only the MWSI is negatively associated with 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Individual-Level Factors
-1.834*** -1.673*** -1.497*** -1.541*** -1.549*** -1.491*** -1.501*** -1.532***
(0.042) (0.081) (0.106) (0.109) (0.108) (0.101) (0.106) (0.109)
 Worker Characteristics
0.716*** 0.443*** -0.231 -0.521 0.036 0.238 0.412
(0.030) (0.100) (0.347) (0.345) (0.229) (0.219) (0.265)
0.644*** 0.648*** 0.647*** 0.648*** 0.646*** 0.645*** 0.646***
(0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109)
0.192*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.189*** 0.189***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
-0.297*** -0.297*** -0.298*** -0.297*** -0.300*** -0.298*** -0.297***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
-0.205*** -0.218*** -0.211** -0.223** -0.202** -0.208** -0.194*
(0.037) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.075)
0.370*** 0.355*** 0.356*** 0.358*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.353***
(0.032) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
0.079*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006
(0.018) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
0.009 0.002 0.019 -0.009 -0.003 -0.020
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.086)
0.024 0.019 0.016 0.020 0.023 0.026
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
0.141*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.142***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Country-Level Interaction
0.00001 0.00001** 0.000009 0.000007 0.000007











Pseudo R-squared 0.022 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.051
  Bachelor Degree or  higher
degree
Table 4-3. Fixed Effect Models Predicting  Temporary Job Probabilities with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
 Intercept
  Female
    Age 15-24
    Age 55-65
  Female  × Regular EPL
  Partnered
  Preschool Children
  Numbers of Children
  Female × Partnered
  Female × Preschool
Children
  Female × Numbers of
Children
  Female  × GDP per capita
  Female  × Overall EPL
  Female × MWSI
Note:  N = 11 countries.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
  Female  × Temporary EPL






the likelihood of holding a temporary job, but no gender interactions with regular EPL 
and temporary EPL. This result also suggests only the pseudo R-squared in Table 4-3 
is similar with the ICC in Table 4-4 (about 0.4 or 0.5), but the coefficient is relatively 




Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Individual-Level Fixed Effects
-2.078*** -1.956*** -1.784*** -0.909 -0.650 -1.364*** -0.911 0.173 -0.839 -0.561 -1.321* -0.933 0.063
(0.122) (0.327) (0.303) (0.055) (0.848) (0.263) (0.548) (0.625) (0.997) (0.848) (0.622) (0.550) (0.631)
 Worker Characteristics
0.716*** 0.443*** 0.444*** 0.444*** 0.444*** 0.444*** 0.442*** 0.326 0.294* 0.367** 0.478*** 0.606***
(0.108) (0.068) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.171) (0.139) (0.108) (0.119) (0.146)
0.644*** 0.649* 0.649*** 0.649*** 0.650*** 0.649*** 0.648*** 0.650*** 0.652*** 0.651*** 0.649*** 0.647***
(0.271) (0.269) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111)
0.193 0.190 0.191** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.192** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.190*** 0.190***
(0.251) (0.251) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
-0.297* -0.297* -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.296*** -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.296*** -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.297***
(0.120) (0.121) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
-0.203*** -0.215* -0.214** -0.214** -0.214** -0.215** -0.217** -0.214** -0.220** -0.205** -0.210** -0.192**
(0.055) (0.092) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.074)
0.369*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.354*** 0.354*** 0.353***
(0.067) (0.058) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
0.079** -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007
(0.028) (0.036) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.016 -0.003 0.001 -0.022
(0.100) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.086)
0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.026 0.030
(0.101) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
0.141** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.141*** 0.144***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Country-Level Fixed Effects
-0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00003** -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00003**





















ICC (Interclass Correlation) 0.042 0.054 0.054 0.045 0.044 0.040 0.0563 0.028 0.045 0.044 0.040 0.043 0.028
 N = 11 countries.or market policy.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
  Female × ALMP
  Female × MWSI
  Female  × Regular EPL
  Female  × Overall EPL
  Female  × Temporary EPL




  Numbers of Children
  Overall EPL
  GDP per capita
  Female × Partnered
  Female × Preschool Childrn
  Female × Numbers of Children
Table 4-4. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Temporary Employment  Probabilities with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
  Preschool Childrn
 Intercept
  Female
  Bachelor Degree or  higher degree
  Partnered
    Age 15-24







Table 4-5 reports the results of fixed effects models, estimating the micro and 
macro determinants of the probabilities of employment in female-type occupations. The 
null model is significant, suggesting that the variation among countries is significant. 
The pseudo R-squared for the null model is only 0.03, and it becomes about 0.13 after 
adding individual-level factors, though the pseudo R square still stays about 0.13 after 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Individual-Level Factors
-2.107*** -2.740*** -2.663*** -2.456*** -2.528*** -2.668*** -2.629*** -2.595***
(0.031) (0.046) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049)
 Worker Characteristics
1.698*** 1.576*** 2.870*** 2.499*** 1.578*** 1.516*** 1.231***
(0.018) (0.031) (0.173) (0.162) (0.144) (0.109) (0.116)
0.321*** 0.325*** 0.321*** 0.322*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.326***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
-0.064** -0.058** -0.061* -0.059* -0.057* -0.058* -0.057*
(0.034) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
-0.199*** -0.197*** -0.196*** -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.196*** -0.199***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
-0.053** -0.069 -0.041 -0.050 -0.071* -0.061 -0.105**
(0.019) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
0.046 0.059 0.046 0.048 0.058 0.053 0.075
(0.024) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
-0.035*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.109***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
0.027 -0.011 0.003 0.029 0.015 0.076
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
-0.007 0.015 0.008 -0.007 0.0003 0.039
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
0.107*** 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.107***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Country-Level Interaction
-0.00001** -0.00001** 0.0000005 0.000004 0.0000006











Pseudo R-squared 0.036 0.131 0.132 0.133 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132
  Female × MWSI
Note:  N = 14 countries.or market policy.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
  Female  × Temporary EPL
  Female × ALMP
  Female  × Regular EPL
  Partnered
  Preschool Children
  Numbers of Children
  Female × Partnered
  Female × Preschool
Children
  Female × Numbers of
Children
  Female  × GDP per capita
  Female  × Overall EPL
  Bachelor Degree or  higher
degree
Table 4-5. Fixed Effect Models Predicting  Female type Job Probabilities with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
 Intercept
  Female
    Age 15-24





adding interactions between gender and country-level factors. As for individual-level 
factors, both being female, and being a young worker, are positively associated with the 
likelihood of holding a female-type job. On the contrary, completing a bachelor degree 
or higher degree, being an older worker, being partnered, and the number of children, 
are all negatively associated with the chances of holding a female-type job. With regard 
to gender and individual-level interactions, the number of children is positively 
associated with females’ likelihood of holding a female-type occupation more than for 
men.   
As for gender interactions with country-level factors, overall EPL and regular 
EPL all both significantly and negatively associated with females’ chances of holding 
a female-type occupation, which does not confirm the deregulation orthodoxy. There is 
a negative and significant interaction between being female and ALMP, which suggests 
that higher ALMP does not necessarily push women into female-type occupations. In 
other words, more developed flexicurity policies (such as higher EPL and ALMP) may 
not necessarily be harmful for women’s employment prospects in the labor market. 
Consequently, perhaps the higher level of flexicurity policies is not necessarily harmful 
for gender equality in the labor market. Finally, Model 7 shows a positive and 





by the MWSI), which suggests that higher welfare state interventions are positively 
associated with the probabilities for women more than for men of holding a female-
type occupation, which again confirms Mandel and Semyonov’s (2006) findings and 
predictions about the “welfare state paradox”. In other words, a higher level of welfare 
state intervention will increase women’s employment probabilities but not into 
desirable and powerful positions.  
Table 4-6 shows the results of fixed effects models, estimating the micro and 
macro determinants of the probabilities of employment in a managerial position. The 
pseudo R-squared for the null model is only 0.06, and it becomes about 0.10 after 
adding individual-level factors, though the pseudo R-squared still stays about 0.10 after 
adding interactions between gender and country-level factors. As for individual-level 
factors, being female, being a young worker, and the presence of pre-school aged 
children all are negatively associated with the chances of holding a managerial position. 
On the contrary, being an older worker, completing a bachelor or higher degree, being 
partnered, and the number of children all are positively associated with the likelihood 
of holding a managerial position. 
However, though being partnered and the number of children are both positively 





interactions suggest these two variables are significantly and negatively associated with 
female workers’ chances of holding managerial positions more than men’s.  
 
All three types of EPL are found to have negative interactions with gender,  
which suggest that the higher EPL is not helpful for women’s probabilities for holding 
managerial positions compared to mens’, these findings resonate Mandel and 
Semyonov’s (2006) findings and prediction about the “welfare state paradox” again. 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Individual-Level Factors
-2.808*** -3.762*** -3.904*** -3.853*** -3.852*** -3.917*** -3.886*** -3.907***
(0.039) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
 Worker Characteristics
-0.807*** -0.364*** 0.197 0.252 0.098 -0.504*** -0.438**
(0.017) (0.033) (0.184) (0.168) (0.169) (0.140) (0.142)
-1.318*** -1.328*** -1.329*** -1.329*** -1.328*** -1.328*** -1.328***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
0.200*** 0.179*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.179***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
0.462*** 0.462*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.458*** 0.457*** 0.457***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
0.374*** 0.374*** 0.535*** 0.536*** 0.533*** 0.536*** 0.533***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
-0.220*** -0.220*** -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.242*** -0.245*** -0.242***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
0.058*** 0.058*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.093***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
-0.426*** -0.433*** -0.435*** -0.428*** -0.435*** -0.427***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
0.056 0.067 0.068 0.061 0.070 0.058
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
-0.139*** -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.134*** -0.140*** -0.140***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Country-Level Interaction
-0.000003 -0.000006 -0.000008* 0.000008* 0.000003











Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.102 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104
  Female × MWSI
Note:  N = 14 countries.or market policy.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
  Female  × Temporary EPL
  Female × ALMP
  Female  × Regular EPL
  Partnered
  Preschool Children
  Numbers of Children
  Female × Partnered
  Female × Preschool
Childrn
  Female × Numbers of
Children
  Female  × GDP per capita
  Female  × Overall EPL
  Bachelor Degree or  higher
degree




    Age 15-24





Besides, Model 6 suggests that higher ALMP is negatively associated with women’s 
likelihood of holding a managerial position compared to men, and in Model 7, more 
generous MWSI is also negatively associated with women’s likelihood of holding a 
managerial position compared to men; these findings also resonate with Mandel and 
Semyonov’s (2006) findings and prediction about the “welfare state paradox” .  
 
Table 4-7. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Employment 
Probabilities by Gender 
 
In Tables 4-7 to 4-11, three types of country-level factors’ margins effects on 
five labor market outcomes by gender are provided; significant gender differences are 
indicated in red. As presented in Table 4-1, there is a significant interaction between 
gender and ALMP, so ALMP has a higher positive association with females’ 
employment probabilities than males’. Females’ employment probabilities increase 9% 
while males’ only increase 1% when ALMP increases from 0.24 % to 0.85% (see Table 





increase about 7% while males’ only increase about 1% when the index increases from 
33.65 to 65.68. 
 
Table 4-8. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Part-time 
Job Probabilities by Gender 
 
     As for part-time job probabilities, higher overall EPL seems to be more positively 
associated with females’ than males’, because females’ part-time job probabilities 
increase 23% while males’ only increase 14% when overall EPL increases from 1.91 to 
2.76, and this finding confirms the significant interaction between gender and overall 
EPL in Table 4-2. As for ALMP, it seems have greater positively association with 
females’ than males, because females’ part-time job probabilities increase 12% while 
males’ only increase 8% when ALMP increases from 0.24% to 0.85%. This finding 
confirms the significant interaction between gender and ALMP in Table 4-2. Also, the 
MWSI seems to have a stronger positive association with females’ than males, because 





MWSI increases from 33.65 to 65.68. This finding is consistent with the significant 
interaction between gender and the MWSI in Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-9. Three Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Temporary 
Job Probabilities by Gender 
      With regard to temporary job probabilities, none of the three country-level show 
significant associations with gender in Table 4-9. These findings are consistent with the 
results in Table 4-3 and 4-4; there were no significant gender interactions found in these 
two tables.    
 
Table 4-10. Three Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Female-type 





As for female-type job probabilities, higher overall EPL seems to have a 
greater positive association with females’ than males, because females’ female-type job 
probabilities increase 1.5% while males’ only increase 0.05% when overall EPL 
increases from 1.91 to 2.76. This finding confirms the significant interaction between 
gender and overall EPL in Table 4-5. As for ALMP, it seems to have a more positive 
association with females’ than males, because females’ female-type job probabilities 
decrease 1.33% while males’ only decrease 0.09% when ALMP increases from 0.24% 
to 0.85%. This finding confirms the significant interaction between gender and ALMP 
in Table 4-5. Besides, the MWSI seems to have a sronger positively association with 
females’ than males, because females’ female-type job probabilities decrease 2.17% 
while males’ only decrease 0.67% when MWSI increases from 33.65 to 65.68, and this 
finding confirms the significant interaction between gender and the MWSI in Table 4-
5. 
 
Table 4-11. Three Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Managerial 





As for managerial position probabilities, higher overall EPL seems to have 
greater negative association with females’ than males, because females’ managerial 
position probabilities decrease 1.7% while males’ only increase 0.09% when overall 
EPL increases from 1.91 to 2.76. This finding confirms the significant interaction 
between gender and overall EPL in Table 4-6. As for ALMP, the association operates in 
different directions for females’ and males’. Females’ managerial position probabilities 
decrease 1.44% but males’ increase 2.57% when ALMP increases from 0.24% to 0.85%. 
Besides, the MWSI association with gender operate in different directions for females’ 
and males. Females’ managerial position probabilities decrease 2.49% while males’ 
increase 8% when MWSI increases from 33.65 to 65.68. This finding is consistent with 
the significant interaction between gender and MWSI in Table 4-6. 
III. Discussion 
First of all (from Table 4-1 to 4-6), temporary EPL negatively influences women’s 
employment probabilities more than men’s. But regular EPL and temporary EPL are 
found to be positive associated with females’ likelihood of holding a temporary job, 
which means females’ likelihood of holding a temporary job is greater than males’. 
Besides,   higher overall and regular EPL are negatively related to the probability of 





necessary that a higher EPL will push women into female-type occupations. This 
challenges the previous literature, which finds that a higher EPL will be harmful for 
women and other outsiders in the labor market. Finally, for the probability of holding a 
managerial position, it is not surprising that all three types of EPL negatively interact 
with being female. In other words, stricter labor market regulation is negatively 
associated with women’s probabilities of holding managerial positions.  
As for gender interactions with ALMP, the results indicate positive associations 
with females’ employment probabilities more than males’. In addition, ALMP is 
negatively associated with females’ chances of holding female-type jobs more than 
males’. Judging from these results, we can say that ALMP seems to be beneficial for 
gender equality because it is negatively associated with female probabilities in atypical 
work (not on permanent contracts or full-time jobs) and female-type jobs. However, 
ALMP is also negatively associated with females’ chances of holding managerial 
positions. Taken together, the effects of ALMP on gender equality in the labor market 
are still mixed and need to be further explored in the future.  
Finally, the effects of the MWSI seem to confirm the Mandel and Semyonov’s 
(2006) findings and predictions about the “welfare state paradox”. In other words, a 





probability, but also increase women’s probability of holding a female-type occupation, 




































Chapter 5. Gendered Flexicurity: The effects of 
Flexicurity on Gender Wage Gaps in 18 countries 
 
I. Correlation between important institutional factors and the gender 
earnings ratio49 
 
Figure 5-1 presents the relationship between overall EPL and general 
earnings dispersion (measured by the 90/10 ratio). The liberal market economies of the 
English-speaking countries (such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom) are concentrated in the left side of the figure, which indicates lower 
overall EPL and higher wage inequality, while the corporatist economies (such as 
Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) occupy the right area of the figure, characterized by 
strong union system traditions and more strict labor market regulations. As Blau and 
Kahn (1992; 2003) contend, a highly centralized wage setting mechanism can 
efficiently contribute to lower wage dispersion and thus indirectly to lowering gender 
earnings disparities. Basically, these results are very similar to Kahn’s (2012) findings: 
the wage inequality is particularly high in the US, the UK and Canada, while it is 
                                                     
49 There many different definitions of gender earning ratios, I include here all employed workers (no 
matter in full-time or other type jobs). I calculate the ratio of mean female annual earnings to the mean 





relatively low in the Social democratic (such as the Denmark, Norway, Finland, and 
Sweden) countries. In addition, it is worth noting that extremely low EPL is usually 
related to higher levels of wage inequality, as Figure 5-1 presents. While the core value 
of “flexicurity” is to enhance labor market flexibility (through the deregulation of EPL) 
and in the meantime enhance employment security (through ALMP), higher flexibility 
(lower EPL) and higher security (higher ALMP) were usually praised as a successful 
labor market institution paradigm (such as Denmark). However, this analysis reminds 
us that the extremely high level of flexibility (or the extremely high level of 
deregulation of EPL) is related to relatively high wage inequality. In other words, 
setting an appropriate level of EPL is a critical issue for flexicurity researchers and 
policymakers.   
 
Figure 5-1. 90/10 Earning Ratio by Overall Employment Protective Legislation 
50 
                                                     





To illuminate the role of wage structure, Figure 5-2 presents gender earnings 
ratios, while Figure 5-3 presents female median annual earnings in the males’ annual 
earnings distribution. As Blau and Kahn (1996) clarify, “gender-specific” factors, 
 
Figure 5-2. Gender Earnings Ratios (All Employed Labor Force) 
 
Figure 5-3. Female Median Earning in Males’ n’s Earning Distribution Percentile  
including differences in qualifications and the impact of labor market discrimination, 





distribution, while “the overall wage structure determines the wage penalty or reward 
associated with this position in the wage distribution (p. 32)”. Generally speaking, 
liberal market economies (such as the US, the UK, Canada and Australia) report lower 
gender earnings ratios than the Social democratic countries (such as Denmark, Finland, 
and Sweden). While the ratios in Figure 5-2 present only the nominal differences in 
gender earnings ratios, the differences in the rankings in Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3 
illuminate the importance of the wage structure in determining the level of gender 
earnings disparities. For example, Blau and Kahn (1992; 2003) emphasize that 
American women have relatively higher human capital and higher wages than women 
in other developed economies, but substantial gender wage gaps still exist, perhaps due 
to the unequal overall wage structure. In Figure 5-2, the US ranking is 11 of 18 in all 
countries; however, in Figure 5-3, it ranks the second highest among 18 countries. In 
other words, the relatively high gender earnings gap in the US is not attributed to the 
low ranking of women in the men’s wage distribution (or gender-specific factors) but 
should be attributed to wage dispersion being larger than in other countries (which 
means the differences in rewards or penalties for specific occupations or industries are 






Figure 5-4. Gender Earning Ratios by Overall EPL  
 
 
Figure 5-5. Gender Earning Ratios by ALMP 
Figure 5-4 presents the correlation between EPL and gender earning ratios. As 
mentioned before, EPL is a composite indicator from 1 to 6, where a higher score 
indicates more strict regulation of the labor market, and it usually serves as the 
“flexibility” indicator in flexicurity research. In this figure, we can see that the EPL 





may result in lower gender earning differentials and higher gender wage equality. 
However, these results indicate only a weak correlation coefficient. Figure 5-5 presents 
the correlation between ALMP and the gender earning ratios. ALMP indicates the 
percentages of GDP that are expended on active labor market policies; this usually 
serves as the “security” indicator in flexicurity research. From this figure, we can see 
that ALMP is positively related to the gender earnings ratios, which means that workers 
in countries with more developed active labor market policies may present lower gender 
earnings gaps. However, similar to the previous figure, the correlation coefficient is 
only at a weak level. Figure 5-6 presents the correlation between the MWSI and gender 
earnings ratios, and it shows a positive relationships between these two indicators. 
However, as mentioned before, a higher level of welfare state intervention will result 
in higher female employment rates and lower gender wage gaps, but that association 
should be attributed to the more equal wage structure, not the more developed welfare 
state policies. 
In Figures 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6, Japan seems to be an obvious outlier. The original 
correlation in Figure 5-4 is 0.20, but it becomes 0.13 after removing Japan. In Figure 
5-5, the original correlation is 0.26, but it becomes only 0.06 after removing Japan. On 





removing Japan. According to an OECD (2017) report, there is a sharp division of paid 
and unpaid work between the genders in Japan, and despite Japanese women’s 
increasing participation in the labor market, Japan still has the third highest gender pay 
gap in the OECD countries. Furthermore, Japan ranks among the lowest countries, 
regarding the women’s share in managerial positions among OECD countries, and 
Japanese women also comprise a very low percentage on boards of directors, and in 
leadership positions in the public sector. Taken together, Japan faces more rigid gender 
inequality in the labor market, compared with other countries. 
 
 






II. Results of Multilevel Analysis: Determinants of Workers’ 
Earnings and Earning Percentile 
 
   Table 5-1 shows the results of HLM51 analyses testing the micro and macro 
determinants of individual workers’ natural log of earnings. First of all, the null model 
is significant, suggesting that the variation in outcomes among the countries is 
significant, and worthy of further analysis. Among the micro determinants, being a 
female, being a young or older workers, the presence of pre-school aged children, and 
the number of children, are all negatively associated with individual workers’ natural 
log of earnings. In contrast, the completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher degree, and 
being partnered, are both significantly positively associated with individual workers’ 
annual earnings. Besides, being partnered, the presence of pre-school aged children, 
and the number of children are all negatively associated with female workers’ earnings 
more than males’. 
As for country-level factors, none of the five country-level factors show 
significant effects on workers’ annual earnings. As for gender and macro-level indicator 
interactions, only the MWSI is positively associated with workers’ earnings, which 
suggests that the higher effort of one country’s MWSI facilitates workers’ entry (with 
                                                     
51 HLM analysis is only adopted in this chapter (Chapter 5) due to its linear structure, while Chapter 4 





most effects on women) into the labor market and thus is positively associated with the 
individual workers’ earnings.  
  In Table 5-2, standardized earnings (the percentiles of earnings) are adopted as 
a dependent variable to re-estimate the HLM regression. The percentile refers to where 
individuals are ranked in each country according to their relative position in the wage 
distribution on a standardized ladder. The null model is significant, suggesting that the 
variation in outcomes among the countries are significant and worth further analysis. 
As for individual-level indicators, the results are similar to the first set of analyses: 
being female, being a young or older worker, the presence of pre-school aged children, 
and the number of children, are negatively associated with the relative position of one’s 
earnings percentile. In contrast, the completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher degree, 
and being partnered, are positively associated with individual workers’ earnings 
percentile. As for gender interactions, being partnered, the presence of pre-school aged 
children, and the number of children all are negatively associated with female workers’ 
earnings percentiles more than males’. 
  As for the country-level predicators, overall EPL, regular EPL, ALMP, and 
MWSI all are positively associated with workers’ earning percentiles. However, all five 





are negatively associated with females’ earnings percentiles more than males’. In other 
word, stricter labor market regulation is negatively associated with women’s relative 
positions in the earning ladder compared to men’s.  
 
 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Individual-Level Factors
11.268*** 10.987*** 10.841*** 14.372*** 13.436*** 12.581*** 13.038*** 12.311*** 14.422*** 13.471*** 12.614*** 13.089*** 10.681***
(0.379) (0.417) (0.427) (3.239) (2.837) (2.063) (1.658) (2.008) (3.235) (2.836) (2.067) (1.654) (1.066)
 Worker Characteristics
-0.590*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.432*** -0.399*** -0.392*** -0.436*** -0.457***
(0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.086) (0.058) (0.052) (0.072) (0.075)
-0.450*** -0.434*** -.434*** -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.434*** -.432*** -0.432*** -0.432*** -0.431*** -0.432***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
-.081*** -.070*** -.070*** -.070*** -.070*** -.070*** -.070*** -.069*** -.069*** -.069*** -.069*** -.069***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
0.271*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
0.068*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.111***
(0.012) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
-0.186*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.091***
(0.030) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
-0.012 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.094* -0.094* -0.094* -0.094* -0.094* -0.094* -0.090* -0.087* -0.083* -0.085* -0.072*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
-0.195** -0.195** -0.195** -0.195** -0.195*** -0.195** -0.195** -0.195** -0.195** -0.201*** -0.200**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057)
-0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.063*** -0.065***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Country-Level Factors
-0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00005 -0.00006 -0.00005 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00005





















ICC (Interclass Correlation) 0.805 0.835 0.836 0.821 0.824 0.826 0.818 0.825 0.821 0.824 0.826 0.818 0.836
N = 18 countries.or market policy.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
  Female × MWSI
  Female × ALMP
  Female  × Regular EPL




  Female × Partnered
  Female × Preschool Children
  Female × Numbers of
Children
GDP per capita
  Preschool Childrn
 Intercept
  Female
    Age 15-24
  Bachelor Degree or higher
Degree
Partnered
    Age 55-65
  Numbers of Children
Overall EPL
 Regular EPL
  Female  × Temporary EPL







    Comparing Table 5-1 and Table 5-2, particularly the interaction between 
gender and those five country-level factors, there are some interesting and important 
findings. First, none of the three types of EPL (overall EPL, regular EPL, and temporary 
EPL) are found to have a significant effect on log of earnings. They are found to have 
negative interactions between being female and earning percentiles. As for ALMP and 
MWSI, these two factors are positively associated with females’ log earnings but 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Individual-Level Factors
50.307***  36.661**  31.942**  24.288***  26.604***  29.826***  30.261***  29.451**  20.376***  23.750***  27.808***  29.927***  26.494**
(0.082) (0.709) (0.727) (4.774) (3.926) (3.097) (2.897) (2.951) (4.748) (3.898) (3.081) (2.894) (2.941)
 Worker Characteristics
-26.000*** -17.388*** -17.387*** -17.387*** -17.387*** -17.387*** -17.386*** -9.354*** -11.700*** -13.559*** -16.685*** -11.333***
(0.092) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.425) (0.337) (0.306) (0.300) (0.349)
-13.204*** -12.864*** -12.862*** -12.862*** -12.863*** -12.863*** -12.863*** -12.994*** -13.010*** -12.932*** -12.883*** -12.960***
(0.400) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399)
-2.868*** -2.571*** -2.572*** -2.571*** -2.572*** -2.571*** -2.570*** -2.639*** -2.648*** -2.639*** -2.577*** -2.627***
(0.173) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172)
12.148*** 12.204*** 12.204*** 12.203*** 12.204*** 12.203*** 12.203*** 12.202*** 12.202*** 12.211*** 12.205*** 12.211***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
2.715*** 4.490*** 4.490*** 4.491*** 4.490*** 4.492*** 4.493*** 4.789*** 4.919*** 4.959*** 4.543*** 5.190***
(0.109) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.165)
-6.911*** -4.463*** -4.463*** -4.463*** -4.463*** -4.463*** -4.464*** -4.439*** -4.448*** -4.436*** -4.475*** -4.532***
(0.100) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
-0.271*** 0.880*** 0.880*** 0.880*** 0.880*** 0.880*** 0.880*** 0.916*** 0.911*** 0.873*** 0.885*** 0.870***
(0.055) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
-2.883*** -2.884*** -2.884*** -2.884*** -2.885*** -2.885*** -3.235*** -3.430*** -3.546*** -2.944*** -3.917***
(0.214) (0.214) (0.214) (0.214) (0.214) (0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (0.216) (0.215) (0.218)
-5.070*** -5.070*** -5.070*** -5.071*** -5.070*** -5.070*** -5.069*** -5.048*** -5.053*** -5.031*** -4.835***
(0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.192) (0.192) (0.192) (0.193) (0.193)
-2.518*** -2.518*** -2.518*** -2.518*** -2.518*** -2.518*** -2.599*** -2.585*** -2.509*** -2.528*** -2.497***
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
Country-Level Fixed Effects
0.00006 0.00005 0.00001 -0.000008 -0.00001 0.00006 0.00005 0.00001 -0.000008 -0.00002





















ICC (Interclass Correlation) 0.00004 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 .011 0.010
N = 18 countries.or market policy.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
  Female × MWSI
  Female × ALMP
  Female  × Temporary EPL
  Female  × Regular EPL




 Female × Preschool Childrn
  Fmale × Numbers of Children
 GDP per capita
 Regular EPL
Table 5-2. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Earnings Percentiles with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
  Preschool Childrn
 Intercept
  Female
    Age 15-24
  Bachelor Degree or Higher
Degree
  Partnered
    Age 55-65
  Numbers of Children
 Overall EPL





negatively associated with women’s earnings percentiles. These results are consistent 
with the major hypothesis of this research: differences in wage structures among 
countries are a vital factor shaping gender earnings differentials, and these differences 
are correlated with flexicurity policies and welfare state interventions. These 
relationships can be observed clearly in Figure 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6, which suggest that  
more developed flexicurity (higher EPL and ALMP) and MWSI are related to lower 
gender earnings differentials, but these factors do not increase women’s positions in the 
wage structure relative to men. By being sensitive to relative ranks rather than the 
absolute wage, this procedure reemphasizes the importance of wage structure in 
determining gender earnings differentials. In other words, the level of flexicurity 
policies and the generosity of welfare state policies reduce the gender earnings gap, but 
they do not increase women’s relative position in the men’s wage distribution.  
     To illustrate this relationship more clearly, Figure 5-7 presents the relationship 
between differences in ranks and the MWSI. Generally speaking, the Social democratic 
countries occupy the upper and right side of the area, while the liberal market 
economies occupy the left and lower side. This means that the Social democratic 
countries have relatively higher gender earnings disparities when measured in 





lower gaps in standardized terms but higher disparities in nominal terms. These results 
are in line with the major theoretical concern of this paper: the Nordic countries have 
more egalitarian wage structures. These countries are also characterized by more 
centralized wage setting systems and more developed flexicurity policies and welfare 
state interventions. Table 5-3 presents the country-level factors used in this chapter (see 
columns 1 to 4); column 5 and 7 indicate the net gender gap after controlling for marital 
status, age, education, the presence of pre-school aged children, and the number of 
children. Column 6 is the ranking of column 5, and column 8 is the ranking of column 
7. Finally, column 9 is the difference between column 6 and 8.  Furthermore, the 
correlation between the 90/10 ratio (column 1) and differences in ranks (column 9) is 
negative and strong (-0.65), which also confirms the hypothesis: a more equal wage 
structure is negatively related to the differences in ranks.  
     
Figure 5-7. Differences in Rank by MWSI52 
                                                     







Table 5-3. Distribution of  MWSI and Gender Earnings Gaps 
 
 
Table 5-4. Three Types of Country-level Factors Margins Effects on Log Wage by 
Gender 
Table 5-4 indicates that the MWSI seems to have a greater positive 
association with females’ log wage than males’, because females’ log wage increase 






















Hungary 3.31 2.40 0.33 65.20 0.18 1 8.814 1 0
Denmark 2.83 2.35 1.26 92.69 0.29 2 18.9 10 8
Italy 4.22 3.15 0.46 48.67 0.32 3 17.73 8 5
Taiwan 4.16 1.95 0.02 15.15 0.35 4 17.66 7 3
Finland 3.21 2.08 0.83 65.68 0.37 5 18.6 9 4
Czech Republic 2.97 2.79 0.24 41.82 0.38 6 19.68 11 5
France 3.53 2.73 0.90 81.67 0.38 7 16.32 4 -3
Spain 4.31 2.76 0.77 42.04 0.39 8 15.92 3 -5
Sweden 2.82 2.58 1.16 83.47 0.41 9 21.05 14 5
Norway 2.92 2.38 0.54 99.92 0.46 10 25.14 16 6
Ireland 3.84 1.91 0.61 44.75 0.46 11 15.78 2 -9
Canada 4.17 1.51 0.28 33.65 0.49 12 17.1 5 -7
Australia 4.50 1.65 0.33 38.28 0.49 13 19.94 12 -1
United States 5.73 1.00 0.12 28.62 0.50 14 17.38 6 -8
United Kingdom 4.37 1.72 0.30 61.02 0.56 15 20.44 13 -2
Netherlands 3.11 2.92 0.99 59.36 0.68 16 29.59 17 1
Germany 3.46 2.95 0.85 38.65 0.76 17 24.4 15 -2





0.22 while males’ increase 0.48 when MWSI increases from 33.65 to 65.68, and this 
finding confirms the significant interaction between gender and MWSI in Table 5-1. 
 
Table 5-5. Three Types of Country-level Factors Margins Effects on Wage 
Percentile by Gender 
       As for wage percentiles, higher overall EPL affects women and men in 
different directions; females’ decrease 3.12 while males’ increase 3.49 when overall 
EPL increases from 1.91 to 2.76. This finding confirms the significant interaction 
between gender and overall EPL in Table 5-2. As for ALMP, it too seems to affect 
women and men in different directions; females’ wage percentile decrease 0.02 but 
males’ increase 2.48 when ALMP increases from 0.24% to 0.85%. This finding 
confirms the significant interaction between gender and ALMP in Table 5-2. At the 
same time, MWSI also shows gender association in different directions; females’ wage 
percentile and males, because females’ wage percent decrease by 4.43 while males’ 





significant interaction between gender and MWSI in Table 5-2. 
III. Discussion  
The objective of this chapter is to examine the effects of flexicurity policies on 
gender earnings gaps. For this purpose, I introduce two bodies of literature: one is on 
the gendered effects of flexicurity policies on labor market outcomes, and the other 
concerns the importance of the wage structure in determining gender earnings 
differentials. In conclusion, according to the findings in Table 5-1, I argue that gender 
earnings differentials are less pronounced in countries with more developed MWSI 
countries, while three types of EPL and ALMP do not have significant effects on log 
earnings. However, when estimating gender earnings using percentiles of earnings, the 
effects of ALMP and MWSI become negative (see Tables 5-2). Furthermore, three types 
of EPL all present negative interactions with gender, suggesting that stricter EPL is 
negatively associated with females’ earning percentile more than males’. In other words, 
more developed MWSI is positively associated with women’s earnings relative to 
men’s, but that result should be attributed to their more egalitarian wage structures. On 
the other hand, stricter EPL not only does not increase women’s annual earnings,it also 
decreases women’s earning percentile relative to men’s. Being aware of the different 





may result in different policy implications to reduce the gender earnings disparities.  
If the gender inequalities are mainly attributed to the overall wage structure, 
policies should be aimed at enhancing the overall wage structure, such as strengthening 
union bargaining, or a more centralized wage setting mechanism. However, if gender 
inequality is more attributed to women occupying lower positions than men in the labor 
market, then we should focus on policies specifically aimed at raising women’s pay or 
other gender-equality efforts. 
Taken together, the more developed MWSI seems to lower less gender earnings 
disparities. However, this research also finds that flexicurity policies (including EPL 
and ALMP) and MWSI do not efficiently increase women’s relative positions in the 
males’ wage distribution. A number of studies have already confirmed the importance 
of centralized wage setting structures, which not only can yield a more equal wage 
structure but can also indirectly contribute to gender earnings equality. Consequently, 
researchers and policymakers should be aware of the importance of centralized wage 








Chapter 6. Flexicurity, Gender and Job Security: 
Determinants of Job Security in 19 Countries   
 
I. Correlation between important institutional factors and job 
security perception53 
As predicted, Figure 6-1 presents a negative and insignificant correlation   
between overall EPL and job security perception. However, overall EPL is found to be 
significantly correlated with employment security perception; these two factors are 
moderately correlated (-0.56) as reported in Figure 6-2. This comparison implies that 
EPL is more related to employment security perception than to job security perception. 
This finding is particularly important because the literature generally focuses only on 
the effects of EPL on job security, and of ALMP on employment security (Anderson 
and Pontusson, 2007). In addition, Figure 6-3 indicates a strong (-0.72) and significant 
correlation between regular EPL and job security, and the correlation is even stronger 
than that in Figure 6-1, which suggests that regular EPL exerts a greater influence on 
individual workers’ job security perception. However, ALMP and employment security 
                                                     
53 The correlation between job security and employment security is 0.29 (insignificant), the correlation 
between job security and job-loss worry is -0.16 (insignificant), and the correlation between 





are not correlated (-0.08), which does not confirm Anderson and Pontusson’s (2007) 
finding about ALMP exerting a significant influence on individual workers’ 
employment security perception.  
 
Figure 6-1. Overall EPL and Job Security Perception  
 






Figure 6-3. Regular EPL and Employment Security Perception  
 
  Figure 6-4. ALMP and Employment Security Perception  








Figure 6-5. Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by Overall EPL  
    In Figure 6-5, almost all countries show a similar pattern of security perceptions: 
job security scores are highest, followed by employment security, and then job-loss 
worry. Furthermore, country on the left in the figure, with relative lower overall EPL 
(United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland and Australia), present similar job 
security with other countries, which suggests that lower EPL may not necessarily lead 
to lower job security. On the other hand, Denmark reports the highest job security scores; 
it is ranked eighth among 19 countries. As for job-loss worry, countries with higher 






Figure 6-6. Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by ALMP in the 2000s 
Figure 6-6 presents the histogram of three types of security perceptions by ALMP. 
The highest employment security is presenting in Denmark (ranked 1st in ALMP), 
Ireland and UK (both ranked in the middle in ALMP), and the US (ranked near the 
bottom in ALMP). In other words, ALMP seems not to be a critical factor shaping 
employment security.   
Denmark ranked first in PLMP. Denmark also shows relatively low job-loss worry. 
However, workers in Ireland report the lowest job-loss worry, while Ireland is ranked 
in the middle (9th) of these 19 countries. On the other side, the highest job-loss worry 
was found in Spain (2.78), it was also relatively high in Germany (2.03), while Spain 
was ranked 7th and Germany got the 3rd with respect to PLMP. Taken together, it 





job-loss worry perceptions among these countries.   
 
 
Figure 6-7. Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by PLMP  
 






 According to Figure 6-8, there seems to be no special pattern associating  
welfare state intervention and the three types of security perceptions. Consequently, 
multilevel analysis will be adopted in the following section to untangle the relationship 
between these country-level factors and individual workers’ security perceptions.  
 
II. Results of Multilevel Analysis: Determinants of Workers’ Security 
Perceptions 
      Table 6-1 shows the results of analyses testing the micro and macro 
determinants of individual workers’ job security perceptions. The null model is 
significant, which suggests that the differences between the countries is significant. 
Therefore, the multilevel analyses are necessary and meaningful. Among workers’ 
characteristics, only the completion of bachelor degree or more shows positive and 
significant effects on job security, which suggests that human capital is a crucial factor 
in determining workers’ perceptions of job security. As for individual worker 
characteristics and job characteristics, the only significant finding is that civil servants 
show higher security perceptions than do workers in private sector. This finding is 
consistent with most previous studies (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Muñoz de 





Seven macro-level characteristics are tested while controlling for the eight 
micro-level indicators. Due to the limited numbers of countries(19 countries), macro-
level factors are introduced one at a time after controlling for GDP per capita. As 
predicted by previous literature, stricter EPL is negatively associated with individual 
workers’ job security perceptions. However, in Model 2 to Model 4, only EPL for 
temporary contracts exerts significantly negative effects on workers’ job security. This 
important finding resonates with the literature on the change to EPL in the 1990s. Most 
countries did not change EPL for regular jobs but loosened employment regulations for 
temporary contract jobs. On the other hand, no other country-level factors show 
significant effects on job security perceptions.  
As for the interaction between gender and country-level factors, it is surprising 
that overall EPL presents a positive interaction with gender, which suggests that stricter 
EPL is positively associated with female workers’ job security perceptions more than 
male workers. However, while the major coefficient of overall EPL is still negatively 
associated with workers’ job security perceptions, the magnitude of decline in female 






Figure 6-9. The effect of Overall EPL on Job Security by Gender54     
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Table 6-1. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Job Security Perception with Individual and Country-level Variables 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Individual-Level Factors              
 Intercept 
0.528*** 0.797 0.277 0.242 0.025 0.130 0.722 0.172 1.048 0.108 0.367 -0.475 0.093 
(0.082) (1.258) (0.804) (0.562) (0.026) (0.596) (1.044) (0.672) (0.612) (0.870) (0.570) (0.673) (0.615) 
 Worker Characteristics              
 Female 
 -0.129 -0.126 -0.132 -0.125 -0.132 -0.135 -0.132 -0.623 -0.157 -0.454 0.389 -0.066 
 (0.136) (0.130) (0.129) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.701) 0.584  0.262  0.346  0.264  
  Age 15-24 
 -0.095 -0.072 -0.072 -0.061 -0.076 -0.062 -0.065 -0.095 -0.075 -0.077 -0.056 -0.075 
 (0.217) (0.206) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.206) (0.206) (0.205) (0.206) (0.206) 
  Age 55-65 
 0.132 0.159 0.120 0.153 0.177 0.153 0.157 0.121 0.167 0.115 0.153 0.179 
 (0.174) (0.167) (0.266) (0.267) (0.266) (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.266) (0.267) (0.267) 
  Bachelor Degree and more 
 0.082 0.114 0.136 0.124 0.137 0.121 0.127 0.083 0.115 0.138 0.122 0.135 
 (0.221) (0.142) (0.135) (0.140) (0.138) (0.140) (0.139) (0.158) (0.142) (0.135) (0.140) (0.138) 
  Partnered  
 -0.182 -0.151 -0.037 -0.060 -0.122 -0.167 -0.140 -0.166 -0.140 -0.002 -0.008 -0.115 
 (0.603) (0.443) (0.416) (0.438) (0.428) (0.440) (0.438) (0.476) (0.444) (0.408) (0.441) (0.430) 
  Children  
 -0.234 -0.232 -0.233 -0.237 -0.217 -0.232 -0.233 -0.234 -0.236 -0.240 -0.244 -0.219 
 (0.133) (0.128) (0.127) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.130) (0.128) (0.127) (0.128) (0.128) 
 Job Characteristics              
  Part-Time  
 0.263    0.270 0.256 0.271 0.261 0.286 0.277 0.269 0.275 0.272 0.289 0.257 
 (0.185) (0.176) (0.174) (0.176) (0.179) (0.177) (0.176) (0.184) (0.177) (0.175) (0.176) (0.176) 
  Civil Servant  







 0.581***  0.564***  0.566***  0.550*  0.558***  0.562***  0.566***  0.566*** 
 (0.175) (0.157) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.161) (0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.158) 








 (0.141) (0.136) (0.130) (0.137) (0.141) (0.136) (0.139) (0.137) (0.136) (0.130) (0.137) (0.142) 
  Managerial Position 
 -0.118 -0.100 -0.109 -0.086 -0.110 -0.100 -0.098 -0.108 -0.099 -0.093 -0.076 -0.109 
 (0.213) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.212) (0.211) (0.211) 
Country-Level Factors              
GDP Per Capita  
 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Overall EPL 
 -0.322  
  
   -0.462     
 (0.329)     (0.401)     







-0.099    
 (0.151)     (0.206)    





     -0.299**   
 (0.061)      (0.094)   
ALMP  
  
 0.224       0.550  






-0.007       -0.006 




   -0.052       
    (0.061)       





  -0.002      
    (0.003)      
Gender Interaction              





   0.236*     
     (0.068)     





    -0.122    













     0.173   
       (0.122)   





      -0.582  






       -0.001 
         (0.004) 
ICC (Interclass Correlation) 0.036 0.009 0.009 0.000  0.007 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.004 

























Table 6-2. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Employment Security Perception with Individual and Country-level Variables 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Individual-Level Factors              
 Intercept 
-1.119*** -1.980 -1.409 -2.231 -2.314* -2.199* -2.261* -2.202* -1.792 -2.290* -2.756** -2.412* -2.410* 
(0.123) (1.092) (1.222) (0.983) (0.963) (0.992) (0.966) (1.124) (1.293) (0.989) (0.996) (1.014) (0.977) 
 Worker Characteristics              
 Female 
 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.399 0.597 0.145 0.650 0.311 0.340 
 (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.483) (0.639) (0.287) (0.390) (0.317) (0.303) 
  Age 15-24 
 -0.009 -0.017 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.022 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.238) (0.239) (0.238) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.238) 
  Age 55-65 
 -0.720* -0.717* -0.718* -0.720* -0.718* -0.719* -0.708* -0.701* -0.714* -0.722* -0.730* -0.712* 
 (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) 
 Bachelor Degree and more  0.161 0.147 0.164 0.167 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.152 0.166 0.161 0.165 0.156 
 (0.166) (0.167) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.167) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) 
  Partnered  
 0.109 0.064 0.110 0.132 0.104 0.108 0.102 0.094 0.096 0.198 0.133 0.094 
 (0.478) (0.480) (0.479) (0.480) (0.480) (0.479) (0.479) (0.481) (0.480) (0.480) (0.480) (0.479) 
  Children  
 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.054 0.066 0.049 0.060 0.055 
 (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
 Job Characteristics              
  Part-Time  
 0.160 0.159 0.164 0.162 0.165 0.165 0.153 0.168 0.156 0.174 0.169 0.144 
 (0.196) (0.195) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.197) 
  Civil Servant  
 0.108 0.105 0.107 0.105 0.107 0.106 0.114 0.103 0.113 0.115 0.113 0.125 
 (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) 
  Union Member  
 -0.275 -0.271 -0.275 -0.283 -0.273 -0.278 -0.284 -0.275 -0.281 -0.274 -0.271 -0.263 








  Managerial Position 
 0.352 0.35 0.354 0.357 0.354 0.355 0.345 0.355 0.347 0.380 0.369 0.363 
 (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) 
Country-Level Fixed Effects              
GDP Per Capita  
 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003 0.00002 0.00003 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003 0.00002 0.00003 0.00002 
 (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Overall EPL  
 -0.109  
  
  0.007      
 (0.234)    (0.271)      







-0.104     
 (0.253)    (0.302)     





    0.040    




 0.218      0.616   





-0.029      0.085  




   0.001      0.005 
    (0.008)      (0.008) 
Gender Interaction              





  -0.193      
    (0.224)      





   -0.261     
     (0.274)     





    -0.078    
      (0.135)    








       (0.391)   





      -0.211  
        (0.192)  





       -0.006 
         (0.004) 
ICC (Interclass Correlation) 0.078 0.072 0.066 0.073  0.072 0.073 0.073 0.072 0.067 0.073 0.071 0.073 0.074 









Table 6-2 shows the results of analyses testing the micro and macro 
determinants of individual workers’ employment security perceptions. The empty 
model is significant, which indicates that variation between the countries is significant, 
so multilevel analyses are necessary and meaningful. For the influence of age, older 
workers reported significantly lower employment security than prime-aged workers. 
This may be because older workers usually have longer tenure, and labor market history, 
and higher salary. Consequently, it is more difficult for them to find a comparable job 
if they lose their current job. This finding is consistent with Anderson and Pontusson 
(2007)’s study, which found that age has a negative effect on employment security. 
However, they also found that the increase of age is positive in associated with job 
security perception. In contrast, my research does not find significant effects of age on 
job security perception. 
    For job characteristics, my research does not find significant differences between 
part-time workers and full-time workers, while Marcel (2008) found part-time workers 
report higher employment security, and Erlinghagen (2008) found that part-time 
workers did not show significant differences from their full-time counterparts. Taken 
together, the results are still mixed. As for union membership, my research does not 





(2007) noted that union membership had positive effects on employment security.  
As for country-level factors, there are no country-level factors showing 
significant effects on employment security. As mentioned before, ALMP is argued to 
be useful to enhance workers’ skill and employability, and thus can enhance workers’ 
employment security (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Chung and Oorschot, 2011; 
Ebralidze, 2012). However, ALMP does not show significant effects on employment 
security here, which suggests ALMP may not be that useful as the previous studies 
claimed.  





Table 6-3. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Job-loss worry with Individual and Country-level Variables 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Individual-Level Factors            
 Intercept 
0.137 1.837* 1.491* 2.189*** 2.328*** 2.337*** 1.842* 1.550* 2.169** 2.363* 2.370* 
(0.150) (0.714) (0.729) (0.624) (0.551) (0.559) (0.716) (0.730) (0.625) (0.551) (0.572) 
 Worker Characteristics            
 Female 
 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.045 -0.156 0.004 -0.110 -0.245** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.126) (0.138) (0.092) (0.079) (0.087) 
  Age 15-24 
 -0.039 -0.038 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.038 -0.040 -0.037 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) 
  Age 55-65 
 -0.274*** -0.275*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.272*** -0.272*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
  Bachelor Degree and more 
 -0.135* -0.134* -0.136* -0.138* -0.138* -0.135* -0.134* -0.137* -0.140* -0.140* 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
  Partnered  
 -0.050 -0.048 -0.053 -0.057 -0.055 -0.050 -0.047 -0.053 -0.057 -0.056 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
  Employed Spouse 
 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.095 0.093 0.098 0.105 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
  Children  
 -0.051 -0.051 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.051 -0.051 -0.050 -0.051 -0.050 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
 Job Characteristics            








 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
  Civil Servant  
 -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.503*** -0.517*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
  Union Member  
 0.177** 0.175** 0.178** 0.181** 0.181** 0.177** 0.174** 0.178** 0.181** 0.181** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
  Managerial Position 
 -0.124 -0.124 -0.123 -0.122 -0.123 -0.124 -0.126 -0.123 -0.124 -0.126 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Country-Level Factors            
GDP Per Capita  






-0.00005** -0.00005** -0.00005** 
-
0.00005** 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Overall EPL  
 0.149  
 
  0.146     
 (0.165)    (0.168)     







0.207    
 (0.158)    (0.161)    
Temporary EPL  
 
  
0.027     0.039   




 -0.127     0.161  




  -0.003     -0.005 
   (0.005)     (0.005) 








Female × Overall EPL  
 
  
   0.005     
    (0.064)     
Female × Regular EPL  
 
  
    0.063    
     (0.066)    
Female × Temporary EPL  
 
  
     -0.024   
      (0.046)   
Female × PLMP 
 
  
      0.069  
       (0.056)  
Female × MWSI 
 
  
       0.004** 
        (0.001) 
ICC (Interclass Correlation) 0.06 0.065 0.061 0.068  0.065 0.066 0.065 0.06 0.068 0.073 0.074 
















Table 6-3 shows the results of analyses testing the micro and macro 
determinants of individual workers’ perceptions of job-loss worry. The null model is 
significant, which suggests that the differences between the countries are significant. 
Therefore, multilevel analyses are necessary and meaningful. As mentioned, scholars 
of psychology divide job security into two categories: cognitive security and affective 
job security. “Cognitive job security” indicates an individual’s estimate of the 
probability of losing his or her current job, whereas “affective job security” refers to 
worry or anxiety about losing one’s job, including worry about the expected outcomes 
of losing one’s current job. As Anderson and Pontusson (2007) argue, in addition to 
cognitive security, there are two expected consequences of losing one’s job: “the 
prospects of finding another job and access to sources of income (livelihood) that do 
not depend on finding another job” (p.214). In other words, economic resources and 
support (or pressure) from the government or their household highly influence 
individuals’ job-loss worries. Consequently, in addition to EPL, passive labor market 
policies (also known as unemployment benefits) are tested in this section. Additionally, 
family support highly influences individuals’ job-loss worries. Therefore, spousal 
employment status (employed or not) is also considered in this section.  





job-loss worry than do prime-aged workers. It is interesting that older workers report 
higher anxiety about finding their next compatible jobs (lower employment security), 
but they also present higher confidence about holding their current job (lower job-loss 
worry).  Besides, the completion of higher education or higher significantly decreases 
job-loss worry. As for spousal employment status, the effect is insignificant. This result 
is consistent with Anderson and Pontusson (2007)’s finding: they also assumed that 
having an employed spouse is associated with lower worry about job loss, but they did 
not find significant effects. 
As for job characteristics, part-time workers show lower job-loss worry than 
full-time workers. This finding is consistent with Erlinghagen (2008)’s study: part-time 
workers did not show significant differences compared to their full-time counterparts. 
On the other hand, employment in the public sector and union membership both 
significantly decrease job-loss worry, and these findings also confirmed previous 
studies’ conclusions (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Muñoz de Bustill and De Pedraza, 
2010). 
     With regard to country-level predictors, all country-level factors are not found to 
have significant effects on job-loss worry. However, PLMP is argued to be the most 





PLMP significantly decreases workers’ job-loss worry. As for the interaction between 
gender and country-level variables, only the MWSI shows significant interaction with 
gender. In other words, higher welfare state intervention is positively associated with 
females’ job-loss worry more than men’s. This finding is in line with the “welfare state 
paradox”: higher levels of welfare state interventions will increase women’s 
employment probabilities but not into desirable and powerful positions, and these kinds 
of jobs may lead to higher job-loss worry. 
 
Table 6-4. Three Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Job Security 
by Gender 
 
Table 6-5. Three Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Employment 






Table 6-6. Two Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Job-loss worry 
by Gender 
      Table 6-4 to 6-6 present the effects of three country-level factors on three types 
of security perceptions. Overall EPL decreases job security, and it is also more 
negatively related to males’ job security perceptions. While males’ job security declines 
0.0402 when overall EPL increases from 1.91 to 2.76, females’ job security only 
declines 0.0225, due to the positive interactions between female and overall EPL in 
Model 8 from Table 6-1 (as showing in Figure 6-9). As for employment security, none 
of the three country-level factors show significant interactions with gender, consistent 
with the findings in Table 6-2 and 6-5. 
As for job-loss worry, it is not surprising that the increase of overall EPL 
increases the level of worry, and the levels are also similar. On the other hand, the 
MWSI is more positively associated with female workers’ job-loss worry more than 





welfare state interventions are positively associated with females’ job-loss worry more 
than males’. This finding suggests that women’s care responsibilities are still greater 
than men’s, and that more developed welfare state policies may lead to more employer 
discrimination against female workers than male to workers.   
III. Discussion 
At the individual-level, the empirical findings of the multilevel logistic 
regression analyses reveal that older workers have more confidence in maintaining their 
current job, although they report greater worries about finding a compatible new job. 
As expected, the completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher degree is negatively 
associated with job-loss worry, but does not have significant effects on the other two 
types of security perceptions. Being a civil servant is the most decisive predictor on job 
security and job-loss worry, though it does not have a significant influence on 
employment security. This is plausible because employment in the public sector 
provides greater protection than does employment in the private sector. Furthermore, 
union membership also has positive effect on job security and job-loss worry 
perceptions, while it does not have an effect on employment security. Besides, this 
research consciously introduces spousal employment status to explain job-loss worry, 





or their household) highly influences individuals’ job-loss worries. However, this effect 
is insignificant, while Anderson and Pontusson (2007) also have the same finding.   
      At the country-level, this research intends to distinguish EPL for regular 
contracts from EPL for temporary contracts, while most previous studies addressed only 
the influences of overall EPL. Furthermore, the gender interaction with EPL was only 
found in the interaction between female and overall EPL. Besides, ALMP and PLMP 
were not found to have significant effects on any of the three types of security 
perceptions, while previous studies find that argue ALMP can increase employment 
security (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Chung and Oorschot, 2011), and PLMP can 
decrease job-loss worry (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). However, Ebralidze (2012) 
also did not find a significant influence of PLMP on job-loss worry. Taken together, the 
results are still mixed and the further studies are needed.  
     Finally, this research is the first to investigate the effects of “combination security” 
(measured by MWSI) on individual workers’ perceptions of job-loss worry. This 
research finds a significant interaction between MWSI and gender, which suggests that 
higher welfare state interventions are more positively associated with females’ job-loss 
worry more than men’s. This finding partly confirmed the “welfare state paradox” again: 





but not into desirable and powerful positions; less desirable jobs may lead to higher 
job-loss worry. Furthermore, this finding may also indicate that women’s caring 
responsibilities remain greater than those of men, and that more developed welfare state 
polices result in greater employer discrimination against women (Nordli Hansen, 1995; 
Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Bergmann, 2008).  
The “flexibility” side of the labor institution exerts more negative effects on 
female workers’ security perceptions, whereas the “security” side of the labor 
institution still does not function well enough to improve workers’ security perceptions. 
Due to the potential link between women’s precarious employment situation and their 
job security perceptions, researchers and policy makers would be advised to consider 
how to address men’s and women’s “fundamentally different experiences” of the labor 
market (Lewis and Plomien, 2009). Although this research begins to investigate the 
effects of more diverse “security” policies on workers’ security perceptions (such as the 
welfare state index rather than only ALMP and PLMP), future researchers should 
explore more contextual or policy factors and other cultural mechanisms that may 






Chapter 7. Conclusion 
I. The Classification of Flexicurity 
 
Table 7-1. Flexicurity Matrix by the Level of Flexibility and Security 
     Table 7-1 provides a three by three matrix of flexicurity, according to the level of 
flexibility and security (divided at the 25th percentile and 75th percentiles of EPL and 
LMP55) ; this matrix presents nine possible flexicurity combinations. From this table, it 
is interesting that only the Netherlands and Finland are located in the high flexibility-
high security cell. On the other hand, while Denmark and the Netherlands are usually 
identified as the two successful models for flexicurity, Denmark is actually located in 
                                                     
55 LMP indicates the total amount of ALMP and PLMP, which suggests a country’s total expenditures 





the medium flexibility-high security type. This classification also reminds us of one 
important result: though high flexibility-high security is argued to be beneficial for 
labor markets outcomes (such as total employment rates and individual employment 
probabilities), moderate flexibility may be more advantageous for earnings equality. 
For example, as shown in Figure 5-1, very low EPL is negatively associated with high 
wage dispersion (measured by a 90/10 ratio). In contrast, countries with moderate 
flexibility or low flexibility seem to perform better in regard to earnings equality. This 
matrix also indicates us that a more refined classification of flexicurity systems need to 
be developed in the future. 
 
II. A Summary of Findings 
Flexicurity is a major labor-market strategy adopted by the European Union (EU) 
Commission. While EU Commission staff members have firmly asserted that 
flexicurity will enhance gender equality, there is still little literature that has addressed 
this issue with quantitative methods. Consequently, the major purpose of this study is 
to examine the effects of flexicurity on gender equality using quantitative methods. 
      Therefore, this research intends to identify the effects of flexicurity policies on 





that stricter labor market regulation will hurt females’ (or other outsiders’) employment 
prospects because the employee usually is reluctant to hire these groups with higher 
labor costs. Following this logic, the deregulation will even be beneficial for gender 
equality, because the looser labor market regulation will encourage employers to hire 
females and other minority groups. Consequently, the most important theoretical 
question in this research that needs to be answered is: does flexibilization (or 
deregulation) hurt or benefit females’ employment prospects compared to males’?   
In the first section, the effects of flexicurity policies on five labor market 
outcomes are examined. Though overall EPL is positively associated with females’ 
probability of holding a part-time job more than males’, and regular EPL and temporary 
EPL are positively associated with females’ likelihood of holding a temporary job (as 
predicted), but overall EPL and regular EPL reduce women’s chance of holding a 
female-type job more than men’s. Taken together, EPL does not necessarily exacerbate 
gender inequality in labor market. 
As for the gender interaction with ALMP, it is positively associated with females’ 
employment probabilities more than it is for males’, is negatively associated with 
females’ probabilities of holding part-time jobs more than males’, and is negatively 





Judging from these results, ALMP seems beneficial for gender equality because it 
decreases females’ probabilities of engagement in atypical work and female-type jobs. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that more protective regulation is not necessarily 
as harmful for female employment prospects as the deregulation discourse predicted. 
In other words, the deregulation camp cannot advocate deregulation in the name of 
pursuing gender equality. These findings also lend support to Dieckhoff and Steiber’s 
(2015) work; they found that men benefited more clearly from stricter employment 
protection than did women, while the neo-classical model asserts that protective labor 
market institutions are detrimental for labor market outsiders (such as women). They 
also found that the deregulation of temporary contracts does not more adversely affect 
women than it does men. However, the MWSI is positively associated with employment 
and female-type job possibilities (as predicted by the welfare state paradox), but 
negatively associated with part-time jobs probabilities. Taken together, the effects of 
MWSI are still mixed. 
     As for the second part, I found that gender earnings differentials are less 
pronounced in countries with more developed MWSI. However, when estimating 
gender earnings with percentiles of earnings, the effects of MWSI become negative. In 





relative to men’s, but not is positively associated with women’s relative position in the 
earnings distribution compared to men. On the other hand, stricter EPL did not 
positively associated with women’s annual earnings compared to men’s, and is even 
negatively associated with females’ earning percentile relative to men. Being aware of 
the different contributors to gender earnings gaps is important because the different 
causes may result in different policy implications. Consequently, creating a more equal 
wage structure, such as strengthening the negotiating power of unions, is the most 
critical measure for enhancing gender equality with regard to earnings’ ranks.   
As for the third part, job security perception, this research intends to distinguish 
EPL for regular contracts from EPL for temporary contracts. Most previous studies 
addressed only the influences of overall EPL. Only temporary EPL has significant 
effects on job security perceptions. Furthermore, the gender interaction with EPL was 
only found in the interaction between female and overall EPL. However, while the 
major coefficient on overall EPL is still negatively associated with workers’ job security 
perceptions, the magnitude of decline in female workers’ job security is smaller than 
male workers’. 
Besides, ALMP was not found to be significantly associated with any of the 





employment security (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Chung and Oorschot, 2011), and 
PLMP can decrease job-loss worry (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). However, 
Ebralidze (2012) also did not find a significant influence of PLMP on job-loss worry. 
Taken together, the results are still mixed and further studies are needed.  
      Furthermore, this research is the first to explore the effects of “combination 
security” (measured by MWSI) on individual workers’ perceptions of job-loss worry. 
This research finds a significant interaction between MWSI and gender, but it suggests 
that more developed welfare state policies are related to higher females’ job-loss worry 
compared to males’. This finding seems consistent with the “welfare state paradox” 
again: higher levels of welfare state intervention is positively associated with women’s 
likelihood of employment, but not into desirable and powerful positions. At the same 
time, this may also be because women’s caring responsibilities remain greater than 
men’s, and more developed welfare state polices result in greater employer 
discrimination against women (Nordli Hansen, 1995; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; 
Bergmann, 2008). The “flexibility” side of the labor institution exerts more negative 
effects on female workers’ security perceptions, whereas the “security” side of the labor 






III. Concluding Remarks and Future Research 
     Besides, there are still some questions that need to be addressed. First, this 
research is intended to introduce some East Asian countries (i.e., Korea, Japan, and 
Taiwan), while most of the research in this area has only included European countries. 
However, this research does not find that those East Asia countries are significantly 
different from other welfare regimes, although most of them present relatively low 
welfare state interventions, low ALMP and PLMP, and moderate EPL. Consequently, 
the effects of flexicurity policies on different welfare regimes need further investigation 
in the future.  
Second, due to data limitations, this research can not capture transition types or 
discrete different of transitions, such as integrative transitions (referring to job-to-job 
transitions, from a fixed-term job to a permanent job and re-entry into employment), or 
exclusionary transitions (referring to exit out of employment). While a number of 
assessments report transition rates with descriptive statistics, more extensive research 
and more complex methods would be necessary to consider the effects of flexicurity 
policies on transition rates. Subsequently, because the effects of ALMP on labor market 
outcomes with regard to gender equality remain still being mixed and inconsistent, it 





      In conclusion, this dissertation is the first work to consciously examine how 
flexicurity policies influence gender equality in labor market policies using two very 
high quality micro datasets: the LIS and ISSP data. Also, this dissertation found that 
more developed flexicurity policies (such as higher EPL and ALMP) may not 
necessarily be harmful for women’s employment prospects in the labor market. This 
conclusion also can challenge previous literature on the deregulation orthodoxy, which 
suggests that a higher EPL is not necessarily harmful for women and other outsiders in 
the labor market. Finally, this work is also the first work to consciously examine the 
effects of flexicurity policies on the gender earnings gaps, and found that higher level 
flexicurity policies are correlated with lower gender earnings differentials. Gender 
earnings differentials are less in countries with moderate EPL (such as Denmark and 
the Netherlands) than in the liberal countries, suggesting that moderate levels of EPL 
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